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Abstract 
This thesis seeks to demonstrate the presence of a 
social structure based on the organisation of relationships 
in a group of preschool children. Analyses of interaction 
frequencies indicate the presence of four distinct friendship 
groups. Analyses based on semantic classifications of acts 
(mainly speech) were undertaken and these demonstrated that 
children do establish mutually meaningful interactions by which 
differential relationships are expressed. This is achieved 
through the selective use by the children of inclusive and 
exclusive behaviours whose distribution was found to conform 
to the distribution of interaction frequencies. It is argued 
that these behaviours provide the constitutive bases of the 
observed social structure by maintaining distinctions in inter- 
relationships. Subsequent analyses of pronominal references 
indicated that different degrees of mutual involvement are 
actively sought by children. 
It is thus demonstrated that children are interested in 
the formation and maintenance of relationships per se and this 
leads to the conclusion that psychological research in this 
area has been constrained by the imposition of excessively 
restrictive paradigms. The social capacities of the young 
child have thereby been underestimated. Most research has 
tended to consider children's relationships within an analytic 
framework based on individual acts (e.g. Social Learning 
Theory) or individual cognitions (e.g. Piagetian Theory). 
This thesis concludes with the assertion that relationships 
evade explication within a paradigm that only allows for a 
study of the individual. 
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CHAPTER 1: EARLY RELATIONSHIPS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY 
"The fundamental fact of human existence is 
man with man . " 
(Buber, 1947) 
I Introduction 
In traditional psychological theories, human co- 
existence is viewed as bi- phasic. The goals of the 
young child and those of society are initially apart, 
be t..& 
perhaps even antithetical, this dichotomyAresolved by a 
process of induction called socialisation; i.e. the child 
renounces his personal goals, wishes etc. and assumes 
those of society as if they were his own. 
A view of the relationship between the young child 
and society as essentially dichotomous has been approached 
in radically different ways by different psychological 
theories, the descriptions varying as a function of the 
degree or nature of initial 'sociality' ascribed to the 
young child. However, all rest upon the same basic 
premise that the child learns to co -exist with his fellow 
man such that socialisation becomes a "grafting process" 
(Tonkin, 1982; page 245). The learning theory child is 
asocial, the Freudian child narcissistic, the Piagetian 
child egocentric. Indeed a thematic affinity can be 
perceived between egocentrism and narcissism;both Q-- 
o» tke. 13a4 -1- of NI- c1-"-d 
definitionally predicated upon a postulated inabilityAto 
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differentiate between self and other. Piaget (1929) 
acknowledges this affinity, referring to narcissism as 
"absolute egocentricity" (page 175). All of these 
theories assume an initial self -interest that in some 
way conflicts with mutual or social interest. The null 
hypothesis is both proposed and assumed. The individual 
and the social are initially apart, the former marked by 
an initial state of ignorance of the latter. 
The young child is on the threshold of society, a 
monolith that is subjectively apart and distinct from 
him. Thus Piaget (Piaget and Inhelder, 1969) asserts an 
identity between the "objectivization of the symbol and a 
socialization of the self" (page 129). Similarly, 
Bandura (1977) asserts that "successful socialization 
requires gradual substitution of symbolic and internal 
controls for external sanctions and demands" (page 43). 
We see here both theorists referring to symbolism as a 
tool of early thought. Piaget (e.g. 1951) argues that 
symbolism is the tool of pre- logical thought and is 
replaced by the word or the sign, the tool of logical 
thought. Freud (e.g. 1913) similarly describes 
symbolism as primitive thought, further asserting that it 
pervades the life span of the individual. The illogical 
(id) co- exists with the logical (ego), therein producing 
the need for repression and symbolism as the vehicle of 
expression of unconscious and socially unacceptable 
thoughts, viz. during dreams. But the point to be made 
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here is that all three theories use the term symbolism 
(though in radically different ways) to describe a 
particular form of early or primitive thought which is 
self -referenced and hence, an integral part of the 
initial dichotomy between child and society. 
Socialisation is viewed as a progression from 
thinking in terms of 'me' to thinking in terms of 'we', 
though the interpretive frameworks within which this 
progression is described are theoretically distinct. 
Indeed, in both Freudian and Piagetian theory, formative 
episodes are described in dynamic terms as reactions to 
conflict. The criterial features of Freud's stages of 
development are defined in terms of psychosexual crises. 
Cognitive decentration is similarly a reaction to a crisis, 
i.e. the challenge posed by the external world and the 
subjective autonomy of the other. Adages such as 
'Spare the rod and spoil the child' reflect fundamental 
attitudes towards childhood that receive formal expression 
in psychological theories. 
The view that the young child is subjectively apart 
from others (i.e., not 'socialised') and that this 
distinction is resolved within a determinist framework 
has exercised a profound influence on research on early 
peer relationships. This is pertinent insofar as learning 
and cognitive theories are conce rrEd since most research 
on preschool peer interactions is conducted and inter- 
preted within their respective paradigms. The individual 
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rather than the inter -individual, is studied with a view 
to gleaning developmental changes. Hence, differences 
between adult relationships and those of young children 
are sought, rather than continuities, the guiding 
assumption being that developmental constraints preclude 
continuity. Moreover, if the child is assumed to be 
initially presocial, then the child /society antithesis 
will necessarily be resolved within a deterministic 
framework simply because the child is not intrinsically 
pre -disposed to being 'social'. This view is reflected 
in the research on early relationships of cognitive and 
learning theorists which is considered below. 
II Learning Theory 
In learning theory, explanations of ontogenesis rest 
upon a premise of extra -psychic determinism. Kuhn (1978) 
asserts that there are three axioms constituting the 
theoretical basis of this approach: 
i) overt behaviour is to be studied rather 
than hypothetical internal structures 
ii) behaviour is reducible to discrete units 
iii) behaviour is controlled by external 
stimuli. 
Socialisation is thus viewed as a quantitative 
process, the child's behaviour with peers,,the net result 
of cumulative stimulus- response bonds. The strength of 
a bond is determined by contiguity and reinforcement 
contingencies. Selectively applied reinforcement 
patterns determine differential rates of emission of 
socially acceptable versus unacceptable behaviours, 
thereby giving "meanings" (Bijou, 1970; page 45) to 
stimuli and responses. 
According to some learning theorists, behaviour is 
explicable in terms of causal chains of antecedent 
stimuli and responses. Raush (1965) argues that an 
interaction can be explained contingently in terms of a 
causal chain of individual acts that generates a deter- 
minative sequence to the interaction: 
"the major determinant of an act was the 
immediately preceding act. Thus, if you 
want to know what child B will do, the best 
single predictor is what child A did to B 
the moment before." (page 492) 
This approach necessarily means that 'cause' can be 
defined statistically in terms of differential probabili- 
ties. Thus Patterson (1974) writes in a study of family 
interaction patterns of an aggressive child that 
"some aspects of the behaviour of one person 
constitute stimuli whose occurrence was 
associated with alteration in the probability 
of occurrence of certain social behaviours in 
the other." (page 900) 
Social learning theorists argue that learning 
experiences derived from situations that antecede the 
ongoing interaction also exercise an influence (e.g. 
Bandura, 1977; Bandura, 1981; Mischel, 1973; Vasta, 
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1976). Thus, a determinative role is ascribed to 
cognition, mediational processes conceived in terms of 
internal representations of external events. Hence the 
nature of cognition is extrinsically determined by one's 
own experiences and further, by observations of the 
experiences of others (i.e., models). Though the 
addition of cognition to the theoretical model presents 
a more complex view of children's interactions, the 
thesis of extra -psychic determinism remains constant, as 
well as the focus on the individual child in investiga- 
tions of relationships. Kuhn (1978) refers to social 
learning theory as a "submodel' within the more general 
mechanistic model" (page 97). Previous experiences of 
others' or of one's own will generate behavioural 
expectancies that determine responses in future relevant 
situations. For example, the consequences of an act 
experienced by a model are all -important in determining 
whether or not imitation will occur. Exposure to a 
model experiencing pleasurable consequences will foster 
imitation, its converse will inhibit it. Further, 
models exercise differential degrees of influence 
according to their social importance, thus peers are 
particularly influential in the social development of the 
young child (e.g., Bandura, 1977). 
Bandura (1981) and Mischel (1973) have referred to 
the influence these learned associations exercise on 
behaviour in information processing terms. For example, 
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Bandura (1981) asserts the importance of a concept of 
self -efficacy in personal relations, this in turn the 
result of the consequences of one's interactions with 
the environment: 
"Self referent thought is initially derived 
from action and observational learning from 
occurrences of environmental events. The 
experiences arising from children's commerce 
with their environment provide the initial 
basis for development of a sense of personal 
efficacy." (page 211) 
Social comparison processes are engaged in, 
initially in the family, and later in relationships with 
peers. A complex model of determinism thus emerges, 
conceptions of self -efficacy determining choice of peers 
as friends and the relationships themselves validating 
and developing the nature of self -referent thought. 
Research in early relationships is conducted within 
a reductionist framework; the nature of an interaction is 
often explained in terms of acts emitted causing acts 
received, hence the focus on individual emission of 
behaviour in studies of the inter- personal. Act emitted 
determines act received such that children emitting 
reinforcing behaviours are more likely to be the recipient 
of reinforcing behaviours. Conversely, children 
emitting negative behaviours are more likely to receive 
negative behaviours (Charlesworth and Hartup, 1967; 
Strain and Shores, 1977; Masters and Furnam, 1981; Kohn, 
1966). Interaction is often described in terms of 
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behavioural units linked together in a pattern of 
reciprocal determinism and a degree of 'inverted' agency 
is thereby ascribed to the young child in his relation- 
ships, e.g. "Thus children's behaviour patterns tend to 
set the occasion for that kind of social approach that 
validates, in a sense, their own approach to peers" 
(Strain and Shores, 1977, page 493). 
Strain and Shores (1977) discuss the importance of 
"developing positive reciprocal interaction" (page 493), 
reciprocity in turn defined as "dyadic interaction in 
which persons A and B reinforce each other at an equitable 
rate" (page 495). Quantity is studied in isolation from 
quality with the assumption that it functions as cause. 
For example, Strain, Shores and Timm (1977) designed a 
program to increase socially isolated children's 
frequency of interaction by rendering teacher reinforcement 
contingent on the emission of positive social behaviours. 
However, frequency of social behaviours returned to base- 
line level on post -experimental observations, thus 
suggesting that contingencies inherent in the experimental 
situation did not effect change within the child himself. 
Others have attempted to increase interaction frequencies 
through exposing children to videotapes of child models 
receiving reinforcement when interacting with peers 
(Jakibchuk and Smeriglio, 1976; Keller and Carlson, 1974). 
Within a model of determinism, there logically has to be 
some 'Prime Cause' that gave rise to the state of social 
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isolation in the first place. 
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Peer interaction is determined not only by social 
contingencies but also by physical contingencies. 
Bullock and Merrill (1980) argue that activity preferences 
exercise a determinative influence on the nature of the 
behaviour engaged in. Activities are "behaviour 
settings" that "produce systematic changes in those who 
are repeatedly exposed to them" (page 808). Hence, the 
activity is the independent variable, the child 
conversely, the dependent variable. Such an-approach 
bears implications that extend beyond the statistical 
analysis of data to reflect the theoretical perspective 
within which the research is being conducted, i.e., the 
assumption of determinism. 
Bullock's and Merrill's hypothesis was confirmed for 
a class of nine year old boys (but not for the girls in 
the class). A relationship between aggression scores and 
activity preference scores emerged on re- testing at the 
end of the year but not when the tests were initially 
administered at the beginning of the year. Bullock and 
Merrill argue that the relationship between the variables 
is "time- lagged" (page 811). Act is sepàrated from 
actor. The relationships existing between children at 
the beginning and end of the year is not even addressed 
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though the aggression score is (a) based on peer assessment 
and, (b) specifically deals with aggression in the context 
of interactions e.g., "Who does things to bother and 
annoy others ? ", "Who pushes and shoves others out of the 
way" (page 809). Degree of acquaintanceship could 
account for the differential results yielded at the 
beginning and end of the year; i.e., the children knew 
each other better at the end of the year than at the 
beginning. Thus, an explanation could be that the 
children developed relationships with each other over the 
rafts -e-r sTa -re d 
yeas than the alternative one: "variables which show no 
synchronous relationship may nevertheless show time- 
lagged relationships (page 811). However, Bullock and 
Merrill conclude within a deterministic framework, ascrib- 
ing cause to activity rather than individuals: 
"From genetics we know that a set of 
independently assorted factors interactively 
determines a self -regulated embryological 
process. Similarly, a diversely based set 
of preferences may determine a pattern of 
situational time allocation which leads to a 
specific course of psychological development." 
(pages 813 -814) 
The above reflects a determinist view which is 
described succinctly by Blasi (1980): 
"human action, like any other event, is caused 
by a finite number of elements and their 
interactions. Examples of elements are genes, 
stimulus -response associations, attitudes, and 
traits. In many cases, the situation is part 
of the elementary units that produce action" 
(page 4) 
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This view constitutes an interpretive framework, both 
analytically and methodologically. In the above -cited 
Bullock and Merrill study, what is an intrinsically human 
characteristic and is manifest in relationships, is 
'treated' as an intrinsic feature of a situation, i.e., 
the activity is the independent variable and the behaviour, 
the dependent variable. Caùse is therein ascribed to a 
physical situation rather than to individuals and their 
relationships. 
Heuristic categories of organization in themselves 
can reflect the interpretive framework encapsulating the 
behaviours of interest. Bullock and Merrill designed an 
aggression inventory in which items were rated on a nine 
point scale by graduate students: 
"Our instructions directed them to base their 
ratings on tenets of social learning theory 
and their knowledge of change- inducing events." 
(page 811) 
However, activities itemized in the inventory differ in 
terms of degree of structure and degree of interpersonal 
contact involved, not to mention the fact that some of the 
activities presented are of a rather sedentary nature. 
More contact between individuals necessarily means that 
both aggressive and affiliative behaviours are more likely 
to occur. Thus it is different types of social 
situations that are also being juxtaposed in the 
aggression inventory: e.g., 'Playing leapfrog (4.81) 
versus singing songs (2.38)', 'Building model cars (3.06) 
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versus playing basketball (6.75)', 'Hanging around down- 
town with some friends (6.50) versus practising on a 
guitar (2.19)' (in brackets are the aggression ratings the 
different activities received). These activities are 
differentiated on the criteria of 'aggression- conduciveness', 
aggression thereby caused by the activity per se rather 
than the relationships occurring within these activities. 
In Masters and Furman's study (1981), the relation- 
ship between popularity and friendship selection in four to 
five year old children was studied in terms of the 
following three categories of behaviour: 
(i) A priori reinforcement, e.g., giving help, gifts, 
smiling, laughing, compliance, cooperative play etc. 
(ii) A priori punishment: Non compliance, rejection, 
insults, quarrelling, attack etc. 
(iii) A priori neutral: All behaviours not included in 
the above two categories, e.g., conversation, 
associative play. 
All of the above categories :4R471;kre 
the effect of an act upon the other. While the 'punish- 
ment' category is less problematic, :tlQ._ »í.sc4,5 
behaviours into 'reinforcement' and 'neutral' categories 
is fraught with difficulties. The term 'reinforcement' 
presumably refers to a rewarding event, the term 
'neutral' to an event that is 'neither here nor there' 
insofar as the recipient of the act is concerned. 
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Theoretically, the categories should be associated with 
differential probabilities of continued interaction, the 
behaviours in the reinforcement category the most likely 
to produce a sustained interaction. This issue was not 
even addressed though the heuristic value of these 
categories as measures of peer interactions rests upon 
the outcome of such an analysis. It is therefore poss- 
ible that socially distinct behaviours (in terms of out- 
come) may have been classified as functionally equivalent 
or, conversely, that socially similar behaviours were 
classified as functionally distinct. Moreover, rates of 
'receiving' and 'dispensing' behaviours within these 
categories were coded separately, thus we don't know 
their pattern of distribution within an interaction. 
Indeed, this limitation is acknowledged by the authors. 
All of the studies discussed are based on learning 
paradigms extracted from the laboratory and applied to 
'real life' since the principles of learning should, 
theoretically, be constant across contexts. All 
approach the interpersonal in terms of individual 
emission of behaviour, the underlying assumption being 
that an interaction is the additive result of behavioural 
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units linked together within a thesis of reciprocal 
determinism. However, while environmental and social 
contingencies are amenable to control within an environment 
created by the experimenter, the same degree of control 
cannot be exercised in a nursery, for example. Categories 
such as reinforcement or Masters and Furman's category 
'neutral', will cover such a vast array of behaviours that 
it becomes impossible to gauge qualitative processes that 
are doubtless differentially operative in different 
relationships. This necessarily reduces the explanatory 
power of the learning theory paradigm. Indeed, Hinde 
(1979) writes: 
"If the learning paradigms are applied to 
real -life situations, it is important to 
remember that one is dealing with paradigms 
and not with processes." (page 206) 
Masters and Furman note that actual rates of engaging 
in reinforcing or neutral acts are not related to specific 
friendship selection though they are related to popularity. 
This finding suggests that relationships are too complex 
for explication in causal chains of act and response. 
Children choose specific friends independently of each 
other though the tenets of learning theory would lead us 
to predict that certain children would be more desirable 
friends for all in the nursery simply because they engage 
more frequently in reinforcing behaviours. Observing 
others interacting with these popular children and 
experiencing pleasurable consequences should motivate 
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observers to interact with these children. Popularity 
and friendship selection are distinct. This finding 
escapes explanation within a learning theory paradigm: 
"General rates of dispensing reinforcement 
or neutral acts were not related to specific 
friendship selection. Thus vicarious 
processes, such as observation of a child's 
behaviour towards other classmates, do not 
seem to play a major role in determining 
which children are selected as liked. 
Instead, the selection of liked peers was 
more related to a subject's own interaction 
with individual peers." (page 348) 
Indeed, if we think of our own relationships, this 
finding makes sense. For example, someone known to 
several people may be acknowledged by all to be well -liked, 
i.e., popular, but that does not necessarily mean that 
everyone is great friends with him. As noted in the 
introduction to this chapter, children are assumed to have 
qualitatively different types of relationships than adults. 
Thus differences are sought rather than continuities. 
Indeed, mediational processes are much more vaguely 
defined in social learning theory than in cognitive 
theory. We know that they are extrinsically determined 
and based on learned associations but how are they opera- 
tive in day -to -day existence? Bandura (1981) writes that 
"modeling displays convey information about the nature of 
environmental tasks, the difficulties they present, and 
the predictability of environmental events" (page 208). 
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However,'information'covers a multiplicity of discrimina- 
tive stimuli that will be differentially salient to 
different children, hence associated 'difficulties' and 
'predictability of environmental events' will also vary 
across children. The generalizability of the paradigm 
to children's daily interactions has not been demonstrated. 
For example, Bandura et al (1963) demonstrated in their 
classic study on aggression that young children were more 
likely to imitate a model receiving rewarding consequences 
yet this experiment was conducted in an experimental 
context with a 'Bobo doll' the target of aggression. 
Hartup and Coates (1967) found that preschool subjects 
exposed to an altruistic peer model displayed more 
altruism (as reflected in the allocation of trinkets) than 
peers not exposed to a model. However, it is not clear 
how principles of learning operative within an experimental 
context are similarly operative in say, a nursery in 
which, as stated above, children will be responding 
differentially to a multiplicity of discriminative stimuli 
outwith the experimenter's control and, possibly, appre- 
hension. Within any nursery, a child may witness a peer 
being rewarded for an aggressive act, i.e., he gets the 
disputed object, yet imitation is not necessarily going 
to occur. Further, we don't know that a child's striking 
the Bobo doll constitutes an aggressive act per se. For 
example, it is not unusual to observe young children 
engage in 'rough and tumble' play, yet the intensity of 
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the physical contact involved does not in itself render 
the interaction aggressive. Similarly, equitable 
distribution of trinkets may occur in an experimental 
context on exposure to a peer model yet children don't 
necessarily imitate the prosocial behaviours of peers in 
their nursery. Indeed, Vasta (1976) notes: 
"Although feedback effects seem to transfer 
to similar tasks, they probably do not 
transfer to tasks of a different nature." 
(page 106) 
It does appear that the paradigm adopted by learning 
theorists to study rearly relationships is excessively 
constraining. The assumption that the same basic 
principles operative in the laboratory can also be 
isolated as operative in real life contexts neglects the 
factor that interactions occur within specific social 
contexts created by the relationships existing between 
children. This is indeed strikingly illustrated in the 
results of Masters' and Furman's (1981) study in which 
children were found to be differentially responsive to 
peers within their nursery. Theorized causal links 
between behaviour emitted and behaviour received cannot 
account for the high degree of selectivity that children 
display in their interactions with each other. As 
Manning (1981) writes: 
"It is necessary to assess their meaning in 
the context in which they occur." (page 153) 
A rigidly deterministic thesis and a neglect of social 
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context thus diminish the explanatory power of the learning 
theory paradigm in its investigations of early relation- 
ships. 
III Cognitive Theory 
In cognitive theory, ontogenesis rests upon a 
premise of intra- psychic determinism. Mediational 
processes are therefore intrinsically determined. 
Development is described as a progression of sequentially 
invariant stages characterized by increasing differentia- 
tion of cognitive structures. The organization of 
cognition conforms to logico- mathematical principles (e.g. 
Piaget and Inhelder, 1969; Furth, 1978; Selman, 1976). 
For example, Piaget and Inhelder write: 
"When he reaches the level of operations, he 
will by that very fact be capable of cooperation." 
(page 129) 
(Cooperation presupposes a knowledge of reversible opera- 
tions.) Hence, the assertion that development conforms 
to an invariant sequence of stages is a necessary result 
of this primary assumption. Feldman and Toulmin (1975) 
address this issue, writing: 
"Many contemporary psychologists . . . argue 
for the existence of characteristic 'stages' 
in cognitive development. The Piagetians, 
for example, characterize each of these 
stages in terms of a set of 'formal 
structures'; they claim that the relation- 
ships between the characteristics of 
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successive stages are themselves logical 
relationships, being based on 'logical 
inclusion'. Thus, it is by now widely 
accepted that there is a compulsory 
sequence of developmental stages through 
which all children must pass in the same 
order, and that each stage in this sequence 
is characterized by the existence in the 
child's mind of corresponding 'mental 
structures'." (pages 409 -410) 
The explication of ontogenesis in terms of structures 
and stages is, of course, an anathema to learning theorists 
since their theoretical framework definitionally excludes 
such a possibility. The concept of cognitive structura- 
lization following a developmental sequence necessarily 
means that internal states circumscribe the potential 
breadth of experience whereas in learning theory the 
inverse held, the breadth of potential experience is 
predicated upon external contingencies. This distinction 
is fundamental. Indeed, the essential difference between 
the quantitative and qualitative approaches is manifest in 
their contrastive interpretations of functionally similar 
events: 
"During exposure observers acquire mainly 
symbolic representations of the modeling 
activities which serve as guides for appro- 
priate performances." 
(Bandura, 1977; page 24, my emphasis) 
"But though he imitates what he observes, 
and believes in perfect good faith that he 
is playing like the others, the child 
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thinks of nothing at first but of utilizing 
these new acquisitions for himself. He 
plays in an individualistic manner with 
material that is social. Such is 
egocentrism." (Piaget, 1932; page 33; 
my emphasis) 
In social learning theory, exposure to a model is in 
itself a sufficient condition for imitation to occur 
whereas this is a theoretical impossibility in cognitive 
theory. As Youniss (1978) writes: 
"The other's behaviour does not flow in 
pure form into the child because the child 
cognitively acts on it and transforms it 
in order to incorporate it." (page 205) 
Social development is governed by cognitive develop- 
ment and is therefore part of an epistemological process, 
e.g., "the child discovers people in exactly the same way 
as he discovers things" (Piaget, 1926, page 272). The 
child's capacity for interpersonal relations is 
predicated upon certain immutable invariants, the prima 
facie example being egocentrism which is preSumea- 
topervade all aspects of the young child's life. Piaget 
(1 929) describes it as "ontological" (page 189), writing 
elsewhere (1926) that "Social ego -centrism may be 
recognized as a particular form of epistemic ego- centrism" 
(page 272, my emphasis). 
Piaget therefore explains social development in terms 
of the decline of the primacy of the ego. Indeed he 
argues (1932) that the genesis of 'personality' lies within 
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the interpersonal sphere. Awareness of self presupposes 
awareness of other: 
"cooperation is really a factor in the creation 
of personality, if by personality we mean, not 
the unconscious self of childish egocentrism, 
nor the anarchical self of egoism in general, 
but the self that takes up its stand on the 
norms of reciprocity and objective discussion, 
and knows how to submit to these in order to 
make itself respected. Personality is thus 
the opposite of the ego." (page 91) 
Children under seven years old (i.e., at the preoperational 
stage) are essentially presocial; Piaget (1926) asserts 
that "there is no real social life between children of 
less than seven or eight years" (page 40). Egocentrism 
precludes awareness of the subjective autonomy of the 
other, hence the child's "minimum of socialization" 
(Piaget and Inhelder, 1969, page 117). Early interactions 
are fragile and marked by an absence of a desire to 
communicate, "the child under seven thinks egocentrically, 
even in the society of others" (Piaget, 1926; page 40). 
Thus Piaget argues that at presch000l age, individual and 
social life are not really differentiated. 
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tion of input ", ( Piaget and Inhelder, 1969, page 6)), 
encapsulated within rites or symbols that are subjectively 
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(internally) defined and maintained. Conversely, play 
activities based on accommodation require that personal 
will be superseded by the demands of external reality 
( "modification of internal schemes to fit reality" 
(Piaget and Inhelder, 1969, page 6)), encapsulated within 
rules that are objectively (externally) defined and 
maintained, i.e., games with rules. Indeed, this 
distinction between symbols /rites and rules is central to 
the Piagetian thesis on the development of interpersonal 
relations. 
Symbols are the tools of fantasy, rendering the child 
a master of an illusory reality. "Just as he makes his 
own truth, so he makes his own reality" (Piaget, 1929; 
page 189). Because symbols are the tools of intra- psychic 
activity (of "ludic assimilation" (Piaget, 1951; page 119) 
and are therein subjectively based, Piaget (1951) does not 
view collective symbolic play as more socially significant 
than Individual symbolic play: 
"We shall not make an essential distinction 
between individual symbolic games and those 
involving two or more persons. Symbolism 
begins, indeed, with individual behaviours 
which enable imitation to be interiorised 
. . and symbolism involving more than one 
makes little change in the structure of the 
first symbols." (page 112) 
Piaget (Piaget and Inhelder, 1969) argues that the 
child's social world consists of "two very distinct 
realities" (page 116) comprised of his relationships with 
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adults and those with peers. The two are functionally 
distinct, relationships with adults serving an essentially 
didactic function (e.g. cultural, moral etc.) and thus 
not characterized by reciprocity. True interpersonal 
relationships develop from interactions with peers which 
force the child to coordinate his viewpoint with those of 
others in order for true communication to occur. Piaget 
and Inhelder (1969) describe this process as "reciprocal 
socialization" (page 116); however, it is not clear how 
experience interacts with cognition. For example, in an 
earlier work Piaget (1926) asserts that "the fact of being 
or of not being communicable is not an attribute which can 
be added to thought from the outside, but is a constitu- 
tive feature of profound significance for the shape and 
structure which reasoning may assume." In later writings, 
Piaget (e.g. Piaget and Inhelder, 1969) similarly explains 
the interpersonal in terms of intra- individual change 
engendered by cognitive growth and differentiation. What 
type of social experiences are important and how they 
directly interact with cognitive development is not 
explained. Thus, Light (1979) writes that "in practice 
he has tended to preserve the isolated individual 
approach which has so frequently characterized the study 
of cognitive development" (page 6). The interpersonal is 
ultimately the result of intra- personal processes. 
Piaget's influence on the study of children's 
relationships has been pervasive, generating a large body 
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of research that has investigated the development of 
friendships within his cognitive framework. Thus the 
assumption that the development of the inter -individual 
is predicated upon intra- individual processes is 
intrinsic to their approach and the theme of intra- psychic 
determinism thereby remains constant. A child's interpre- 
tation of, and subsequent response to, any social event is 
therefore determined by his present level of cognitive 
development. Two Piagetian premises are central to their 
research: 
(i) the structure of the preschool child's actions 
upon his social world are isomorphic with those 
upon his physical world (e.g. Selman, 1976; 
Broughton, 1978) 
(ii) the preschool child is egocentric (e.g. Youniss, 
1978; Livesley and Bromley, 1973) 
Many theorists assert that the child's growing 
awareness of others confovms to an invariant sequence of 
stages (e.g. Selman, 1980; Bigelow, 1978; Kohlberg, 1969; 
Damon, 1983;). Indeed Selman and Jaquette (1977) succinctly 
captures the interpretive framework within which children's 
awareness of their relationships is placed in his following 
assertion: 
"It is the developmentalist's task to chart 
progression in understanding of each of those 
processes as it goes through an ontogenetic 
sequence of cognitive stages." (page 267) 
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A stage -like model necessarily means that a child's 
potential range of interpretive responses to any social 
event will necessarily be circumscribed within the limits 
set by his present level of cognitive development. 
According to Selman (1977; 1980; 1981), the preschool 
child is at Stage 0 of his theoretical framework of inter- 
personal awareness. His interpersonal relationships are 
based on physicalistic connections, his friend being 
whomever he happens to be playing with at the moment, this 
in turn being determined by proximity. The child is aware 
of the other as a physical entity but not as an independent 
psychological entity. Interactions are viewed as getting 
what one wants, wants referring to physical objects (e.g. 
a bicycle) rather than desire for friendship. This stage 
endures till the age of seven when the child enters the 
preoperational stage. 
Selman's assertions are substantively consonant with 
those of other theorists working within the same interpre- 
tive framework. Using children's essays as his data 
base, Bigelow (1977) asserts that friendship expectations 
follow a sequentially invariant model comprised of three 
stages. Six year old children are at the first stage 
"situational ", defining relationships in terms of meeting 
their own needs and wants. The child's interest in the 
other is based on personal involvement in an activity, 
thus proximity is an evaluative basis of others at this 
age. Bigelow describes the friendship 'cognitions' of 
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these children as reflecting "the more superficial aspects 
of friendship" (page 251). Hayes (1977) reports similar 
findings in his investigations. Similarly, Youniss and 
Volpe (1978) see the young child's conceptions of friend- 
ship as being initially self -referenced. Younger children 
(6 to 7 years old) describe friendship in terms of 
physical aspects of the interaction, e.g. sharing toys or 
playing together. They do not apprehend peers in terms 
of personal characteristics or states. 
Youniss (1978) writes that "the child's present level 
of cognitive functioning is the basis for interpreting the 
meaning of socializing events" (page 209). As stated 
previously, the determinist thesis that the child's capacity 
for interpersonal relations is predicated upon intra- 
personal processes is a primary assumption of this approach. 
For example, Hayes entitles his study, based on verbal 
reports, "Cognitive Bases of Liking and Disliking Among 
Preschool Children ". Implicit is the assumption that 
overt expression directly corresponds to internal media - 
tional processes and further that we can study relation- 
ships through gauging the latter. Hence Damon (1983) 
writes in a chapter dealing with peer relations in his 
recent text: 
"With age, children develop a conception of 
friendship as a continuing stable relation 
that has a significance beyond the immediate 
interchange . " (page 143) 
Implicit in this research approach is the view that 
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children are providing in their verbal reports functional 
descriptions of relationships, which at the preschool 
level are believed to be physically based. Thus Youniss 
and Volpe (1978) assert that "children are able to 
translate actions into their concept of friendship as is 
shown in their agreement about which interactions signify 
friendship" (page 14). However, asking children to 
contemplate their relationships in isolated contexts may 
pose its own set of problems: 
"In the very early stages, before the child has 
developed a full awareness of language, 
language is embedded for him in the flow of 
events which accompany it. So long as this is 
the case, the child does not interpret words in 
isolation - he interprets situations" 
(Donaldson, "978, page 88) 
Verbally reflecting upon a relationship in vacuo is funda- 
mentally distinct from maintaining that relationship within 
an interaction. 
Research conducted within the area of moral reasoning 
yields a similar portrait, also asserting an initial self - 
interest. For example, Kohlberg (1969) describes stages 
of moral development based on the premise that inherent in 
socialisation is the capacity to resolve the interests of 
the self in a way that doesn't exclude the interests of 
others. Role- taking opportunities provided by the school, 
home etc. are asserted to be crucial to the child's under- 
standing of social rules (i.e., moral concerns). Accord- 
ing to Kohlberg, role -taking is definitionally implicit in 
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the term 'social': 
"the primary meaning of the word tsocial'is the 
distinctively human structuring of action and 
thought by role -taking, by the tendency to 
react to the other as someone like the self 
and by the tendency to react to the self's 
behaviour in the role of the other." (page 398) 
The interpersonal relations of the preschool child do not 
need the criteria delineated in Kohlberg's definition. 
The interests of the other are necessarily excluded from 
view by the constraints inherent in egocentrism. As 
with his conceptions of friendship, the preschool child 
apprehends the other on a physicalistic basis, actions 
judged in terms of physical consequences rather than 
psychological ones. Damon (1983), in his stages of 
justice, similarly posits the primacy of self -interest at 
the preschool level. 
A constant portrait prevails over this research, 
one moreover that is wholly consonant with that presented 
by Piaget. The concept of egocentrism is invoked as both 
cause and explanation. For example Selman (1982) 
entitles the preschool child's level of social perspective 
taking, "Egocentric or undifferentiated perspectives" 
(page 66). Youniss (1978) refers to it in aetiological 
terms as a "capacity restriction ": 
"With each step towards maturity, children are 
more able to free themselves from private 
interpretations and come closer to understanding 




As noted earlier, if an initial antithesis between 
child and society is assumed, then it follows that this 
dichotomy will be resolved within a determinist framework 
since the child must necessarily go through a specific 
process of socialisation. 
Indeed, Piagetts bifurcation of early interpersonal 
relationships into those with adults on the-one hand and 
those with peers, on the other, is similarly evident in 
the research of the theorists considered above (e.g. 
Damon, 1983; Youniss, 1978; Selman, 1982). For example, 
Selman describes young children's understanding of parent - 
child relations as 'Boss -servant' relation. Damon argues 
that children will seek each other out for companionship 
but perceive parents within a nurturant, didactic role. 
Youniss argues that they are two distinct interpersonal 
spheres, possibly sources of different types of social 
understanding. The social only really comes into being 
through interactions with peers hence the discontinuity 
between the child's experiences at home and those when he 
enters the nursery. Relationships with adults do not 
demand reciprocity and coordination of viewpoints - those 
with peers do. 
However, assertions of discontinuity in the child's 
social life may not be wholly justified. Reddy (1983) 
has demonstrated that didacticism can occur within the 
context of reciprocally structured interactions between 
parent and child. Light (1980) reports a direct 
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relationship between role -taking score and the nature of 
four year old children's relationships with their mothers. 
Children whose mothers considered them as if they were 
equals, i.e., persons in their own right, attained a 
higher score than children whose mothers viewed the 
relationship in a more authoritarian perspective. Thus 
Light asserts that maternal relationships may exercise a 
critical influence in the development of social sensitivity. 
Whilst there are obvious differences between a young child's 
relationship with his mother and those with peers, the two 
may not be functionally discrete to the extent proposed by 
Piaget and others. These findings challenge the exclusive 
emphasis placed on peer -peer relationships and on the 
acquisition of certain logical operations, e.g. reversible 
relations, in overcoming egocentrism. Further, they 
suggest that individual differences may be operative in 
childhood just as they are in adulthood: 
"In children just as in adults, it may be 
appropriate for some purposes to treat role - 
taking as a disposition, or 'habit of thinking', 
rather than a series of quasi- logical 
acquisitions. This approach naturally under- 
mines attempts at structural analysis in 
terms of developmental stages. Indeed it 
suggests that the same kinds of things which 
govern individual differences in adulthood 
may also govern comparable individual 
differences amongst children" 
(Light, 1980, page 140, 
my emphasis.) 
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Other research evidence also suggests that relation- 
ships with adults and with peers may not be discontinuous. 
Bearison and Cassel (1975) found that six year old 
children from person- oriented families (based on maternal 
reports) were more able to accommodate their communication 
to the perspective of blindfolded listeners than children 
from more authoritarian position- oriented families. 
Radin (1973) reports a direct relationship between 
paternal nurturance (e.g. meeting needs of child, asking 
information) as observed in fathers' interactions with 
their preschool sons and intellectual functioning a year 
later. Manning (1980) found a relationship between 
types of aggressive behaviours and maternal relationships 
in young children. Montagner et al (1974) have also 
demonstrated a relationship between family environment and 
aggressive expression. (This research will be discussed 
in greater detail in Chapter 3). This research suggests 
that aligning children along a developmental yardstick 
that contains implicit normative standards and performative 
expectations may place a blanket of homogeneity over 
heterogeneously distinct groups. 
The above challenges the assertion that the child's 
social world consists of two functionally discrete realms 
If, on the other hand, continuity does prevail, then when 
the child does come into contact with peers, he may not be 
as limited as has been held. The research on young 
children's relationships cited above proceeded on the 
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primary assumption that interpersonal contact is 
constrained by the limits inherent in egocentrism and 
that the ability to form true relationships is predicated 
upon intra- personal change. All examined the individual 
child abstracted from his social context yet made 
assertions about the nature of the child's functioning 
within that context. Glick (1978) asserts that social 
knowledge can only really be observed in the context 
within which it is operative: 
"Knowledge for an actor is governed as much by 
its conditions of application (Glick, 1975, 
1977) as it is by its structure as a known 
field of information. Two bodies of knowledge 
must intersect: knowledge of a domain of 
information and knowledge of the domain of 
application. Yet it is likely that applica- 
tion rules are obeyed and not 'known' as a 
cognitive object. In much the same way that 
we use appropriate syntax without being able 
to talk explicitly about grammar, or follow 
rules of conversational sequencing (Sacks, 
Schegloff, and Jefferson, 1974) without being 
able to describe them, we probably know about 
sociability without that knowledge being 
explicit. In fact, in the social domain it 
is most likely that tacit knowledge (Bransford 
and McCarrell, 1974; Franks, 1974; Turvey, 
1974) is pre -eminently important." (page 5) 
Trevarthen's (1979) research demonstrating that 
infants and mothers enter into cooperative relationships 
based on mutual regulation and control further challenges 
the assertion that intrapersonal constraints preclude 
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interpersonal contact at the preschool level. At the age 
of two months, infants can be observed engaging in 
expressive and gestural communication with their mothers, 
structured within a turn- taking dialogue. Further, when 
the mother does not respond appropriately, i.e., does not 
support or complement his communicative attempts, the 
infant becomes distressed. This interaction is only 
evident when the behaviours of both the mother and her 
infant are observed. Consideration of either in isolation 
of the other necessarily provides a distorted view of the 
interaction: 
"It emerges from complete descriptions that 
both partners exercise control." (page 544) 
Trevarthen argues that infants are born with a capacity for 
communication, that an inherent intersubjectivity - i.e. 
understanding of others - regulates cooperative interactions 
and "impels humans to cooperation in awareness and purpose" 
(page 531). Interpersonal contact is actively sought and 
maintained as a goal in itself. Further, a child can only 
realize his social capacities through contact with the 
other: 
"The intersubjectivity to be seen in the infant 
is evidently not a self- sufficient, genetically 
specified faculty. Though robust, it depends 
on complementary functions of other humans." 
(page 531) 
The research considered suggests that relationships 
evade both causal and descriptive explication in intra- 
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individualistic terms. The two present, in any event, a 
contradiction in terms, a relationship by definition 
referring to inter -individualistic processes rather than 
to internal mediational processes of isolated interactants. 
The isolated thoughts of the child tin vacuo' are being 
used as material from which theoreticians abstract his 
social world, hence abstractions are necessarily being 
made from abstractions. The methodological procedure is 
in itself intrinsically problematic. Further, the 
child's behaviour is being 'fitted' into a paradigm which 
assumes egocentrism. Hence when the child describes a 
peer in physicalistic terms, it follows that this is 
because he is subjectively unaware of the other because he 
is egocentric. As Toulmin and Feldman (1975) write: 
"the actual observed behaviour has to be 
passed through a filter of scientific inter- 
pretation before we can see whether it any 
way supports or fails to support the theoreti- 
cal claims in question. First the subject's 
actions must be scrutinized and classified as 
displaying certain systematic properties: 
only then can these interpreted properties be 
related to the theoretical mental structures 
. . . The actions of a child cannot by them- 
selves either corroborate or refute directly 
the claim that a child has any particular 
mental structure." (page 413) 
As noted above, the assertion that behaviour is ultimately 
endogeneously determined has theoretically rendered inter - 
individual processes a result of its converse such that 
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mediational processes are the focus of empirical research. 
Yet what happens when two like -minded ?thinkers? meet and 
how these internal constraints are operative within an 
interaction has not been addressed. As Glick (1978) 
writes: 
The social world is not only 'known about ?, 
it is acted within." (page 5) 
IV Considerations 
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, the 
assumption of an initial antithesis between child and 
society is central to both learning theory's cognitive 
theory's explanation of ontogenesis. An initial state of 
sovereign ignorance of the social is assumed and the 
concepts of 'tabula rasa' or 'egocentrism? are invoked to 
describe it. Moreover, if we ássume an initially pre - 
social state, then a determinist thesis is a necessary 
interpretive framework since the child is not intrinsically 
pre- disposed to being social. Where the theories 
radically differ, however, is the manner in which this 
ignorance is overcome and the dichotomy resolved, one 
seeing ontogenesis as endogeneously determined, the other 
as exogeneously determined. However, in their research 
on the friendships of young children, we may isolate the 
following commonalities: 
(i) Both have looked at friendship relations from the 
perspective of the individual, learning theorists, in terms 
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of behaviour emitted and /or received, cognitive theorists 
in terms of children's cognitions about relationships. 
However, neither have looked at how different relationships 
are established and maintained over time as is the case in 
say, a nursery. 
(ii) Both theories are marked by a quest for a unitary 
dimension that functions as both cause and explanation of 
behaviour. For example, in social learning theory, the 
same inferential processes are operative in efficacy 
appraisal in mathematical tasks as in social interactions, 
e.g., perceived competence (Bandura, 1981). Similarly, 
in Piagetian theory, the same logico- mathematical opera- 
tions underlie interactions in the interpersonal and 
impersonal sphere (e.g. Selman, 1980). 
(iii) Both approaches have adopted an interpretive frame- 
work within which differences rather than continuities 
between children are sought, learning theory within a 
quantitative framework, cognitive theory within a qualita- 
tive framework. This is, of course, an outcome of the 
child /society dichotomy. The investigation of differences 
is especially salient in the research of cognitive 
theorists whom we have seen asserting a functional 
discontinuity between children's relationships with adults 
and with peers in the socialization process. Learning 
theorists, on the other hand, argue that prior learning 
experiences do have a determinative effect on future 
behaviour, hence family relations and peer relations are 
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not discontinuous (e.g. Bandura, 1981). 
Walkerdine (1982) criticizes what she refers to as 
"certain basic psychological assumptions ", i.e. that 
individual and context can be firmly distinguished: 
"In psychology the problem is conceived in 
terms of the 'internalization' of social 
features, that is by relating the 'external' 
social dimension to the 'internal' individual 
dimension. . . My position is that this 
approach, though useful up to a point, is 
radically unable to provide the breakthrough 
which is required." (page 130) 
Scant attention has been paid to young children's 
social behaviours within their context of occurrence though 
the importance of considering social context in analyses 
of early relationships has been succinctly demonstrated 
(e.g. Trevowthen, 1979; Manning, 1980). Children do not 
engage in social behaviours in a void but within a 
mutually defined social context with particular individuals 
with whom they have particular relationships. As noted 
above, in an environment such as a nursery, children will 
be actively engaging in different relationships with 
different individuals over an extended period of time. 
Are these different relationships consistently and 
selectively maintained? 
The topic of this research endeavour, 'Preschool 
Children Within Their Social Structure' reflects my wish 
in the course of this thesis to demonstrate that children 
actively and selectively establish a social structure 
38 
based on differential relationships that are consistent 
and stable. If children do organize their relationships 
thus, then they must be actively aware of their relation- 
ships with each other in order for this organization to 
occur and to be sustained. Garfinkel (1967) argues that 
our sense of our social world is interactively maintained. 
This is the view being adopted here. As Glick (1978) 
writes: 
"The main problem of social life is not 
necessarily to emerge with a 'theory' of social 
actors. It is rather to maintain and sustain 
coherent courses of action which are related 
coherently to an interactive context." (page 5) 
Elucidating a social context based on children's organiza- 
tion of their relationships is the task of this research 
endeavour. 
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CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY 
I Subjects 
Research was based on fourteen children, five girls 
and nine boys (including two sets of twins). All 
except one child were over four years old when data 
collection commenced. The youngest child was 3.7 years. 
Pseudonyms and dates of birth for each child are presented 
in Appendix 2. The nursery was staffed by a nursery 
teacher and her assistant. Children attended classes 
from 9.00 a.m. - 12.00 p.m. and were free to engage at 
will in the various activities the nursery provided. The 
only structured activity was tstory -time' for twenty 
minutes every day. Parental occupation ranged from 
SES class 1 to 4, though heavily weighted towards class 1. 
Selection criterion for the sample was duration of 
attendance in the nursery. All the children had been in 
the nursery the previous year, with the exception of two 
who joined the nursery after the summer break. Because 
they were the same age as the other children, they were 
included in the sample. Younger children entering the nursery 
during data collection were not included since the result 
of their inclusion would have been a sample characterized 
by excessively different degrees of familiarity, not to 
mention a two -year age range. Both these factors 
necessarily need to be controlled for a study on relation- 
ships. 
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The data on which this research endeavour is based 
extends over a four -month period. By the time data 
collection commenced, the children had been together in 
the nursery for a minimum of five months. Degree of 
acquaintanceship would seem, on a purely intuitive level, 
to be essential to both methodological and theoretical 
considerations, i.e., our relationships with people we 
know well are quite different from those with whom we are 
less familiar. This is a neglected factor in research on 
early relationships. Many studies of the social 
behaviours of young children involve observations of 
dyadic interactions in pre- arranged settings without paying 
due attention to the circumstances of the encounter in 
considerations of results. Strangers are paired by virtue 
of common age or children from a class are randomly paired. 
(e.g. Rabinowitz et al, 1975; Eckerman and Whatley, 1977; 
Strain et al, 1977 ) This issue is discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 7 (pages 271-2). 
However, research has clearly demonstrated that 
previous acquaintanceship does exercise an effect on the 
course of an ongoing interaction. Indeed, this is 
strikingly illustrated in McGrew's (1972) research 
demonstrating the distinctive social behaviours of 
'newcomers' to a nursery. Gottman and Parkhurst (1980) 
observed differential relationships between dyads who were 
friends and dyads who were strangers in children ranging 
in age from 2.11 to 6.1 years, regardless of age of dyad 
(children were matched for age). 
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II Sampling Decisions 
(a) Nature of task 
In a review of sampling methods employed in 
observational research, Altmann (1974) writes: 
"choice of selection criteria is best determined 
by the demands of the particular question" (p. 235) 
The question upon which this thesis is based can be 
presented in a twofold manner for the purposes of 
explication: 
i) Research dealing with sociometric nominations of 
friendship preferences demonstrates that preschool children 
do have specific friendship preferences. There is, 
however, a dearth of research showing how this selectivity 
is operative in an environment that is shared for a 
considerable period of time. What happens? Do children 
have differential relationships that are consistent and 
stable, i.e., a social structure? This would seem to be 
a logical conclusion of the sociometric research. On 
the other hand, Piaget (and Piagetian theorists) contend 
that the young child is not capable of forming enduring 
relationships. As noted in Chapter 1, egocentrism 
precludes the possibility of true interpersonal contact. 
ii) If children do form a social structure based on 
differential relationships, how are these relationships 
established and matinained? How are differential 
relationships communicated? 
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These research questions can only be answered through 
a study of the social context within which a child inter- 
acts with his peers. Individual acts per se are not of 
intrinsic interest so much as the act within its context 
of occurrence, i.e., who initiated what type of act to 
whom and what type of response occurred from whom? 
Harré's (1977) following remark reflects the line of 
thought followed in deciding upon a particular methodo- 
logical approach: 
"In a structured entity the component parts 
derive their meaning from the other details 
to which they are internally related. A 
handshake is not the same action when 
embedded in a betting routine as when part 
of a greeting. The frequency of meeting 
someone is not a social item at all if 
detached from a particular social milieu 
from which it can gain significance as a 
meaningful feature of interaction." (p. 286) 
(b) Resultant choice of sampling methods 
A description of social context necessitates a record 
of the identity of the children who are interacting and 
what transpires in the course of these interactions. A 
record of each child's interactions with different peers 
also seemed essential. For this reason, a focal child 
was observed for a fixed period of twenty minutes. This 
method of sampling is referred to as event- sampling in 
the research literature and is appropriate for obtaining 
frequency of occurrence of particular behaviours (Altman., 
1974; Fassnacht, 1982). 
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Many observational studies of young children's 
interactions use time -sampling techniques in which 
children are observed for pre -selected intervals of a 
duration specified in seconds. For example, Jakibchuk 
and Smeriglio (1976) observed children for 55 fifteen - 
second intervals over a minimum of two days. A child's 
score on the various categories of behaviour was derived 
from the number of intervals in which an occurrence of 
the relevant behaviour was observed, within a range 
therefore of 0 to 55. Masters and Furman (1981) 
observed individual children for 3 six -second intervals 
at a time. They thus collected 180 intervals of observa- 
tion for each child. However, there is a danger of 
getting 'inflated frequencies' in that frequencies could 
partially reflect whether or not an act 'over -lapped' an 
observation interval. Indeed, Fassnacht (1982) 
comments that "the result of a time -sampling study partly 
depends on the length of the standard interval" (p. 121). 
An advantage of the time -sampling method is that one 
can feasibly include a large number of subjects in one's 
study. A disadvantage is that one necessarily loses 
social context since one is pragmatically confined by 
duration of interval to a small selection of grossly 
defined categories of behaviour. Altmann(1974) makes 
the following observation: 
"In order to keep sampling time brief, the 
categories that are recorded should be easily 
and quickly distinguished. For this reason, 
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it is in general more suited to studies of 
non -social behaviour . . . or to situations 
in which social behaviours can be lumped into 
a few easily distinguished categories." (p. 259) 
The above -cited studies used three broad categories 
of social behaviour. (Masters and Furman's categories 
are presented in Chapter 1, page 12). Others have 
employed Partents (1932) categories of social participa- 
tion, i.e. parallel, co- operative etc. (e.g. Jennings, 
1975; Smith, 1978; Bakeman and Brownlee, 1980). 
An observer loses 'inter- action' when acts received 
and acts initiated are sampled independently of each 
other. This occurred in both the Jakibchuk and Smeriglio 
and Master's and Furman's studies. As mentioned in 
Chapter 1, Masters and Farman acknowledge this problem, 
writing: 
"A more complete description will require 
continued careful specifications of the acts, 
the actors, the recipients, and the concept 
of the interchange . . . it is essential that 
attention be given to the transactions of the 
participants in any social exchange rather 
than simply to the static or summary 
characteristics of each." (p. 349) 
The research question being posed in this thesis 
obviously cannot be answered through data yielded from 
time -sampling techniques of observation. A study of 
obf aih.e_d_ 
social context necessarily demands data from 
extended periods of observation. 
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III Nature of recorded observations 
During the observation period, the following data 
were recorded: 
a) activity area the child was in and the nature 
of his activity, e.g., having tea in the 
Wendy House. 
b) who the child was with. 
c) ongoing interactions between focal child and 
peers: 
All conversations were recorded verbatim. 
If the Target child was part of an interacting 
group, the whole interaction was recorded, 
e.g., a triad in a "car" going to "Hampstead ". 
This was deemed essential to provide me with 
a record of social context, since I needed to 
know the child's actions within the context 
of mutual activity. 
All gross motor nonverbal interactions were 
recorded such as exchanging objects, 
approaching, hitting, pushing, hugging etc. 
d) if the child was engaging in an activity alone 
this was also recorded as I couldn't tell 
beforehand whether or not an interaction based 
on the child's activity was going to occur, 
e.g. a child is painting alone, using black 
paint. Another approaches and comments: 
"That's horrible! You're making black." 
In this example, the meaning of the child's 
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comment is based on his peer's activity, 
i.e., it occurs within a context of a specific 
nature and its meaning is therefore bound 
within that context. 
e) in all cases, who initiated what type of 
behaviour and who responded with what type of 
bheaviour was recorded. 
f) no child was observed more than once a day and 
observations were regulated such that data on 
each child was equally distributed over the 
four -month observation period. 
In a study of social behaviours a decision has to 
be made to include some behaviours and to exclude others 
from one's records. Information is simultaneously lost 
and gained. This is a methodological problem that 
arises in any observational study of naturally occurring 
behaviours. The data in this study largely comprise the 
children's conversations. The role of children's 
conversations in their relationships has received little 
attention in the research literature though such data 
would seem to provide the opportunity for a fine grain 
analysis on how children communicate when they interact. 
IV Methodological Tools 
Initial attempts at recording observations by writing 
everything down proved unsuccessful simply because the 
children's rate of activity exceeded my rate of writing. 
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Thus an alternative method was sought. An attempt to 
collect data with a portable cassette recorder was 
abandoned. The resultant product often seemed to be a 
confluence of every activity in the nursery. Transcrib- 
ing from the cassettes was especially time -consuming in 
view of the poor quality of data that was yielded even 
though the recordings were supplemented with written 
notes. A radio microphone, carried by the focal child, 
was considered but rejected as unsuitable because: 
i) it was too heavy and bulky for a small child 
to wear for extended periods; he could 
possibly injure himself if he fell. 
ii) such a device would almost certainly attract 
attention to the focal child, possibly from 
children with whom he didn't normally 
interact, and would therefore influence the 
course of ongoing interactions. Because I 
was interested in studying naturally 
occurring interactions, I was keen to 
maximize the distance between the children 
and my observational tools. 
In view of the above problems attempts to collect 
data returned to paper and pencil. I learnt basic 
shorthand (Pitman, 1977) and 'practised' collecting data 
over an extended period until I was recording the children's 
interactions to a satisfactory standard. 
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V Observer Presence: "We :just want you to write, not talk" 
(comment from child in nursery) 
By the time I was ready to collect data, children 
were fully accustomed to my presence. Obviously, this 
method requires an observer to remain as unobtrusive as 
possible and thus I was willing to comply with the above 
'request'. However, it is impossible to claim that 
children are totally unaware of the presence of an out- 
sider in their midst and the above 'request' testifies to 
this. It is possible, though, to minimize the effects 
of one's presence by assiduously avoiding any form of 
interpersonal contact with them, e.g., eye contact or 
talking to them. This was successfully achieved. In 
over 42 hours of data, only four references were made to 
my presence (including the one above) and it is the content 
of their speech that I've affected rather than their 
encounter per se. In one instance a child accidentally 
broke a screwdriver and attempted to hide it in front of 
me. Thus, it appears that children were used to my 
presence such that I did not influence or disrupt their 
interactions with each other. 
VI Method of describing a social structure 
The organization of children's relationships will 
be approached within the following analytic framework: 
i) Interaction frequencies 
A social structure based on differential relation- 
ships presupposes a selective distribution 
of interaction 
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frequencies. Chapter 3 deals with an analysis of these 
frequencies. An act between two children was counted 
as an interaction. If an act was directed towards, say, 
two individuals then an interaction between both 
individuals was counted. To illustrate with an example, 
(1) Linda- Karen: "I can jump, I can jump, I can 
jump a 100 metres." 
(2) Karen -Linda: "I bet you can't jump a 100 metres." 
(3) Derick (approaches) "Yes. I can." 
-Karen & Linda: 
(4) Karen -Derick & Linda: "Me too." 
This example would be 'counted' as follows: 
(1) 1 interaction: Linda and Karen 
(2) 1 interaction: Karen and Linda 
(3) 2 interactions: Derick and Karen 
Derick and Linda 
(4) 2 interactions: Karen and Derick 
Karen and Linda 
Thus total interactions per dyad would yield: 
3 interactions between Karen and Linda 
2 interactions between Karen and Derick 
1 interaction between Linda and Derick 
ii) Categories 
a) Introduction 
The categories employed in this research endeavour 
are based on a semantic interpretation of acts. As 
discussed above, since I was interested in the way 
children actively and explicitly communicate differential 
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relationships, most of my data are recordings of their 
conversations. Coding was therefore necessarily inter- 
pretive, though any form of taxonomic classification of 
social behaviour is ultimately an interpretive activity. 
For example Grant (1969), in his classic study, describes 
facial expressions in terms of their muscular components. 
However, if we apply this classification to the behaviours 
of young children and label one act as a 'smile' and 
another as 'cry' or 'grimace', we are implicitly returning 
to a phenomenal rather than a noumenal realm. Attempts 
to objectify what is an intrinsically subjective 
occurrence are internally problematic, independent of the 
research topic itself. 
Communication, and interpretation of communication, 
in social relationships, are barely addressed in research 
on young children. The inherently subjective nature of 
the activity has perhaps rendered it slightly 'untouchable'. 
However, trying to avoid this problem by singularly 
classifying all utterances under the taxon of 'vocalization' 
or 'conversation' or 'social interaction' is not a solution. 
Indeed, we surely have more experience, by virtue of daily 
ra_7 k p r 
existence, nterpreting the semantic content of an actAthan 
what is unilaterally 'reinforcing' to a class of several 
young children. Commenting on the dearth of conversational 
analyses in research on young children's relationships, 
Gottman and Parkhurst (1980) write: 
"A . . . shortcoming of previous observational 
research in children's social interaction is 
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that it would be essentially impossible for 
any human to demonstrate high levels of social 
competence using the coding categories. That 
is to say, the very choice of the coding 
categories contains hidden limiting assumptions 
about what children's capabilities are. As an 
example, in one coding system of children's 
social behaviour (McGrew, 1972), only one 
category out of more than 100 categories, 
called svocalize', recognizes the fact that 
preschool children can speak. The data 
obtained from such coding systems would not be 
applied to the social behaviour of adults, and 
they place an implicit ceiling on the social 
competence children can display." (p. 200) 
A brief consideration of the literature indicates the 
extent to which conversation is CI a.ssi 'e 
= as a discrete entity, or type of social 
behaviour, to be functionally grouped with other social 
behaviours displayed by young children. As noted 
previously, Masters and Furman (1981) used a category of 
behaviour called "a priori neutral" which incorporated all 
"social behaviour not categorised as reinforcement or 
punishment. . . This category included most instances 
of visual attention, conversation and associative play" 
(p. 345). Jakibchuk's and Smeriglio's (1976) category 
of "positive social behaviours" comprised the following: 
"verbalization, smiling and /or laughing, imitation, and 
other behaviours including giving (both tangible and 
symbolic) and physical contact signifying friendliness." 
(p. 840) Jennings' (1975) category dealing with the 
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content of play activities was based on a distinction 
between object and social activities, the latter subsuming 
"games, role playing, conversation, and social 
interaction" (p. 513). Smith (1978) placed all extended 
interactions in a category called 'Group' which incorpor- 
ated a multiplicity of social behaviours: "the focal 
child has one or more other children who interact 
substantially with him or her in the nature of the 
activity, either visually, verbally, through exchanging 
objects, or in the organization of a game" (p. 519). 
Rubin and Maioni (1975) looked at play preference and its 
relationship to measures of popularity, egocentrism and 
classification skills. During the one minute observation 
period collected on consecutive days, all behaviours 
including interchanges between children, were coded 
according to play type (dramatic, constructive etc.) and 
correlations with the various measures were later 
investigated. Though this is an extremely brief overview 
of the literature, it does indicate the pervasiveness of 
the assumption that children's communicative abilities are 
extremely limited and hence do not merit individual 
attention in investigations of social development. 
b) An approach towards analysis of communication 
On the basis of a belief that an understanding of 
children's relationships required a consideration of the 
actual context within which they interacted, a categorisa- 
tion scheme was constructed in which acts are semantically 
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classified. In the construction of this scheme, I was 
influenced by unsuccessful attempts to address my original 
thesis topic, "The relationship between creative play and 
social adjustment ". . Apart from experiencing great 
difficulty in delineating the definitive criteria which 
separates creative from non -creative play, I realized, 
through various attempts to construct an appropriate 
categorisation scheme, that childrengs relationships 
eluded description in terms of individual acts. Further, 
I noticed in the course of observations, that the children 
appeared to be communicating with each other to a degree 
that challenged traditional assumptions of egocentrism. 
A social structure based on relationships, by 
definition, presupposes communication. Communication, in 
turn, implies an interest or involvement in what the other 
person is doing or saying. If children do selectively 
establish and maintain differential relationships that are 
consistent and stable over time, then they must be 
engaging in mutually meaningful interactions in order for 
these relationships to be maintained. 'Meaning' must be 
apprehended in the same way by the children. 'Meaning4 
was operationalized by use of the concept of 'theme4. A 
definition provided by a dictionary was sufficient for my 
purposes: 
"a subject set or proposed for discussion" 
(Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary) 
The use of theme as a basis of classification 
necessarily obliged me to code acts in relation to 
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preceding acts. The degree of thematic consonance 
inherent in any act is, by definition, predicated upon 
its semantic relation to a preceding act. Thematic 
consonance distinguishes a 'conversation' from what 
Piaget (e.g. 1926) refers to as a "collective monologue ". 
It is the basis upon which we interact with each other and, 
indeed, upon which I am endeavouring to write at the 
present moment. In coding the children's acts, I there- 
fore used what Shields (1978) refers to as "that classical 
analytic device, the native language speaker's intuition" 
(p. 321). Below is a broad outline of the classificatory 
framework employed. Further details will be provided in 
pertinent chapters. 
A Theme (Chapter 4): 
i) Social conduciveness of acts: 
All acts were initially coded on the basis of 
whether or not they were conducive to continuing 
the nature of the ongoing interaction. 
This category comprises two discrete mutually 
exclusive sub -categories. 
ii) Thematic sub -categories: 
Each act was further assigned a code dealing 
with the extent to which it developed the theme 
or topic of the preceding act. These sub- 
categories are also discrete and mutually 
exclusive. 
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B Content: Differential responsiveness: 
i) Exclusion (reject person) /Reject idea (Chapter 5): 
'Exclusion' subsumes acts involving rejection of 
an individual such as "You can't come in." 
'Reject idea', on the other hand, subsumes acts 
involving a rejection of what a peer is doing such 
as "Don't put that there." 
ii) Inclusion (Chapter 6): 
'Inclusion' subsumes acts that reflect a personal 
involvement or commitment to the other person and 
implicitly create expectations of a continued 
interaction such as "Will you play with me ?" 
iii) Pronominal references are investigated in Chapters 
5 and 6 in terms of their distribution across the 
children's relationships. 
'Inclusion' and 'exclusion' are discrete and 
mutually exclusive as are their respective sub -categories. 
I expected the distribution of 'exclusion' and 'inclusion' 
to conform to the selective distribution of interaction 
frequencies I hoped to yield in analysis conducted in 
Chapter 3, such that 'exclusion' was more likely to occur 
between children who did not interact frequently and, 
conversely, 'inclusion' among children who did interact 
frequently. In this way, I theorized, children would 
maintain the differential relationships upon which their 
social structure was based. 
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Inter -coder reliability: 
Reliability tests were undertaken by requesting a 
coder to categorize interactions from the transcripts. 
Reliability tests were undertaken for all the sub- 
categories employed and they will be presented in the 
pertinent chapters. Mean reliability coefficients for 
the superordinate categories are presented below: 
Social conduciveness 1.00 
Thematic sub -categories .87 
Exclusion .94 
Reject idea .84 
Inclusion .87 
`r ese_ we -re.. eo[c...Alaféd b devdc: e 1ote..C. 
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Problems: 
The major difficulty I experienced with my data was 
one of over -categorisation. This can only be attributed 
to naive zeal. Insofar as the thematic sub -categories 
are concerned, I over -categorised to a degree that was 
excessive for the purposes of my study, i.e. to see 
whether or not children are communicating within a 
mutually meaningful framework. My 'excuse' is that I 
developed an interest in children's conversations (i.e. 
how they develop and maintain them) whilst I was 
collecting data and the resultant categorisation scheme 
reflects this interest. The 'inclusion' and 'exclusion' 
sub -categories were over -categorised to a degree that 
rendered statistical analyses problematic. Some 
children engaged frequently in particular behaviours 
subsumed within particular sub -categories whilst others 
didn't. Thus I 'collapsed' them (e.g., statements of 
friendship would be combined with play invitations on 
the basis that they both function as 'inclusive' 
behaviours) to render possible statistical analyses that 
incorporated the activities of all the children in the 
sample. 
VII Analysis of data 
The data were categorised on coding forms in 
preparation for SPSS analyses. Because I was trying to 
illustrate a social context (based on differential 
responsiveness) in terms of particular behaviours, 
Z 
I did many 
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analyses to test for the significance of 
the distribution of these behaviours across different 
groups of children. Children were collapsed into 
friendship groups on the basis of analyses of their 
interaction frequencies and subsequent analyses were 
conducted using the behavioural classification as the 
independent variable in order to see if the behaviours 
were being used differently towards different groups of 
children. The validity of this procedure was checked 
with the statistical advice clinic, University of 
Edinburgh. Data analyses are based on 28 hours of 
observation (2 hours /child). Though each child was 
observed for 3 hours coding proved to be extremely time - 
consuming and 2 hours provided an abundance of data. 
All statistical tests undertaken were two -tailed. 
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CHAPTER 3: STRUCTURE 
"An individual is usually defined as an 
indivisible, self -contained unit, with a 
separate, independent existence of its own. 
But individuals in this absolute sense are 
nowhere found in Nature Or society, just as 
nowhere we find absolute wholes. Instead 
of separateness and independence, there is 
cooperation and interdependence." 
(Koestler, 1975; page 67) 
The child is part of mankind, part of a family, part 
of a peer group. He moves within groups, groups that are 
functionally autonomous and distinct from one another yet 
he is a definitive part of each. Each group may be 
defined by its individual members and their inter- 
relationships, the interactive result their group identity. 
Functional (e.g. family versus peer group) and personality 
(members comprising it) characteristics combine to produce 
a specific group structure. From these considerations it 
follows that 
(a) a social structure should be characterized by 
communication between members (this was mentioned in 
Chapter 2, page 53). Indeed, communication is the 
criterial basis of McGrew's (1972) definition of social 
structure, i.e., 
"the consistent, nonrandom channeling of 
socially communicative behaviour patterns 
between types of individuals in a group" 
(page 147) 
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(b) a social structure should be characterized by inter- 
dependent relationships. This is implicit in Piaget's 
(19 68) distinction between "structures" and "aggregates ", 
"the former being wholes, the latter composites formed of 
elements that are independent of the complexes into which 
they enter" (page 7). Riegel (1978) asserts that "All 
reality lies in the dialogical - or rather in the 
dialectical - process" (page 55). Therefore, each 
individual must be seen in the context of "constitutive 
relationism" wherein every phenomenon is intrinsically 
determined by its relations with all other phenomena. 
The communication of inter -dependent relationships 
is the subject matter of this thesis. In Chapter 1, it 
was argued that research on young children's relationships 
is dominated by a focus on the individual child to the 
exclusion of context and that this approach stems from the 
premise that the young child is not initially social, 
hence a focus on how he becomes 'social'. However, the 
individual thinker or actor reflects a theoretical/ 
methodological approach rather than an experiential reality.. 
From the moment of birth, the interpersonal is a constant 
fact of the child's existence. Bruner (1968) prefaces 
his work on infant cognitive development as follows: 
"I take it as a working premise that growth 
cannot be understood without reference to 
human culture." (page 2) 
Trevarthen (e.g. 1982) espouses a similar view. Donaldson 
(1978) writes that "personal relations appear to form the 
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matrix within which learning . . . takes place" (page 88). 
Personal relations may provide the matrix within which 
children learn about each other and form different 
relationships on the basis of this knowledge. Labelling 
an individual child as sociable, aggressive or dependent 
will, therefore, not provide us with a description or an 
understanding of his relationships with peers. This 
argument is central to this thesis. 
In the research literature, one can identify three 
well- established structural approaches to the social 
relationships of preschool children. They are as follows: 
1. Dominance Theory 
2. Attention Structure Theory 
3. Sociometric Theory 
These three approaches will be discussed below. 
1. Dominance Theory 
Dominance theory looks at the organisation within 
the group of power relationships based on aggressive 
encounters or property disputes. Theoretically, a group 
such as a nursery class, can be hierarchically ordered 
along a dimension based on dominance, with the top child 
being the most successful in such disputes, i.e., the most 
dominant, and the bottom child the least successful, i.e., 
the least dominant. This hierarchy is theorized to be a 
necessary pre- condition for the peaceful co- existence of 
group members, as repeated aggressive episodes have a 
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disruptive or 'dispersive' effect on the group. Therefore, 
a dominance hierarchy should have predictive validity: 
"group dominance hierarchy formalizes dyadic 
roles during periods of aggressive conflict, 
and thus serves as a regulatory system that 
minimizes dispersive agonistic exchanges 
between group members." 
(Strayer, 1980; page 167) 
A dominance hierarchy thus expresses the expected 
outcomes of dyadic encounters of an aggressive nature for 
a given group. Dominance theorists argue that it is 
therein expressive of the relationships between the 
individuals comprising the group along the dimension of 
dominance: 
"The concept of dominance refers to the relation- 
ship between individuals, not to the amount of 
aggressive behaviour that they show." 
(Hinde, 1974; page 342) 
The degree of linearity characterizing this hierarchy 
will necessarily be determined by the relationships between 
the individuals from which it is derived. In a purely 
linear hierarchy, for example, if A dominates B, and B 
dominates C, then A dominates C. However, if the dominance 
relationships do not conform to a linear model, then this 
syllogism fails to hold, and we are presented with a 
dominance hierarchy that is structurally intransitive: 
A dominates B, B dominates C, and C dominates A. Given 
that preschool groups are not structurally identical, i.e., 
that the structure of a group will vary as a function of 
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the personalities and inter- relationships of the members, 
it is inevitable that the degree of linearity present in 
hierarchies will vary across groups. Indeed, in the 
research literature reports of hierarchies characterized 
by varying degrees of linearity can be found (e.g., 
Abramovitch, 1980; Sluckin and Smith, i977; McGrew, 
1969). 
In asserting that a dominance hierarchy reflects 
structural organization within the group of a certain kind 
of interactive episode, the question of the children's 
awareness of this structure necessarily arises. Edelman and 
Omark et al 
Omark (1973), and / 1975) devised a sociometric test that 
required children to rate themselves and their peers on 
relative 'toughness'. The concept of 'toughness' was 
chosen because definitions provided by children corresponded 
to primatologists' definitive criteria of dominance. 
Children were presented with pictures of peers and asked 
"Who is the toughest ?" If two children independently 
agreed that one was tougher than the other, then they 
constituted a "dyad of established dominance" (Edelman and 
Omark, 1973). In contrast to school -aged children, 
nursery school children did not show an awareness of 
dominance relationships, tending instead to overrate them- 
selves. Edelman and Omark argue that their results support 
the Piagetian thesis of egocentrism and proffer the further 
argument that the inferential abilities required for rank 
ordering a dominance hierarchy are functionally equivalent 
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to those required for Piagetian seriation tasks. Success 
in both tasks requires an awareness of the concept of 
transitivity: 
"Being able to make finer and finer distinctions 
between others and between the self and others 
is, of course, one of the bases upon which 
hierarchical social relationships can develop. 
It is also a necessary part of the cognitive 
stages involving seriation and transitivity." 
(Omark, 1980; page 234) 
In an investigation of this hypothesis, Omark and 
Edelman (1976) presented children (kindergarten to 3rd 
grade) with two tests of "cognitive hierarchization ". 
Children were required to order eight sticks by length and 
were also presented with photographs of eight peers which 
they were required to rank on the basis of relative 
toughness. An awareness of dominance relationships was 
evident after the kindergarten level. Omark and Edelman 
argue that younger children are too egocentric to give 
precedence to others within a hierarchy. They also claim 
a developmental parallel between performance on the 
hierarchy test and the seriation task. 
The above research stimulated other investigations. 
Strayer, Strayer and Chapeskie (1980) found their sample of 
preschool children to be unsuccessful at assessing relative 
toughness within the dyad. Furthermore, a child's 
position in the dominance hierarchy did not predict how 
accurately he perceived his own dominance status. Children 
were more successful in making judgements about others than 
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about themselves, lower status children showing a 
significantly greater degree of inaccuracy. Strayer et 
el consider the possibility that these results may reflect 
the constraints inherent in cognitive egocentrism, therein 
rendering it difficult for children to make relative 
judgements that involve the self. 
Assertions that egocentrism constrains the perception 
or identification of dominance relations necessarily pre- 
suppose that children do actually have such relations. As 
stated above, dominance theorists hold that a dominance 
hierarchy is expressive of relationships of a particular 
nature between individuals comprising a group, yet 
dominance is a construct that is by definition derived from 
the outcome of a relationship of a particular nature. For 
example, Rowell (1974) writes: 
"Dominance is useful as a shorthand term to 
indicate that the outcome of an agonistic or 
competitive interaction is predictable at 
some level of certainty." (page 151) 
Moreover, it is an inherently 'asymmetrical' construct in 
that A's dominance is defined by B's subordination. 
'Dominance' does not gauge psychological factors inhering 
in an encounter, i.e. we know nothing about the individuals 
within a group (apart from their relative degrees of 
success in agonistic episodes) nor the inter -relationships, 
negotiations, etc., that presumably culminated in the 
resultant structure. However, it is these factors that 
may determine the outcome of an encounter falling under 
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the taxon, "dominance ". Yet in asking children about the 
dominance relations in their class, we are necessarily 
dealing with the above -mentioned factors and thereby 
treating dominance as a construct with psychological, as 
opposed to logical validity. This assumption is implicit 
otherwise theorists in this area would not assert a 
necessary relation between 'perceived' and tactual' 
dominance relations and attribute its absence to egocentrism. 
This theoretical ambiguity that seems to characterize 
the concept of dominance may account for the inconclusive 
nature of investigations into 'perceived' dominance rela- 
tions. Sluckin and Smith (1977) asked preschool -aged 
children to select the 'strongest' (British equivalent of 
'toughest') from a set of photographs of peers. They 
found that children's responses corresponded more to 
initiations of aggressive acts than the outcomes of acts 
from which the hierarchy was derived. Sluckin and Smith 
also speculated that their results may reflect an identity 
between a child's perception of dominance relationships 
and his ability to make transitive inferences: 
"The present findings suggest that the 
children's social experience in the preschool 
is also providing a suitable experiential 
matrix for the development of transitive 
inference procedures." (page 922) 
Pickert and Wall (1981) investigated further 
Sluckin 
and Smith's finding that young children's 
perceptions of 
dominance relations corresponded 
more to the initiation of 
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the relevant encounter than its outcome. They suggest a 
distinction between "getting one's own way" - i.e., 
successful outcome of confrontation - and "toughness" - 
i.e., a characteristic of individuals who make dominance 
attempts. Children (aged 92 years) were asked to rate 
peers according to the above two criteria. Although 
children did differentiate between the two terms, over- 
lapping hierarchies resulted. The same children tended 
to occupy the upper and lower echelons of both hierarchies. 
Like Sluckin and Smith (1977), they found that children 
overranked themselves on 'toughness' (i.e. 'strongestt). 
However, on "own way" judgements, high groups underranked 
themselves, whereas low groups overranked themselves. 
Pickert and Wall suggested differential perceptions of 
dominance based on the terms employed: 
"In their descriptions, the children interpreted 
'own way' as success in controlling others 
through varied strategies. In contrast, 
'toughness' was interpreted primarily as an 
aggressive characteristic of behaviour. Thus 
the children's definitions of dominance did 
seem to vary according to the terms." (page 79) 
They go on to suggest that the overlapping hierarchies, 
which contradicted the distinctions that the children did 
make between the two terms, may reflect the strategic 
significance of aggressive behaviours in the interactions 
of children: 
"The overlap in hierarchies may have occurred 
with this age group for whom aggressive 
behaviours are a prevalent strategy 
for 
obtaining one's own way." 
(page 80) 
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The above remark does not receive any empirical verifica- 
tion. However, these results do reflect the difficulties 
inherent in an approach that assumes (a) that a direct 
relationship should occur between a child's definition of 
a term and his operationalization of that term to peers 
with whom he probably has different types of relationships, 
and (b) that a direct relationship should occur between a 
dimension defined by an experimenter and children's percep- 
tions of their peers when presented with this dimension, 
i.e., the former's definition should correspond to the 
latter's experience. 
The above research rests on the assumption that 
'dominance structure' is not just a heuristic tool but 
actually represents an organization of relationships that 
is created by the children and is, moreover, intrinsically 
meaningful to them and not just to the experimenter. This 
means that the child should perceive, say, 'toughness' in 
a manner that is both structurally and functionally 
equivalent to the way the researcher perceives 'dominance'. 
The ontogenetic significance of the hierarchy is assumed. 
This is implicit in the researcher's tendency to attribute 
preschool children's performance in hierarchization to 
egocentrism. 
Aggressive behaviours occur within a social context. 
Behaviours that preceded and followed the agonistic 
encounter are not considered. Significance is only 
attached to the dominance encounter itself, and the point 
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at which they are extracted from their context of occurrence 
is decided by the experimenter. Thus, the functional 
dichotomy between affiliative and aggressive behaviours, 
and the salience attached to the latter as a regulatory 
factor in group relations, is assumed. Hierarchies 
merely reflect organization. However the relations 
existing within that organization may go beyond the assump- 
tion of dominance relations to include personality and 
affiliative constraints. 
Frankel and Arbel (1980) indeed, suggest that a 
hierarchical arrangement may be an artefact of methodology 
rather than reflecting a regulative property of social 
organization intrinsic to the group itself. They adopted 
a sociometric measure of dominance based on the number and 
status of individuals for whom the child is a winner or 
loser across various agonistic encounters (e.g. hitting, 
object struggles). A centrality score was thus derived. 
Frankel and Arbel also constructed a 'traditional' 
hierarchical model of dominance relations based on amounts 
of wins and losses. They found that non -agonistic 
measures (e.g. imitation, initiation of prosocial interac- 
tions) correlated with the centrality model but not with 
the hierarchical model. Thus, hierarchic and non - 
hierarchic models of dominance may be gauging different 
properties of social organization. Indeed, Vaughn and 
Waters (1980) found the dominance hierarchy within their 
sample of preschool children to be unrelated to measures 
of sociometric preference. 
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Such results suggest that undue attention has been 
paid to the functional significance of hierarchical 
structures and asymmetrical relationships. Indeed, within 
primate research from which the concept of dominance was 
taken, the structure of affiliative interactions has been 
found to be inversely related to that of aggressive inter- 
actions, i.e., the latter tends towards asymmetry, the 
former towards symmetry (Pitcairn, 1976). Moreover, 
dominance relations are not necessarily hierarchically 
arranged (Rowell, 1974). The relationship between 
aggressive and affiliative behaviours in preschool groups 
has barely been addressed; however research does indicate 
that a hierarchical structure provides an inadequate 
descriptive model of group interactions in this age group. 
In an investigation of the differential structures 
characterizing affiliative and aggressive interactions in 
preschool groups, Strayer (1980) reports: 
"The comparatively low level of asymmetry in 
cohesive behaviours indicates that a hierarchi- 
cal model cannot adequately represent the 
organization of affiliative relationships within 
the preschool groups." (page 182) 
Indeed, aggressive encounters are extremely infrequent 
compared to affiliative ones. For example, in the above - 
mentioned study, Strayer (198 0) notes that in one group 
over 1,000 affiliative gestures were recorded and less than 
200 agonistic episodes over the same time period. 
Theoretically, one can attribute the low frequency of 
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intra -group aggression to the regulative function of the 
dominance hierarchy, i.e., it minimizes dispersive 
encounters and thereby serves a cohesive function. 
However, such premises can lead to tautological rationaliza- 
tions (it does not happen because there is a dominance 
hierarchy to prevent it from happening) and post hoc valida- 
tion of a concept is in any event dubious. 
Ontogenetic significance is assumed on the basis of 
assumptions of phylogenetic continuity. Comparisons 
between primate dominance hierarchies and those of young 
children recur in the research literature. For example, 
in a study of low - ranking (tomega') children in school -aged 
groups, Ginsburg, Wauson and Easley (1983) write: 
"Imanishil noted that in the Japanese monkey 
(macaca fuscata), the lowest ranking troop 
members rarely engaged in social interaction 
with other troop members, including aggression 
. . . Investigations of preschool children 
and adolescent groups have yielded similar 
results; omega youths were rarely targets of 
aggression by higher ranking peers." (page 151) 
1lmanishi, K., Social behavior in Japanese 
monkey Macaca Fuscata. Psychologica, 1957, 
1, 47 -54. 
Similarly, Omark (1980) discusses within a phylogenetic 
framework the tendency of young children to overrate their 
status: 
"From an evolutionary perspective, where man, 
the primates, and perhaps other species, are 
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seen as group -dwelling species and where 
dominance relationships are also seen as 
serving a stabilizing function, the above 
set of findings may begin to make sense. 
The developing organisms act in such a way 
that their peer group is momentarily 
stable; they 'learnt a position within 
the group. At the same time they are 
moving towards adulthood, reproductive 
age, and the probable necessity of leading 
the group. Hence, it seems important that 
the child may cognitively be viewing the 
self as being more than and, in part, 
different from what is expressed 
behaviourally." (pages 249 -250) 
Yet, even within primate research literature, the 
regulative function of a dominance hierarchy is a debated 
issue. In contrast to 0mark's argument above, Rowell 
(1974) asserts: 
"This is commonly held to be the main function 
of hierarchies, yet overall associations 
indicate the opposite: hierarchies are found 
especially prominent in association with high 
levels of aggression in stressful conditions, 
wherever intraspecific comparisons are avail- 
able (Lindberg, 1972; Rowell, 1967; 
Bernstein, 1966; Plotnik et al, 1968). . . 
learning processes leading to hierarchy forma- 
tion will be favoured in conditions of frequent 
conflict. The assumption that hierarchy then 
reduces conflict probably stems from the common 
observation that if several stranger monkeys 
are thrown together initial violent fighting 
diminishes and a hierarchy emerges (Bernstein 
and Mason, 1963). We would expect from our 
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analysis that fighting would produce a 
hierarchy as subordinates succumb to the 
stress; what is lacking is evidence that 
establishment of a hierarchy itself provides 
feedback to reduce aggression." (page 145) 
Dominance is theorized to regulate access to resources 
such as food or partners in primate groups. Environmental 
contingencies will therein directly affect organizational 
properties underlying the hierarchy of a given group. 
Intraspecific differences in the hierarchies of primates in 
the wild compared to those in captivity have been noted in 
the research literature (e.g. Hinde, 1974). Lea (1984) 
argues that the conditions under which primates are 
observed (such as captivity or providing a single focused 
food source) can in themselves induce the formation of a 
hierarchy in animals not normally displaying one; hence he 
asserts that "dominance hierarchy is too easily assumed to 
be ubiquitous" (page 63) . Thus assumptions of a functional 
identity between preschool and primate groups on the basis 
of morphological similarities are not justified given the 
radically different environmental contingencies facing the 
preschool child in a group compared to those of a hamadryas 
baboon, for example. Indeed, research does suggest that 
expressions of 'dominance' may encompass functionally 
different behaviours in preschool groups thought it has 
been treated as a unitary construct. Vaughn and Waters 
(1980) report that aggression with intent to harm (teasing, 
taunting, fights that are not over objects or places) and 
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object struggles (fights over objects or places) both 
conformed to hierarchical models, yet the correlation 
between the two measures was not significant. It would 
thus appear that research into the ontogenetic significance 
of dominance structures in young childrents groups is 
necessary before we can posit phylogenetic continuity. 
2. Attention Structure Theory 
Attention structure theory is based on the premise 
that the amount of attention, both given and received, 
reflects the organization of status relationships within a 
given group. Barkow (1976) writes that attention structure 
is a structure of communication that is a function of the 
groupts prevailing social situation: 
"Attention structure is a communication 
concept . . . a way of understanding social 
organization in terms of the structure of 
communication rather than solely in terms 
of its content or behavioural effects." 
(his emphasis, page 203) 
Within any group a hierarchical organization of 
attention is theorized to prevail, high -ranking individuals 
receiving more attention, lower -ranking individuals 
receiving less. Chance and Jolly (1970) assert that 
uniform direction of attention can serve a cohesive 
function: 
"predominant attention to a single individual 
can, by acting as a common focus of attention, 
provide a means whereby a number of people 
cohere." 
74 
Theoretically, attentional distribution within a group will 
be structured on a centripetal basis, thus enabling a group 
to coalesce more efficiently when in danger. 
Like dominance structure theory, attention structure 
theory is a relational concept, taken from primate 
literature and applied to humans. Omark and Edelman 
(1976) argue that the presence of an attention structure 
within a group presumes awareness of that group's 
dominance relations: 
"Before attention can be directed upward in a 
hierarchy it has to be directed toward others; 
and, for attention structures to exist as a 
total group phenomenon, this directed percep- 
tion would have to occur in both sexes. That 
is to say that a hierarchy, or some form of 
structuring of individual relationships . . ., 
is probably a necessary characteristic of 
centripetally organized groups. Once a group 
has been recognized, then differential percep- 
tions within the group can occur." (page 137) 
Based on Chance's (19 67) argument that dominance was 
determined more by the focus of attention than by the out- 
come of aggressive episodes, Omark and Edelman (1976) 
hypothesized that the child at the top of the hierarchy 
would be watched more carefully than the child at the 
bottom. Thus there would be more agreement between 
children on who was at the top of the hierarchy than on 
who was at the bottom. Their hypothesis was confirmed in 
young school children (1st to 3rd grades). Moreover, 
children could reason better with hypothetical premises 
concerning children at the top than at the bottom. 
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Research in this area involving preschool -aged 
groups has tended to investigate behavioural correlates of 
attention structures, dominance in particular. Hold 
(1976) investigated the relationship between rank- specific 
behaviours associated with leadership styles(1). She 
found a direct relationship between being centre of 
attention and leadership style: 
"he is the one who is asked, shown, told, 
obeyed, imitated, who gets most presents and 
is well -liked. His most characteristic 
activities are initiation and protection as 
well as arbitration. He does a lot of 
organizing and shows aggressive behaviour 
too, but these activities are more character- 
istic of peers following him in the hierarchy 
than of himself." (page 193) 
Boys in the upper- middle section of the attention structure 
engaged more frequently in aggressive behaviour against 
children of adjacent status and in more organizing 
behaviours. Middle- ranking children sought reassurance 
often, imitated and showed friendly and anxious behaviour 
towards higher -ranking individuals. Lower- ranking 
children are characterized by lower interaction and 
activity levels. 
Abramovitch (1976) found dominance relationships and 
proxemic behaviours to be related to attention structures. 
(1) Hold's leadership categories are: Initiator, Organizer, 
Aggressor, Protector and Arbitrator, Group Representa- 
tive, i.e. the child making the first contact with 
children of another group. 
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Dominant children had priority of access to toys, were 
most looked at and tended to have subordinates as close 
neighbours. Elsewhere, Abramovitch (1980) reports 
findings indicating that attention is related to dominance, 
popularity and imitation. Vaughn and Waters (1980) found 
that attention structure was related to sociometric rank 
but not to aggression. 
A difficulty with the above research is that the 
meaning of an attention structure has not been clarified. 
A structure has been identified but not its underlying 
function. Thus it is difficult to interpret or explain 
its co- relationships with other behaviours or measures. 
Indeed, researchers' explanations of their findings often 
seem particularly vague: 
"The correlational data suggest, instead, 
that attention structure . . . and the 
sociometric data . . . measure much the 
same thing . . . and that hazing and 
specific hostility(1)measures something 
different . . . The correlations . . . 
reveal something about the relationships 
among the measures, but they are not very 
descriptive of the relationships between 
a given child's rank on a measure and his / 
her behaviour toward other children." 
(Vaughn and Waters, 1980; page 371, my 
emphases.) 
Abramovitch (198 0) writes about her results in a similarly 
vague manner: 
(1) Vaughn's and Waters' aggression categories. 
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"The fact that attention and status seem to 
be correlated in some groups and possibly not 
in others may mean that this is a somewhat 
variable phenomenon." (page 389, my emphasis) 
The functional significance of an attention structure 
within a group of children is not clear. As noted in the 
consideration of dominance theory, there is a tendency to 
take concepts derived from primate research with assumptions 
of phylogenetic continuity prior to investigating the 
ontogenetic significance of the concept. Thus most 
studies tend to investigate attention structure in relation- 
ship to dominance, though dominance relations are just one 
aspect of social behaviour within the social network of a 
group of children. Omark and Edelman (1976) assert the 
functional significance of a centripetal organization of 
children's groups, based on primate research: 
"If developing a hierarchy is a basic theme 
of juveniles in centripetal primate 
societies, we might also expect that 
learning dominance relations would be 
important for human children as well . . . 
Because human growth is similar to that of 
other primates, the expectation is that it 
is adaptive for children . . . to have a 
coherent view of the dominance relations in 
their groups since the chance of their 
becoming adults is increased by the ability 
to anticipate and avoid potentially 
damaging fights among themselves." (page 122) 
However, not all groups are characterized by a centripetal 
organization of attention. Pitcairn (1976) noted that 
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species showing a low level of intra -group aggression 
(augurs, patas, vervets) have a high escape motivation and 
thus distribution of attention is centrifugally structured. 
On the other hand, species showing a higher level of 
intra -group aggression (macaques and baboons) have a 
centripetal structure of attention. 
Assumptions of a functional and structural identity 
between attention structures characterizing primate groups 
and young children ignore the importance of environmental 
contingencies (e.g. wild vs. captivity vs. nursery) and 
intra -group relationships in determining the structure of 
attention. Abramovitch (198 0) reports that dominance and 
attention were not found to be "interchangeable" in her 
study, and thus asserts: 
"there is little evidence to support Chancels 
notion that attention is the basis of dominance." 
(page 395) 
However, her findings on the relationship between dominance 
and attention in young children does not in itself consti- 
tute a refutation of the relationship between dominance and 
attention in primate groups. Abramovitch (1980), Hold 
(1976), and Vaughn and Waters (1980) report correlations 
between attention and popularity, imitation and sociometric 
status. These findings in themselves stress the importance 
of examining the function of a structure such as attention 
within the context of intra -group relationships. Onto - 
genetic significance must be established before we can 
assert phylogenetic significance. 
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3. Sociometric Theory 
Like dominance and attention structure theories, 
sociometric theory involves ranking a group, such as a 
class, along a pre- selected dimension. Hallinan (1981) 
defines sociometry as "the measurement of social relations; 
it is a technique for collecting data about interpersonal 
choices" (page 9). 'Interpersonal choices' are usually 
gauged by means of verbal reports from group members. 
Children are asked questions concerning friendship 
preferences such as "Who do you like ? ", "Who don't you 
like ? ", "Who is your best friend ", "Who do you like to sit 
next to ? ", "Who do you like to play with ? ", etc. The 
score derived for each child constitutes his sociometric 
status. Friendliness is defined as number of friendship 
choices made, popularity and /or peer acceptance as the 
number of choices received. Thus, a researcher may 
hierarchically arrange a group of children along the 
dimensions of friendliness, popularity or acceptance. 
Moreno (1953) coined the terms "sociometric star ", 
"neglectee" and "social isolate" to characterize those at 
polar ends of the hierarchy. The "sociometric star" is 
the recipient of many choices, the "neglectee" and "social 
isolate" of few and no choices respectively. Hartup 
(1978) notes that these structures tend to be stable and 
are apparent in groups of young children: 
"Social hierarchies can be observed in 
children's societies, even when the individual 
members are 2 -, 3- and 4 -year old children. 
Sociometric scores (i.e. indices of social 
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status or popularity) are somewhat less stable 
in groups of nursery school children than in 
groups of older children although considerable 
stability exists even in the choices of very 
young children." (page 146) 
A large amount of research in this area has involved 
investigations of the correlates of high and low socio- 
metric status and the implications of these correlations. 
"Status is viewed primarily as an indicator of 
a child's position within a specific group; 
explanations for the child's status are sought 
primarily in terms of the child's behaviour in 
the group." (Berndt, 1983; page 447) 
Marshall and McCandless (1957a) reported a positive corre- 
lation between a child's friendly social interactions and 
his sociometric status. In a later study (1957b), they 
found a correlation between emotional dependency on 
adults and low soiometric status. McCandless, Bilous 
and Bennet (1961) found emotional dependency negatively 
correlated with frequency of peer participation and 
sociometric status (based on popularity ratings of 
children by their teachers). Hartup, Glazer and 
Charlesworth (1967) looked at the relationships between 
social acceptance, social rejection (inverse of social 
acceptance, i.e., frequency of negative choices received 
from peers), and type of social reinforcement dispensed 
in preschool children. Positive social reinforcement 
subsumed behaviours such as giving attention, approval 
or affection, indicating acceptance, imitating and so 
forth. Behaviours such as aggression, ignoring, 
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insulting, refusing to share or cooperate, were classified 
as negative social reinforcement. Dispensing positive 
social reinforcement was positively correlated with 
acceptance, whereas dispensing negative reinforcement 
correlated with social rejection. 'Accepted' peers also 
received more positive reinforcement from peers. Gottman, 
Gonso, and Rasmussen (1975) also noted that popular 
children received more positive reinforcement. Rubin and 
Daniels -Beirness (1983) found that preschool -aged popular 
children engage in more cooperative and prosocial 
behaviours than their less popular peers. 
The implications of such studies cannot be extended 
beyond acknowledging the occurrence of certain correlations. 
Piaget (1968) criticizes sociometric methods for their 
tendency to describe social structures in terms of 
observable patterns of behaviour which are regarded as a 
sufficient explanation of the structure itself and are 
derived from a statistically based methodology "whereby 
relations are, no doubt, quantified, but not in any sense 
explained" (page 101). Frequency of emission of 
particular types of behaviours may distinguish the 
accepted from the rejected child but they tell us nothing 
about the children's friendship patterns and the reasons 
underlying their acceptance or rejection. Moore (1964) 
succinctly discusses these problems that are, indeed, 
inherent in correlational studies of this nature: 
"To know that two variables are correlated with 
each other does not, unfortunately, tell us all 
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we might like to know about the relationship 
between them. We do not, for instance, know 
which of the variables is the 'cause' of the 
other or if, in fact, some other factors are 
causing both. To know that popular children 
perform a preponderance of friendly behaviours 
is not to say that their friendliness is the 
'cause' of their popularity. It is just as 
reasonable to hypothesize that being well - 
liked inspires a child to perform friendly 
behaviours as it is to hypothesize that 
performing these behaviours causes the child 
to be well -liked." (page 287) 
Correlations between sociometric status and cognitive 
functioning have also been investigated. Rubin and 
Maioni (1975) looked at the relationship between classifi- 
cation skills, egocentrism, popularity and play preference 
in preschool children. They found a significant negative 
correlation between functional (repetitive) play and 
popularity. In contrast, significant positive correla- 
tions were found between popularity and dramatic play, 
empathic role- taking and spatial egocentrism. Rubin 
(1972) earlier reported a relationship between popularity 
and the ability to take the other persons point of view. 
Rardin and Moan (1971) have reported positive correlations 
between popularity and classification and seriation skills. 
Deutsch (1974) found communicative skill related to her 
observational measure of popularity but not to sociometric 
status. 
Jennings. (1975) found sociometric status to be 
positively correlated with her measures of social 
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knowledge (e.g. role taking, moral judgement) but not 
with her observational measures of social orientation. 
However, interpreting the 'meanings underlying the 
relationship between sociometric status and certain 
cognitive skills is no less problematic than a considera- 
tion of its behavioural correlates. Jennings theorizes 
that her findings may indicate a "link between the 
effectiveness of social functioning and social knowledge" 
(page 518), however the nature of this link obviously 
requires further research. On the other hand, Renshaw 
and Asher (1983) compared popular and unpopular children's 
responses to hypothetical social situations and concluded 
that "social knowledge differences between high- and low - 
status children are subtle rather than glaring" (page 370). 
The necessarily inconclusive nature of this type of 
research is indeed acknowledged by Rubin (1972) in his 
study of the relationship between popularity and communi- 
cative skills: 
"The results indicate that the ability to take 
another person's point of view may play a causal 
role in the child's attaining popular status among 
his peers during early school years. However, 
by Grades 4 and 6, variables other than egocen- 
trism may determine the popularity of the child. 
Although a cause -effect relationship has been 
postulated, the exact nature of the relationship 
must remain uncertain until other data are 
gathered." (page 364) 
Some researchers have proposed intervention programs 
designed to increase the child's sociometric status. 
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Gottman, Gonso and Schuler (1976) designed a training 
program involving modeling and coaching. Two 8 -year old 
children, of low sociometric status, were exposed to a 
videotape of a girl entering a group of peers. The 
videotape was discussed and the subject role -played 
situations in which she was a new child in the class and 
wanted to make friends. After this, communication 
training was given to teach the child to consider the 
listener's perspective in interactions. The two coached 
children received higher ratings from peers than the two 
control children on sociometric tests administered upon 
completion of the program. The results are not clear: 
one of the children interacted more with popular 
children, the other interacted more with 'low sociometric 
status' children (9 - 10 years old). 
Children with low sociometric status were 
verbally instructed in social skills by a 'coach' (the 
experimenter), participated in a play session with a peer 
of higher sociometric status, and then discussed the play 
session with their 'coach'. Sociometric scores were 
based on peer preference nominations for play, work and 
best friends. A child's sociometric score was 
significantly increased for play, there was a small but 
non -significant increase for best friends, but no change 
occurred in a child's status for the work category. 
Implicit in this research that defines types of 
children in terms of their high or low sociometric status 
are two assumptions: 
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(i) The assumption that friendship, acceptance or 
popularity constitute unidimensional concepts. 
This assumption implies that children can be defined 
in terms of uniform patterns of behaviour manifest in 
varying degrees by a group of which they are members. 
This attitude is reflected in intervention programs of 
the type discussed above, which assume that a low socio- 
metric status indicates inadequate social skills and that 
successful amelioration of this inadequacy is reflected 
in an increased sociometric status. In positing a uni- 
dimensional.concept, it is possible to assert a constant 
normative standard of behaviour which distinguishes the 
accepted from the unaccepted. Thus Oden and Asher (1977) 
in the above -mentioned study observed popular children at 
play in addition to their experimental pairs: 
"In order to learn how popular children would 
interact in the same play situation as the low 
accepted children, the highest rated child of 
the same sex as the isolated children was 
selected to be observed while playing a game 
with the second highest -rated child for one 
play session." (page 498) 
The friendliness (i.e. frequent emission of positive 
behaviours) of popular children is presumed to result in 
the formation of relationships whereas the absence of 
friendliness in unpopular children is presumed to 
constrain the formation of relationships. 
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(ii) The second assumption implicit in this 
approach is that of homegeneity, i.e., 
that popular and unpopular children 
constitute two distinct homogenous groups. 
The two groups can be differentiated from each 
other by frequency of emission of particular types of 
behaviour such as friendliness, for example. Oden and 
Asher (1977) employed an observation scheme that 
measured frequency of emission of peer- oriented behaviours, 
task -oriented behaviours, uncooperative /rejecting behaviours, 
and behaviours in response to outside noise and distraction. 
They looked neither at the response to these behaviours, 
nor at their contextual distribution across the observation 
session. In noting that the experimental children were 
not selected significantly more frequently as best 
friends by their peers after the session than before, Oden 
and Asher conjecture: "friendship may require additional 
social skills not included in the coaching." (page 504) 
However, the distinction between the popular and unpopular 
cannot be quantitatively defined. Oden and Asher 
encountered this situation when comparing the two groups: 
"The popular children did not behave very 
differently from 4solated children when 
comparing the latterts pre -intervention 
play session data with data from the former 
one's play session." (page 505, my emphasis) 
In assigning children to broad categories, individual 
differences both in play and relational styles become 
blurred. Assumptions of homogeneity are challenged by 
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research demonstrating that the unpopular group may 
comprise children who are rejected (disliked) and those 
who are neglected (neither liked nor disliked). The 
former tend to engage in disruptive social behaviours 
whereas the latter tend to be shy (Dodge et al, 1983). 
In a longitudinal study, Coie and Dodge (1983) found that 
neglected children are more likely to move towards an 
average or popular sociometric status than rejected 
children. Maxwell's (1983) findings further challenge 
assumptions of homogeneity. He found that whilst only 
well- adjusted children demonstrated 'reciprocated best 
friendship patterns', both difficult and well- adjusted 
children in his sample displayed unreciprocated and 
pluralistic (no preference for a particular peer) friend- 
ship patterns. What distinguished the difficult from 
the well- adjusted was the way in which interactions were 
conducted. Difficult children who had unreciprocated 
best friends tended to engage in behaviours characterized 
by "bland, acquiescent friendliness" (page 149) whereas 
well- adjusted children attempted to develop a reciprocal 
relationship by engaging in prosocial behaviours as well 
as behaviours encouraging social play involvement. Well - 
adjusted and difficult children in the pluralistic category 
of friendship also differed. The former were found to 
be socially active whereas the latter displayed fewer social 
acts, a lesser degree of social involvement and fewer 
regular friends. 
A "hands up those who like to play with Billy" 
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approach to social relationships tells us nothing about 
Billyts interactions with others, nor how others respond 
to him, let alone how motivated he is to engage in peer 
interaction. Further, the low sociometric status group 
may include both children who do actually experience 
difficulties in their relationships with others and those 
who are not peer- oriented but, at the same time, are not 
maladjusted. Coates, Lord and Jaka.bovics (1975) found 
that children who spent more time in non -social play were 
more field -independent than children who did engage in 
social play. They thus concluded that social orientation 
is linked with field dependent cognitive functioning in 
preschool children. Thus, the childts attitude to his 
social predicament is surely worth considering when his 
social predicament is to be examined. Indeed, popularity 
could reflect a type of social orientation. This 
possibility is posed by Masters and Furmants (1981) 
finding that the distinctive feature of popular children 
is that they tend to interact with many children. 
Whether or not sociometric stratification reflects 
a form of social organisation is unclear. Noting that 
different studies have yielded convergent findings insofar 
as the behavioural correlates of sociometric status are 
concerned, Cairns (1983) suggests that "the roles children 
occupy in the social network may provide a catalyst of 
stability" (page 343) but how popularity /acceptance is a 
regulative factor in childrents relationships has not been 
demonstrated. Much research has tended to deal with the 
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upper and lower strata of a group (popular -unpopular) who 
are rendered salient by statistical significance, thus 
leaving neglected the child in the middle who does not 
yield statistically significant results: 
"the overlooked child takes a spot some place 
between the top and the bottom - neither 
popular nor unpopular." Moore, 1964; page 283) 
Differential rates of emission of positive and 
negative behaviour correlate with sociometric status but 
are not descriptive of relationships but rather of the 
behaviours of individuals. Vaughn and Waters (1981) 
theorize that the distribution of attention reflects a 
social organisation based on social competence which is 
gauged by popularity. The distribution of attention was 
found to correlate with sociometric status which correlated 
with their interactive play measures. The researchers 
assert that high sociometric status children may be watched 
more because they possess skills that children of lower 
status can learn. Thus Vaughn and Waters argue that 
social competence "is a more salient basis for social 
organisation among preschool children than either the 
distribution of attention per se or competition /dominance 
relationships" (page 275). On the other hand, Masters 
and Furman (1981) recorded the identity of the children 
receiving initiations (which Vaughn and Waters did not do 
with their interactive play measures) and found that 
popular children are not distinguishable because of their 
general behaviours Der se but because of the breadth of 
their social contacts: 
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"They are . . . not popular because of their 
general social behaviour but because of their 
specific interchanges with a large number of 
children. That is, a child's attraction to 
a peer is not affected by the peer's behaviour 
towards others but only by the peer's 
behaviour towards that child." (page 349) 
Thus, it is possible that popular children may be more 
salient (i.e. receive more attention) because they are 
more acquainted with a wider circle of peers than say, 
average children who don't cultivate the company of so 
many children. This speculation does, of course, 
require empirical validation. 
A major difficulty with much of the research is that 
friendship skills are associated with popularity. 
However, friendship and popularity are definitionally 
distinct, the former referring to a relationship the 
latter to degree of agreement about a particular 
individual. Duck et al (1980), in addressing this issue, 
suggest that "different causal mechanisms may be operative" 
(page 94). Certainly it is not clear how sociometric 
status is operative in the formation and maintenance of 
friendships. Masters and Furman (1981) found that 
friendship selection did not relate to popularity and thus 
urge a distinction be made between "general interaction 
patterns affecting sociometric status and specific 
interaction affecting friendship selection" (page 344). 
In a study of clique membership in five to eleven year 
old children, Miller and Gentry (1980) found a weak 
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relationship with popularity. On the other hand, Ladd 
(1983) found social networks comprising sociometrically 
distinct children (popular, average and rejected) however 
the problem remains that sociometric status describes 
individual children within the network but cannot be 
used as an explanation for the formation of the network 
per se. Thus it would seem that Masters and Furman's 
suggestion that "the general character of popularity 
requires reconceptualization" (page 349) is not 
unjustified. 
Conclusion 
The above three approaches have all considered the 
group in terms of linear rankings along a pre -selected 
dimension. Hence, each child's relative position within 
the social structure is dependent upon, and determined by, 
the positions of others in a manner that conforms to a 
hierarchically -structured model. However, sociometric 
structures are distinct from attention and dominance 
structures in that the latter are constructed from the 
occurrence of specific behaviours, the former from peer 
nominations. 
Resultant structures are theorized to have predictive 
validity. For example, a dominance structure describes 
the outcome of potential encounters, e.g., if A is dominant 
to B, A will win access to the rocking horse in the event 
of a struggle over the toy with B. Many investigations 
have extended the implications of an individual's 
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sociometric status beyond its definitional context, 
suggesting that it is predictive of later socio- emotional 
and academic functioning. Low sociometric status has 
been found to be related to mental health problems in 
later life (Cowen et al, 1973), to delinquency (Roff et 
al, 1972) and to low achievement in school (Bonney, 1971; 
Coie and Dodge, 1983). Thus, tests of sociometric status 
are regarded in the research literature as having 
diagnostic and prognostic potential, indicating those 
children who are tat risk'. 
Some of the attention and dominance structure 
literature stress the ontogenetic significance of a 
hierarchically- structured group organization. This is 
implicit in Omark's and Edelman's (1976) assumption of a 
functional identity between the child's identification of 
the hierarchical organization characterizing his peer 
group's dominance relations and performance on seriation 
tasks. A stress on hierarchical organization is also 
evident in the following remark by Abramovitch (1980) in 
which she seems to assume that linear arrangements 
exhaust all possible forms of social structure: 
"It seems obvious that the full range of 
behaviour on which group members can be rank 
ordered needs to be investigated in order to 
understand fully group structure, and in 
particular the operation of attention. 
While this work is certainly slow and pains- 
taking, it would be very useful to have 
observational data on many different 
hierarchies or rank orders within a given 
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group. It might then be possible to specify 
the interrelations among the various 
behaviours and be possible to discover some 
structure underlying the many different 
behaviours." (pages 395 -396, my emphases) 
A particular problem inherent in the linear arrange- 
ment of a group along a particular dimension is that it 
tends to result in the isolation of extremes. It is 
these children who both yield statistically significant 
results in investigations of behavioural correlates and 
engage in behaviours that render them more salient in 
observation sessions. The 'average' child is thereby 
neglected yet we are provided with no evidence that he, 
say, conducts his relationships in a less competent 
manner than the popular child. This is a difficulty 
that is present in all of the structural approaches 
reviewed above (e.g. Berndt, 1983; Hold, 1976; Vaughn 
and Waters, 1981) . 
A further problem posed by arranging children along 
a pre- selected dimension is that individual differences 
get submerged under assumptions of homogeneity. However, 
these individual differences may be important to an 
understanding of not only the child himself, but to an 
understanding of his relationships with others and hence, 
to group structure itself. A nursery class does not 
constitute a homogeneous unit. For example, not all 
children are equally motivated to be popular or win in 
agonistic encounters. This necessarily has implications 
for the functional significance of any structure a 
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researcher isolates. For example, some children prefer 
solitary play activities. Thus, they may tend to be 
overlooked in popularity ratings though engaging in 
solitary play is not necessarily an index of social 
inadequacy as Moore et al (1974) have demonstrated: 
"most solitary play observed was indicative 
of independence and maturity rather than 
immaturity and dependency." (page 830) 
Similarly, in treating dominance as a unitary con- 
struct, and thereby singularly classifying all aggressive 
interactions over objects or space as agonistic exchanges, 
social, personality and contextual features that inhere 
in the encounter may not emerge. Manning et al (1978) 
found the context within which expressions of aggression 
occur - i.e., activity- related, non -activity -related, 
provoked, unprovoked - to be directly related to social 
and emotional adjustment. Further, a relationship was 
found with maternal interaction style. For example, the 
mothers of 'teasers' tended to be controlling and over - 
manipulative. Similarly, Montagner et al (1974) found 
that dominant children constitute a heterogeneous group, 
distinguishable from each other by the nature of the 
relationship between appeasement and aggressive behaviours. 
A positive relationship was found between these behaviours 
for 'leaders' who organised friendly activities, a 
negative relationship characterized children who disrupted 
group activities. Mothers of the former tended to 
engage in a wide range of appeasement behaviours themselves 
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contrary to mothers of the latter group. 
Children may be arranged along a hierarchy but the 
reasons underlying their relative positions within that 
structure appear to be diverse. The research considered 
above indicates that differences in personality and 
interactional style characterize childrents groups. 
Though sociometric as well as dominance and attention 
structure research have indicated that childrents inter- 
actions do appear to be characterized by consistency, 
stability and selectivity, the functional significance of 
the structures theorists propose to characterize group 
processes has not been demonstrated. 
Assumptions have been made but not subjected to 
empirical verification, for example, the regulative 
function of dominance hierarchies. Further research is 
needed'on the actual social context within which these 
behaviours occur. The behaviours under study did not 
occur within a void but within a relationship between 
particular individuals engaged in a particular activity 
and so forth. Similarly the characteristics associated 
with different levels of sociometric status are ultimately 
derived from relationships between particular individuals. 
Behaviours or relationships cannot be extracted from 
their context of occurrence and adequately understood 
neither from a descriptive nor a functional point of view. 
For a social system to exist there has to be, first 
of all, some degree of tacit acceptance of this structure, 
i.e. the children must be engaging to some degree in 
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cooperative behaviours in order for this structure to 
occur and be maintained: 
"Personal relationships and other human groupings 
do not exist and function as matters of fact, 
but are maintained by the intention of their 
members to maintain them; without such intentions 
they collapse. Thus they cannot simply be 
observed and described from the standpoint of an 
external observer, for . . . it is their 
projected or prospective ends which structure 
people's actions not their attained ends." 
(Shotter, 1974; page 223) 
None of the approaches we have been considering address 
this issue. Thus, while acknowledging the importance of 
the contribution they have made to our knowledge of pre- 
school social behaviour, I suggest a structural approach 
based on an investigation of the formation and maintenance 
of friendship groups. As these groups are organized by 
the children themselves, such an investigation may provide 
us with more information on how young children structure 
and maintain their social worlds. 
Analysis of interaction frequencies: 
It is a common observation that children form small 
friendship groups around the ages of four to five years 
old (e.g. Parten, 1932, e.g. Piaget, 1951). These groups 
comprise a minimum of two children and a maximum of four 
or five. Friendship has been noted to be selective and 
relatively stable (e.g. Masters and Furman, 1981; Asher 
et al, 1977). If a social structure based on the 
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organization of friendship preferences does characterize 
the relationships of the children comprising the sample, 
then their interaction frequencies should be selectively 
distributed. This will be investigated below: 
A. Total interaction frequencies: 
Total interaction frequencies over the observation 
period yield the matrix in Table 3.1. Turning our 
attention to the sample of fourteen children, we can see 
that interaction frequencies appear to be selectively 
distributed. Particular children seem to either: 
a) interact more frequently with each other than 
with other children within the sample 
b) do not interact frequently with each other, 
but each interacts frequently with a third 
child in the sample. 
To illustrate: Fiona and Colin interact 44 times. 
Arthur and Fiona interact 132 times. 
Arthur and Colin interact 183 times. 
Thus Arthur is the 'interactive link' between Fiona 
and Colin. 
B. Sociographic Analysis: 
To see if any form of social organization based on 
the above two criteria did emerge, a sociographic analysis 
of the sample's interaction frequencies was undertaken 
(based on Sade, 1972). The resultant structure is 
presented in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.1 
































































































































































A to N corresponds to first letter of each child's name 
within the sample. 
X : Younger children. 
Y : Teachers. 
Z : Adult visitors. 
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Table 3.2 
Sociographic Analysis of Social Organization. 
10% 20% etc . 
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Examination of the sociogram indicates that the 
children within the sample form four distinct 'interacting 
clusters'. Each distinct cluster will henceforth be 
referred to as a 'group'. They are as follows: 
Group 1: five boys and 1 girl: Arthur, Brian, Colin, 
Derick, Edward, Fiona. 
Group 2: four boys: George, Hanish, Iain, Jimmy 
Group 3: two girls: Karen, Linda. 
Group 4: two girls: Mary, Nancy. 
C. Initiation of interaction 
If these groups do actually reflect an organization 
of interaction preferences, then initiations of interaction 
should be selectively distributed on a group basis. 
Table 3.3 contains total initiation x target frequencies 
according to group membership (Appendix 3.1 contains 
initiation x target frequencies per individual). 
Examination of the table indicates: 
(i) Initiation is selectively distributed, i.e., 
children do tend to initiate interactions 
more frequently to fellow group members than 
to children outwith their respective groups. 
(ii) If we include initiations directed towards 
younger children in our considerations, we 
notice an inverse relationship between intra- 
group initiation frequencies and frequency of 
initiations directed towards younger children. 
The frequency of initiations directed towards 
Table 3.3 









307 2176 724 204 153 
9% 61% 20% 6% 4% 
(67 %) (22 %) (6 %) (5 %) 
189 368 750 45 82 
13% 26% 52 % 3% 6% 
(30 %) (6o %) (4 %) (7 %) 
' M 
89 75 54 397 72 
13 % 11 % 8 % 58 % 10 % 
(13 %) (9 %) (66 %) (12 %) 
213 63 52 52 172 
39% 11% 9% 9 % 31 % 
(19 %) (15 %) (15 %) (51 %) 
. 
Total Interaction Frequency by Group. 
Notes: 








(ii) Younger children were only observed in their interaction with the 
sample children, so that no score is recorded in cell 0 /0. 
(iii) Percentages indicated are of cell scores vs. row totals; in rows 
1 - 4 the second, bracketed ( ) percentages are formed excluding group O. 
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these children progressively increase from 
Group 1 to Group 4, who initiate more 
frequently towards younger children than 
within their own group. A correlational 
analysis between intra -group initiation and 
initiation towards younger children yielded 
a Pearson coefficient of -.98 
Children who show a greater interest in 
each other are less interested in younger 
children. 
Interpreting the meaning of this correlation is 
difficult in view of the differences in group size. 
However, it is interesting that Group 4 do direct their 
interactions towards younger children than towards the 
children in the sample who are more within their own age 
group. (Most of the younger children were born in 1976 
and thus were barely three years old at the time of data 
collection.) Shatz and Gelman (1975) have noted that 
four year old children reduce the complexity of their 
speech in interactions with younger children. Qualitative 
differences in interactions between mixed -age dyads 
compared to those of same -age dyads have been reported in 
the research literature (e.g. Foot et al, 1979; Lougee et 
al, 1977). Many researchers have observed that girls 
pay greater attention to the younger children in their 
nursery than do boys. For example, McGrew (1972) found 
that girls showed much more interest in newcomers to the 
nursery, many of them displaying protective behaviours. 
103 
Boys, on the other hand, tended to be indifferent. In 
any event, in so far as the sample of older children is 
concerned, Mary and Nancy do show a distinct preference 
for each other, therein confirming the hypothesis of 
selectivity. 
D. Reciprocity: 
Given that 'interaction x target' frequencies are 
selectively distributed, the structure underlying this 
distribution must be addressed. In the consideration of 
dominance, attention and sociometric theories above, it 
was noted that groups of children were organized on a 
linear basis. The degree of linearity inherent in group 
interactions has been approached in terms of symmetrical/ 
asymmetrical, transitive /intransitive and hierarchical 
arrangements. 'Fitting' relationships into a mathematical 
model facilitates methodological goals in rendering 
relationships explicable in quantitative terms. Recipro- 
city may be defined as a 'symmetrical' relationship (e.g. 
Hinde, 1979). Strain and Shores (1977) discuss the 
importance of "developing reciprocal interaction ", defining 
reciprocity as "dyadic interaction in which persons A and 
B reinforce each other at an equitable rate ". Leiter 
(1977) adopts a similar definition: "dyadic interactions 
in which a social initiation by one person is followed by 
a social response by another ". 
However, such definitions may place artificial 
constraints upon an ongoing relationship. Differential 
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rates of activity by individuals within the dyad may in 
themselves preclude a one -to -one relationship between act 
and receipt of response. Contingencies inherent in 
long -term, compared to short -term interactions, further 
complicate this issue. 
To investigate the relationship between initiation 
and receipt of initiation in the sample of children under 
study, the following correlational analyses were under- 
taken. For Groups 1 and 2: 
(i) initiation and receipt within the group 
(e.g. Group 1 members to Group 1 members) 
(ii) initiation and receyCwith non -group 
members (e.g. Group 1 members to Group 2 
members). 
It was hypothesized that there would be a higher 
correlation between initiation and receipt of initiation 
in interactions outside the group than within group 
interactions. The rationale underlying this hypothesis 
is the following: 
The quantitative analyses of interaction frequencies indi- 
cate that children spend longer periods with certain 
children than with-others. This suggests differential 
social preferences. More complex interactions will 
necessarily lead to a distortion of the act -response 
relationships simply because a relationship that lasts 
over time is 
a) less dependent on an immediate response than is 
a short -term relationship (primarily as a 
function of length of time together) 
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b) qualitatively different from a short -term 
relationship. For example children inter- 
acting over a period of time may be mutually 
engaged in an activity such as building a 
ship. In these situations, statements will 
frequently occur that do not necessarily 
require a response, e.g., "I'm putting this 
block here ". Mutual ground exists between 
the children that will not inhere in shorter 
term relationships, e.g., 'passer-by' to 
child at art table: "Is this your lighthouse? 
It's good." 
Results 
i) Initiation and receipt of initiation within group: 
Results of analyses are presented in Table 3.4. 
They are in the predicted direction for Group 1. 
Correlational analysis yielded a Pearson 
,dF =2t 
coefficient of .23 (not significan). In contrast, 
Group 2 interactions appear to be characterized by 
a more reciprocal relationship; a coefficient of .81 
(.05 significance.) was achieved. 
ii) Initiation and receipt with non -group members: 
Returning our attention to Table 3.4, we note that 
Group 1's interactions with non -group members show 
a more reciprocal relationship between initiation 
and receipt than their internal interactions. 
However, the correlation is still quite low at .59 
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Table 3.4 
Frequencies of occurrence as initiator and as target for Groups 1 and 2. 
Within group With non -group members 
Name Initiator Target Initiator Target 
Arthur 471 307 185 58 
Brian 388 344 196 73 
Colin 339 419 224 98 
Derick 432 405 240 124 
Edward 342 432 118 68 
Fiona 204 279 118 85 
r= .23 r = .59 
(N.s.) (N.s.) 
Within group With non -group members 
Name Initiator Target Initiator Target 
George 237 253 130 250 
Hanish 120 107 87 155 
Iain 185 229 175 260 
Jimmy 208 161 103 165 
r = .81 r = .91 





(not significañtr). The correlation between 
initiation and receipt similarly increases for 
Group 2 interactions with non -group members, 
a coefficient of .91 (.05 significance's) being 
achieved. 
Thus, the internal interactions of Group 1 and Group 2 
are characterized by a less reciprocal relationship 
between initiation and receipt of initiation than their 
external interactions. Obviously, this result is less 
marked for Group 1 than for Group 2 interactions. 
4n inverse relationship between reciprocity and degree of 
also 
acquaintanceship hasAbeen reported in the adult research 
literature (Derlega, Wilson, Chaikin; 1976). Nevertheless, 
contingencies inherent in relationships per se appear to 
differentiate Group 2 interactions from Group 1 interactions. 
The sizes of Group 3 and Group 4 precluded any 
correlational analyses of the relationship between 
initiation and receipt characterizing their interactions. 
Frequencies of initiation and receipt are presented in 
Table 3.5. Perusal of these frequencies indicates that 
their interactions are characterized by reciprocity. 
Differences in Group size between 1 and 2 as opposed to 
3 and 4 necessarily places restraints" on any comparison 
of results. Indeed the relationship between group inter- 
actions based on two persons and group interaction based 
on three or more is a contentious issue in the research 
literature. Cartwright and Zander argue that there are 
qualitative differences (1968). Whether or not this 
Table 3.5 
Frequencies of occurrence as initiator and as target for Groups 3 and 4. 
Within group With non -group members 
Name Initiator Target Initiator Target 
Karen 189 208 69 101 
Linda 208 189 142 200 
Within group With non -group members 
Name Initiator Target Initiator Target 
Mary 83 89 77 141 





applies to groups of young children is at present an 
empirical question that will be addressed in following 
chapters. 
Conclusion 
The results of analyses conducted in this chapter 
indicate that a study of social structure based on children's 
friendships can be pursued. Children do appear to 
selectively establish relationships that are consistent. 
We may thus isolate four distinct 
friendship groups. The distinction between these groups 
is emphasized by the inverse relationships found between 
frequency of internal interactions and frequency of inter- 
actions with younger children as well as the differential 
results of 'reciprocity' analyses for Groups 1 and 2. 
However, analyses of interaction frequencies informs us of 
the presence of differential relationships but not how 
these relationships are established and maintained. This 
will be addressed in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER 4: COMMUNICATION 
I Introduction 
The distribution of interaction frequencies within 
the sample indicates the differentiation of four 
distinct groups. This suggests that children do 
structure their environment on the basis of affiliative 
preferences. This structure is thus a product of the 
children's own interactions. It does not reflect an 
order imposed upon the sample by someone who is socially 
extraneous to it (such as myself). However, the 
selective distribution of interaction frequencies informs 
us of no more than the presence of some form of structural 
organization. We know nothing about the processes by 
which children maintain and organize their social worlds 
from data that tells us who plays with whom and their 
respective interaction frequencies. The analyses of 
'reciprocity' indicate that relationships cannot be 
captured within a quantitatively derived act -response 
paradigm. 
Criticisms of dominance, attention and sociometric 
theories were based on the argument that they 
a) approached group relations within the confines of an 
experimentally defined, pre- selected dimension, 
b) extracted behaviours from the social context that were 
presumed to be definitive of this dimension. Thus, they 
informed us of an aspect of social organization, such as 
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expressions of liking or aggression, but not the social 
context in which they occurred. Yet if these aspects 
are inherent parts of early social organization, if they 
are consistent and sustained over time (which theoreti- 
cally they should be), then the children must be engaging 
in interactions that are mutually meaningful: 
"The social has to do with the recognition of 
the humanity of the other and the minimal 
mark of that recognition is the endowment of 
the action with meaning. It is not only an 
intentional meaning as seen by the actor, but 
is a meaningful social act as seen by one 
upon whom the action impinges." 
(Harré, 1974, p. 225) 
In Chapter 1 research was cited which argues that 
young children conceive friendship in terms of momentary 
interchanges which are self -referenced and based on 
personal involvement in an activity. Hence, physical 
parameters such as proximity are theorized to be essential 
determinants of interpersonal contact (e.g. Bigelow, 1977; 
Selman, 1980; Serafica, 1982). Egocentrism is held to 
provide cause and explanation for this phenomenon, 
rendering the young child unable to apprehend peers as 
subjectively distinct. On the other hand, analyses of 
interaction frequencies conducted in the previous chapter 
indicate that children do have enduring friends. Masters 
and .Furman (1 981) found friendship to be selectively 
organised. Strayer (1980) also reports findings of a 
stable affiliative organisation in preschool children. 
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We thus have two theoretically distinct research findings 
which seem to contradict each other, i.e., 'If children 
don't perceive others in enduring terms, how do they 
establish and maintain enduring friendships ?' Separating 
the child into Thinker and Actor necessarily begs the 
question of 'how do we put him back together again ?'. 
As noted in Chapter 1, Glick (1978) asserts that 
social life requires one not so much to have a "theory of 
social actors" but rather to "maintain and sustain 
coherent courses of interaction which are related 
coherently to an interactive context" (p. 3). If the 
children upon whom this study is based do establish 
differential relationships that are consistent and stable 
over time, then one would expect them to be able to meet 
this requirement, i.e., they should be engaging in mutually 
meaningful interactions. Such interactions are 
necessarily based on mutual obligation since a social act 
implicitly obliges an addressee to respond in a particular 
way to maintain coherence and thus, the interaction. 
Hence the signification of an act lies not only in its 
content per se, but also in its semantic relation to the 
antecedent act, i.e., it is bound within a social context. 
Shields (1978) as well as Keenan and Klein (1975) have 
similarly stressed a 'semantic dependence' between acts in 
their studies of children's conversations. 
An act therefore, cannot be assigned a communicative 
value independently of its context of occurrence. A 
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major difficulty with Piagetts (1926) classification of 
children's conversations is that speech is categorised 
in terms of developmental processes within the individual 
rather than in terms of its relevance to the ongoing 
interaction. This is implicit in his taxonomy of 
"egocentric speech ". For example, repetition of words 
and syllables are classified as manifestations of egocen- 
tric speech because of their lack of any intrinsic 
informational or truth value. Keenan and Klein (1975) 
have demonstrated that a repetitive exchange of nonsense 
syllables can be communicatively structured in children as 
young as two years and nine months, i.e., a turn- taking 
dialogue that is phonologically coherent. As noted in 
Chapter 1, in Piagetian theory social development is 
asserted to be ultimately the result of internal processes 
which develop in a manner that is fixed and sequentially 
invariant. Therefore acts that occur in the course of an 
interaction are considered from the perspective of intra- 
individual constraints. Indeed, Keenan and Klein assert 
that the use of concepts like egocentrism by definition 
presume the child's and the adult's use of language to be 
discontinuous such that it is difficult to see how the 
developmental transition occurs. Indeed words in them- 
selves can provide pleasure such that we have communica- 
tive structures that are phonologically derived. In the 
formalized world of 'adult play' we may find this 
expressed in poetry, e.g., syllabic meter, rhyme, rhythm, 
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assonance, features that can also occur in young 
children's interactions, for example: 
Linda is swinging on the climbing frame, Karen is 
climbing. 
Linda: "Swing high . . . this is good fun 
swinging on this. You could try it 
later on but I might be on it all day." 
Karen: "I don't want to try it because I'm 
afraid of heights." 
Linda: "Are you a bit: 'Hei! Hei! Hei! 
Heights! Heights!' ?" 
The extent to which young children's interactions 
are constrained by egocentrism has now been widely 
challenged (e.g. Mueller, 1972; Garvey and Hogan, 1973; 
Keenan, 1973; Gottman and Parkhurst, 1980). For example, 
Gottman and Parkhurst found that collective monologues 
were more likely to occur among strangers than among 
friends but failed to find any significant correlations 
between age and collective monologue in children 2.11 to 
6.1 years. This suggests that contingencies inherent in 
the relationship per se (such as degree of familiarity) 
may exercise a determinative role in communicative success. 
Indeed, they also found that older children (5 to 6.1 
years) were more likely to respond inadequately to 
requests for information or clarity. Noting that this 
latter finding contradicts theoretical expectations about 
children's communicative competence, they ask: 
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"Is it possible that there is something about 
friendship in young children that makes 
communication clarity vital ?" (page 225) 
Communication clarity is of course predicated upon 
meaning that is mutually held. As Freeman et al (1982) 
writes: 
"To understand the way a speaker intends an 
utterance to be used, requires agreement over 
a frame of reference." (page 54) 
Keenan and Klein (1975) found this agreement in subjects 
who were, as noted above, 2.9 years: 
"After a new topic has become established, and 
both children can take for granted that they 
are talking about the same thing, it becomes 
possible for them to use pronouns anaphorically 
. . . The referent has become part of the 
context in that both children can presume, or 
take for granted, that the object has been 
identified or located within their mutual 
sphere of attention. Anaphoric pronouns are 
used with similar presuppositions by adult 
speakers." (p. 373) 
Frame of reference is thus provided by the theme upon 
which an interaction is based. An interaction that is 
coherent is rendered so by thematic continuity which in 
turn requires apprehension of communicative intent. 
Discontinuity may occur when an addressee fails to 
apprehend communicative intent. Consider the following 
interaction: 
Linda is painting alone. Mary approaches and says: 
"Linda, lets get dressed up." 
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Linda: "I'm dressed already." 
Mary, with emphasis: "No, let's get dressed 12.2." 
Linda, with emphasis: "I'm dressed already." 
Mary leaves, goes to 'dressing up' area. 
Linda runs after her, saying: "Mary let's get 
dressed up." 
Here we see Linda making a joke on Mary's statement though 
she obviously comprehends its actual meaning. On the 
other hand, Mary misunderstands Linda, thus a thematically 
dissonant interaction occurs. Linda 'rectifies' 
communication by later responding to the meaning intended 
by Mary and the interaction can thereby continue. In 
other instances, implied meaning may be actively inter- 
preted. This is illustrated in the following interaction: 
Some children are discussing where they are going 
on holiday: 
Brian, smiling: "I'm going far away and you'll 
never see me again." 
Iain: "Where are you going ?" 
Derick: "He doesn't know really." 
Though it is not clear whether or not Iain did understand 
Brian's joke (i.e., communicative intent), Derick 
obviously did and, moreover, he relayed his interpretation 
of Brian's remark to Iain. We can see in the above two 
examples children selectively choosing a certain aspect of 
an utterance and basing their response upon it. There is 
an interest in meaning per se. This is strikingly 
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illustrated in Linda's efforts to restore mutual meaning, 
i.e. thematic consonance, so that an interaction can 
continue. However, in both interactions, the content of 
an act is semantically bound to a context created by the 
antecedent acts of others. Communication is therefore 
actively pursued. 
As noted in Chapter 2, a social structure based on 
relationships presupposes communication. Communication, 
by definition, implies mutually meaningful interactions. 
This is discussed above. Therefore proposing a social 
structure based on affiliative preferences requires one to 
demonstrate that children do have these type of interac- 
tions, i.e., that they are interacting within a mutually 
meaninfgul framework. For the purposes of a communica- 
tion analysis, meaning has been operationalized by using 
the concept of theme, "a subject set or proposed for 
discussion" (Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary). 
The rationale underlying this approach is that it may 
enable one to circumvent the limits inherent in isolating 
aspects of an interaction since it necessarily refers to 
the relation between those aspects. As argued above, it 
is this relation that renders communication possible: 
"although turn- taking is a basic feature of 
dialogue, it is clearly not sufficient that 
the speakers should take turns, there also 
has to be some cohesion between the remarks 
so that each one is dependent on what went 
on before, and forms a link with what comes 
after which is indicated either by continuity 
of theme or by structural continuity of some 
sort." (Sheilds, 1978, p. 317) 
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Categories employed for the communication analysis and 
results are presented below. 
II Categories 
As noted in Chapter 2, all acts were categorised 
according to (a) their conduciveness to continued inter- 
action and, (b) their thematic relation to antecedent 
acts. Below are descriptions of the categories employed. 
Inter -coder reliability coefficients for the individual 
categories are presented in brackets. 
(a) Social Conduciveness (1.0) 
This category was designed to gauge 'social 
climate' by distinguishing interactions involving agree- 
ment. 
(i) Open (1.0): Agreeable acts that are conducive 
to an interaction. 
Example: Edward and Fiona are in the hospital, Fiona, 
the 'patient' is getting into bed. Nancy 
approaches and tells Fiona to remove her boots, 
Nancy: "I've got red boots." OPEN 
Fiona: "Have you got them on ?" OPEN 
Nancy: "No." OPEN 
Edward: "I've got black boots." OPEN 
(ii) Closed (1.0): Acts involving some form of 
disagreement or conflict. 
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Example: Linda and Derick are on the climbing frame 
together. 
Derick: "We're going gymnastics." OPEN 
Linda: "No it isn't. No it isn't. CLOSED 
My teacher tells me it's not 
gymnastics at school." 
Derick: "You don't go to school. CLOSED 
You go to nursery." 
'Open' and 'Closed' are mutually exclusive categories. 
They are not concerned with the extent to which acts are 
thematically consonant however, in some cases, coding had 
to be based on the nature of the antecedent act. For 
example, Mary and a younger child are having tea in the 
Wendy House. They start discussing the colour of the 
walls. 
Younger child: "This is pink too." 
Mary: "Everything pink." 
Younger child: "And white." 
Mary: "And there is blue." 
Younger child: "Yeah, alright, or pink." 
Mary: "Mhm." 
The above monosyllabic response was coded as 'Open', 
however in other cases, monosyllables may be coded as 
'Closed'. For example, in the following interaction, 
two children are attempting to reclaim their 'ship'. 
Derick - Hamish and Jimmy: "Get off our ship!" 
Edward - Hamish and Jimmy: "Yeah!" 
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The rationale for coding "Mhm" as 'Opens and "Yeah" as 
'Closed' lay in the different contexts in which these 
acts occurred. Mary and the younger child are having a 
friendly conversation, "Mhm" functions as agreement with 
the younger child within that context. However, the 
second interaction was of a clearly unfriendly nature. 
The function of Edward's agreeing with Derick is to oust 
Hamish and Jimmy from a particular area rather than to 
maintain an interaction with them. 
Thus, classifying acts within 'Open' and 'Closed' 
categories was necessarily interpretive. As stated in 
Chapter 2, in a semantically -based classification of 
speech, this cannot be avoided. However, the high 
reliability coefficients suggest that the categories are 
not difficult to apply and that the distinction between 
'Open' and 'Closed' is clear. 
(b) Thematic sub -categories (.87) 
All acts were further coded on the basis of their 
semantic relation to antecedent acts by means of the 
following classification scheme. The categories are 
discrete and mutually exclusive. 
1. Development: Acts which constitute a continuation or 
development of the ongoing topic of interaction. 
(i) introduce: Acts were placed in this category 
when they were presented as a topic for conversa- 
tion and did not constitute an interruption of any 
previous activity. It thus marks the start of a 
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particular topic and cannot be coded for thematic 
continuity. A reliability check for this category 
therefore seemed unnecessary. It was included in 
the 'Development' category as it signifies the 
commencement of a conversation. 
Example: Colin and Douglas are working alongside each 
other at the art table. 
Colin: "Are you going to the Meadow's INTRODUCE 
Festival today ?" 
Derick: "Yes, I am." 
Colin: "I'm going tomorrow because it's 
Jenny's birthday today." 
(ii) radial (.90): acts that involve an expansion 
of a particular topic of conversation without the 
addition of new elements. 
Example: Karen and Linda are at the dough table, they 
have been talking about how much easier it is to 
roll dough that is soft. 
Karen: "I'm making it soft" RADIAL 
Linda touches Karen's dough and says: RADIAL 
"It isn't soft." 
(iii) tangential (.80): acts which add a new 
element to the ongoing theme. 
Example: Linda is swinging on the climbing frame, Karen 
is there too. 
Linda: "Watch me" Linda swings. INTRODUCE 
Linda: "Was that good ?" RADIAL 
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Karen: "Yes." RADIAL 
Linda: "Really hard work when I go to 
gymnastics. It makes me learn." TANGENTIAL 
(iv) repetition and development (.90): part of a 
previous act is repeated with an additional new 
element. 
Example: 
Edward: "I can tie knots with my hands." INTRODUCE 
REPETITION 
Colin: "I can tie knots with my arms." AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
REPETITION 
Derick: "I can tie knots with my face." AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
(v) adjust divert (.77): acts which involve an 
adjustment to a changed topic of conversation (see 
External Categories below). 
Example: Brian and Colin are ?camping? in their 'caravan'. 
Brian: "It's starting to get late so we 
should put the lights on." TANGENTIAL 
Colin: "Put the lights on." RADIAL 
Colin points to the lettering on his t- shirt, 
says: "What's that ?" CHANGE TOPIC 
Brian: "It says 'Watch out For the 
ADJUST 
Giants?." DIVERT 
Colin: "No, it says ?New York Giants'." RADIAL 
(vi) adjust return (.90): acts which involve a 
return to the topic of conversation which was 
underway prior to the change (see External categories 
below). 
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Example: Nancy and a younger child have been quarrelling 
on the climbing frame, Nancy is climbing. 
Nancy: "I'm up here!" CHANGED TOPIC 
Younger child: "You're a naughty girl!" ADJUST RETURN 
Nancy: "I'm a good girl. I'm going RADIAL 
to tell you you're a naughty 
girl: 'You're a naughty girl, 
Sally! . . . and some girls are 
good!" 
Comments on 'Adjust return' and 'Adjust divert': 
These two categories were specifically designed to 
gauge responses to changes in ongoing topic of interaction. 
They were subsumed within the superordinate category 
'Development' because they incorporate acts which 
explicitly acknowledge the change by either accepting 
(adjust divert) or rejecting it (adjust return). 
(b) Static 
Acts which do not develop the ongoing topic of 
interaction. 
(i) not significant (.75): acts which are themati- 
cally superfluous, serving no overt contributory 
function. 
Example: Mary and a younger child are having 'tea' in 
the Wendy House. They start to discuss the colour 
of the walls. 
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Younger child: "This is pink too" CHANGE TOPIC 
Mary: "Everything pink" ADJUST DIVERT 
Younger child: "And white" RADIAL 
Mary: "And there is blue" RADIAL 
Younger child: "Yeah, alright or pink" RADIAL 
Mary: "Mhm" NOT SIGNIFICANT 
Younger child gives Mary his tea cup, 
saying: "I want some more." ADJUST RETURN 
This category comprises mainly monosyllables. Monosyllables 
that were answers to questions, however, were included in 
the 'radial' category since they are explicitly contributing 
to the ongoing topic of conversation, for example: 
Nancy: "I've got red boots" CHANGE TOPIC 
Fiona: "Have you got them on ?" ADJUST DIVERT 
Nancy: "No." RADIAL 
(ii) imitation (1.0): repetition of another child's 
act. 
Example: Arthur is telling Hamish and Edward not to 
frighten the 'pussy cat' (Fiona). 
Edward: "She's scared." RADIAL 
Hamish: "She's scared." IMITATION 
Arthur: "She's scared." IMITATION 
(iii) self -repetition (1.0): repetition of one's 
own act. 
Example: Edward and Arthur are having their snack. 
Edward: "They're not letting us on INTRODUCE 
the bricks." 
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Arthur: "Yeah." NOT SIGNIFICANT 
Edward: "They're not letting us SELF -REPETITION 
on the bricks." 
(c) External 
Acts that interrupt an ongoing topic of interaction. 
They are collectively referred to in the above examples 
as 'change topic'. 
(i) athematic (.80): acts that are thematically 
askew in that they don't 'fit in' or 'make sense' 
with the preceding acts. 
Example: Derick and Colin remark that their brothers 
attend the same school. 
Arthur, re his brother: "I'm going to RADIAL 
Michael's school." 
Edward: "I'll run fast to school." ATHEMATIC 





(ii) incidental (.80): acts that involve a response 
to a peripheral aspect of what someone has just 
said rather than to the actual topic of interaction. 
Example: Arthur, Linda and a younger boy are having their 
snack. 
Arthur, re younger boy: "Do you know her ?" INTRODUCE 
Linda: "It's not a girl." INCIDENTAL 
Arthur: "Do you know her? Do you ?" ADJUST RETURN 
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(iii) parenthetic (1.0): acts that are completely 
unrelated to the ongoing topic of interaction. 
Example: Colin and Derick are playing 'Cowboys'. 
Derick: "It's a sunny day, isn't it ?" PARENTHETIC 
Colin: "Yes." ADJUST DIVERT 
Derick and Colin are walking together. 
Colin: "Indians coming! Quick!" ADJUST RETURN 
(iv) inappropriate (.75): acts that do not bear 
any semantic relation to antecedent acts and further, 
do not appear to have any expressed meaning themselves. 
Example: Linda is pushing a doll in a pram. She says she 
is 'shopping'. 
Hamish leans into the pram and INAPPROPRIATE 
swings the doll's arm back and forth 
several times. 
Linda: "Stop it." RADIAL 
Comments on 'Inappropriate': 
The 'inappropriate' category was only applied to non- 
verbal behaviours. It subsumes acts whose semantic 
relation to antecedent behaviours is not made evident by 
the actor. For example, in the interaction described 
above, it is not clear why Hamish is shaking the doll's 
arm. His act does not overtly relate to the stated theme 
of 'shopping', however, he could be pretending that he is 
a 'fellow- shopper greeting Linda's baby' in which case he 
is acknowledging her activity. Because it is not clear 
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whether or not these type of behaviours actually do 
constitute a change in topic, the categories 'adjust 
divert' and 'adjust return' were not employed for coding 
responses here. However, this sub -category was subsumed 
within the superordinate category, 'External' because 
contrary to the categories included in the 'Development' 
and 'Static' classifications, semantic relation to antecedent 
acts is unclear. This procedure necessarily means that I 
may have coded thematically distinct acts within the same 
category. However, the classification scheme employed 
can obviously only be applied to expressed topic of inter- 
action and thus, this flaw seemed unavoidable. 
Problems in application of 'theme' taxonomy: 
The inferential nature of this scheme is its major 
challenge. Thus, the results of inter -coder reliability 
tests were extremely encouraging. Apart from the 
behaviours subsumed within the 'inappropriate' category, 
'inferring meaning' was not particularly difficult. Most 
of the interactions recorded were verbally expressed, 
however, as noted in Chapter 2, nonverbal interactions were 
also recorded. Their meaning had to be inferred from 
accompanying utterances, to illustrate with an example: 
Linda states that the object she is holding 
(a piece of styrofoam) is a "gun ". She then 
aims the "gun" towards another child. 
The latter act was coded as 'radial', its meaning was 
inferred from the antecedent act and this inference, in 
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turn, was the criterion upon which its thematic relation 
to the antecedent act was based. 
Coding verbal utterances was obviously a more 
straightforward process however the meaning of monosyllables 
always had to be inferred from antecedent acts before 
thematic consonance could be ascertained. In a few cases 
the meaning of a child's utterance was classified by 
succeeding utterances. This is illustrated below: 
(1) Brian - Sally: "You're stupid. You kiss Billy." 
(2) Sally - Brian: "I'm not." 
(3) Brian - Sally: "You do." 
(4) Sally - Brian: "I'm not Billy." 
In this example, the 'meaning' of utterance 2 was inferred 
from utterance 4. Utterance 2, "I'm not ", could mean 
"I'm not stupid ", however, utterance 4 suggests that 
Sally has misinterpreted Brian's statement. Thus, both 
utterance 2 and 4 were coded as being 'athematic'. 
Fortunately, interactions like this were infrequent. 
III Analysis of Data 
Given the stability and selectivity of group organiza- 
tion, it was theorized above that the children are engaging 
in interactions that are mutually meaningful, i.e. a high 
degree of thematic consonance should be evidenced in their 
inter -relationships. Thematic consonance underlies 
successful communication and successful communication is 
necessarily implicit in assertions of selective group 
organization. 
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Two distinct hypotheses result from these speculations) 
(i) the children can discriminate communicative 
intent 
(ii) the children are using the thematic categories 
in the same way, i.e. thematic consonance 
should be present in their interactions. 
These hypotheses will be addressed below: 
(i) Discrimination of communicative intent 
Analysis will be sub -divided as follows: 
a) Responses to ?open? and 'closed' initiations. 
b) Open /Closed responses to initiations within 
the thematic sub -categories. 
c) Responses to thematically dissonant acts. 
d) Consideration of results. 
a) Responses to 'open' and 'closed' initiations: 
Table 4.1 presents 'Initiation' x 'Response' 
frequencies for 'open' and 'closed' behaviours. 'Open' 
initiations tend to receive an open response (89 per cent); 
only 11 per cent of responses to 'open' initiations are 
'closed'. On the other hand, responses to 'closed' 
initiations tend to be more evenly distributed: 54 per 
cent are closed and 46 per cent 'open'. 
b) Open /Closed Responses to Initiations within the 
thematic sub -categories: 
Table 4.2 presents relative frequencies of 'open' 













OPEN -CLOSED BEHAVIOURS: 
Initiation: x Response 
RESPONSE 
Open Closed 
4331 547 4878 (83%) 
(89%) (11 %) 
458 528 986 (17%) 
(46%) (54%) 
5864 
Percentages on extreme right are of row totals relative 
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[[ RES PONS E 
OPEN CLOSED 
introduce 620 93 
radial 1495 145 
tangential 314 30 
repetition & 99 8 
development 
adjust divert 131 12 
adjust return 255 25 
not significant 475 85 
imitation 194 23 
self- repetition 305 38 
athematic 67 16 
incidental 123 8 
parenthetic 247 44 
inappropriate 6 20 
OPEN CLOSED 
radial 222 219 
tangential 63 37 
adjust divert 37 44 
adjust return 14 22 
imitation 34 28 
self -repetition 28 81 
athematic 18 35 
incidental 12 14 
parenthetic 25 42 






and 'closed' initiations. A comparison of the two tables 
indicates that closed behaviours were employed not only 
less frequently, but also less extensively insofar as the 
variety of the thematic sub -categories is concerned. 
The strength of the relationship between type of act 
initiated (as defined by the thematic sub- categories) and 
whether or not it received an 'open' or 'closed' response 
was as follows: For 'open' initiations, the relationship 




= 11.2827, Kruskal- Wallis;). In contrast, the 
relationship is not significant for 'closed initiations 
fÇ.I 
(X2 = .7557, Kruskal- Wallis;). 
Results of analyses in sections (a) and (b) suggest: 
(1) Children prefer to engage in interactions that are 
conducive to further interaction. Thus, we may 
deduce a desire or willingness to interact. 
Gottman and Parkhurst (1980) found in their study 
of dyadic interactions that younger children (under 
five years) were more concerned with establishing 
a climate of agreement than were older children 
(5 to 6.1 years). For example, they inhibited 
disagreement (e.g. through agreeing) to a greater 
extent than did the older children. 
(2) The distribution of responses to 'open' and 'closed' 
thematically defined initiations does not appear 
to be random, suggesting that some form of inter- 
pretive process is present, i.e. that children are 
interpreting the content of an act and are basing 
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their responses on perceived content. The 
absence of any significant relationship between 
initiation type and response for closed initiations 
is interesting. Closed behaviours may serve the 
two distinct functions of either rejecting a thematic 
line or rejecting a person. Consider the distinc- 
tion between the following texts: 
(i) rejection of thematic line: 
Karen: Now, it's your turn to be patient. 
Linda: No, I don't like having bandages on me. 
(ii) rejection of a person: 
Brian - Jimmy: "You're not my friend." 
Obviously, these conversations have different social 
implications. The first interaction contains the 
possibility of continued interaction through 'thematic 
adjustments' in the conversation, i.e., Karen and 
Linda can do something else or Karen can agree to be 
a 'patient' again. The second interaction, on the 
other hand, excludes this possibility. This 
distinction between saying something 'negative' that 
does not terminate an interaction as opposed to 
saying something negative that does serve to 
terminate an interaction is central in a considera- 
tion of how children structure their social environ- 
ment. One would expect the former to be more 
likely to lead to an open response than the latter. 
This hypothesis will be investigated in further 
detail later in Chapter 5. 
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c) Responses to thematically dissonant acts: 
If thematic consonance is a regulative factor 
inherent in children's interactions, and children can 
discriminate communicative intent, then they should either 
adjust to thematically dissonant acts or reject them by 
returning to the original theme. Consider the following 
interaction: 
Colin, Derick and Edward are painting, 
Derick: "I have paint on my hands ". INTRODUCE 
Colin: "So have I." RADIAL 
Derick: "I was painting at home one day TANGENT 
and I left my dirty hands . . . " 
Edward interrupts: "cos my house has ATHEMATIC 
paint as well." 
Derick: "No, I paint." ADJUST RETURN 
Edward: "My house has got paint as well" ATHEMATIC 
Colin: "This is not what he means." ADJUST RETURN 
Derick: "I paint. Have you painted ?" ADJUST RETURN 
Edward: "Yes." RADIAL 
This interaction clearly illustrates an awareness of 
communicative intent. Derick appears to have comprehended 
the nature of Edward's misunderstanding of his remark and 
is trying to correct this misunderstanding, finally by 
actively steering him to a thematically consonant response 
i.e., "I paint. Have you painted ?" Moreover, Colin 
understands the communicative intent of both children and 
hence, the nature of the resultant misunderstanding, i.e., 




















Development(l) Static Externa 
Introduce ,1 Divert' Return 
etc. 
11 50 45 16 13 
(8.1 %) (37%) ,(33.3 %) (11.9% (9.6 %) 
1 
12 54 58 17 15 
(7.7%) (34.6%) (37.2%) (10.9% (9.6 %) 
14 122 91 58 49 
(4.2%) (36.6%) (27.2 %) (17.4% (14.7%) 
1386 9 46 349 283 
(66.9%) (.4%) (2.2 %) (16.: 
».) 
(13.7%) 
259 2 4 81 97 
(58.5%) (.5%) (.9%) (18.3 %) (21.9%) 
584 0 0 97 31 









(1)For the purposes of this analysis, 'Divert' (adjust to thematic 
change) and 'Return' (return to original theme) were separated from the 
other categories subsumed within 'Development'. 
( 2)Percentages on the extreme right are of row totals relative 
to the grand total. 
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sustained relationships presuppose thematically consonant 
interactions. Thus, misunderstandings like the one above 
should be actively rectified by the children themselves. 
This hypothesis was addressed by investigating the 
distribution of responses to 'External' initiations. 
The results are presented in Table 4.3. 
Examination of the table indicates that 
(1) Children prefer responses involving thematic 
progression to those involving thematic digression. 
(2) Children know when thematic dissonance has occurred. 
They tend to respond to its occurrence by re- 
establishing thematic consonance either through 
'picking up' on the new theme (adjust divert) or 
through returning to the original theme (adjust 
return). 'Adjust divert' and 'adjust return' 
responses will follow 'Development' initiations 
('radial' and 'tangential') when adjustment tó 
dissonance is not immediate. This occurs 
infrequently. Thematic dissonance tends to be 
addressed immediately. The hypothesis under 
examination is thus confirmed. Thematic 
consonance does appear to be a regulative factor 
in children's interactions. 
d) Consideration of results 
The above analyses indicate that children do not 
approach their social environment in a random and 
haphazard manner: 
(i) They show a distinct preference for interactions 
that are conducive to further interactions. 
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(ii) They structure their interactions within a mutually 
meaningful framework. Children appear to actively 
interpret the meaning of acts and selectively base 
their responses on perceived content. 
(iii) They not only prefer interactions that are 
mutually meaningful, but will choose to render 
interactions meaningful when thematic consonance 
is threatened. 
We may therefore conclude this section by asserting that 
analyses of the interactions of the children under study 
indicate that they can discriminate communicative intent. 
This concords with other research findings (e.g. McTear, 
1979; Keenan, 1973; Keenan and Klein, 1975; Walkerdine, 
1982). 
(ii) Children's use of thematic categories: 
These results justify an examination of the second 
hypothesis to repeat my argument at the beginning of this 
section: If children do organize their social environments 
in a selective and consistent manner, then they must be 
engaging in mutually meaningful interactions. Thematic 
consonance should be evidenced in their interactions which 
implies that the four groups should be using the thematic 
categories in the same way. 
Results 
1) Frequencies of initiations of all open and closed acts. 
Below in Table 4.4 are the relative frequencies and propor- 
tions of 'open' and 'closed' acts for each group: 
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Table 4.4 
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(83 %) (17 %) 
826 88 
(90 %) (10 %) 
520 163 
(76 %) (24 %) 
Perusal of the table indicates that all groups express 
a strong preference for acts that are conducive to further 
interaction, Group 3 engaging in the highest proportion of 
open acts and Group 4 the lowest. 
2) Thematic consonance by group 
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 contain the initiation x response 
frequencies based on thematic extensiveness for each group 
for open -open and closed -closed interactions. The thematic 
sub -categories were collapsed into their respective super - 
ordinate categories of thematic extensiveness. Development, 
Static and External as frequencies of occurrence for some 
combinations of thematic sub -categories were too low to 
justify individual attention (see Tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 
in the Appendix). The hypothesis was investigated using 
Kendall's concordance of rankings for open -open (2 = 29.2,) 
AP 
and closed -closed (X2 = 27.1.) behaviours separately. 
Results were significant (p .001) confirming the hypothesis. 
Thus, we may conclude that the four groups are using the 
thematic categories in the same way. 
Table 4.5 




Development 973 3o6 37 
Static 222 245 64 GROUP 1 
External 186 4o 3o 
RES FONSE 
Development Static External 
Developmen 414 94 66 
Static 69 86 24 GROUP 2 
External 64 12 6 
RES 1NSE 
Development Static External 
Development 263 32 37 
Static 39 57 12 GROUP 3 
External 29 4 5 
RESPONSE 
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N Development Static External 
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The results of analyses conducted in this chapter 
indicate that the interaction frequencies addressed in 
Chapter 3 consist generally of thematically related acts. 
Walkerdine (1982) argues that an "axis of selection" 
(page 137) is evident in discussive formats, however 
results here suggest that selection may be constrained by 
the communicative necessity of maintaining a semantic 
relation between individual acts. This is the basis of 
coherent interactions. 
The children upon whom this study is based appear to 
not only prefer interactions that are conducive to further 
interactions, they also appear to maintain coherence by 
(a) interpreting the communicative intent of others and, 
(b) basing their responses on perceived intent. Moreover, 
continuity is generally restored when thematic consonance 
is threatened. An obligation that is implicit - to 
maintain mutually meaningful interactions - becomes explicit 
when dissonance occurs. In this way, mutual regulation 
and control may be operative within interactions and hence, 
a social structure like the one suggested by the results 
of sociographic analyses conducted in Chapter 3 (page 99) 
can emerge. 
We have seen that all four groups do appear to be 
using the thematic sub -categories in the same way, and, as 
stated above, a social structure based on relationships 
presupposes mutually meaningful interactions. However, 
if children do establish a social structure based on the 
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selective organisation of relationships, then this must 
be conveyed in the course of their interactions with each 
other. Addressing this issue will be the task of the 
following chapters. 
143 
CHAPTER 5: EXCLUSION 
I Introduction 
Campbell and Wales (1970) have defined communicative 
competence as the ability to understand utterances which 
are appropriate to the context in which they are made. 
Context provides the framework within which individuals 
interact, defined by the physical (e.g. activity) and 
social (e.g. degree of familiarity) factors that are 
inherent in their encounter. Thus, context is a shared 
experience and is necessarily based on mutual and often 
implied understandings. 
Consider the following interaction: 
Edward (1) *, Derick (1), Hamish (2) and George (2) 
are at the art table. Hamish (2) has stuck a 
matchbox onto an empty plastic container. 
Edward reaches for Hamish's 'construction', 
Hamish pulls it away, saying: "Don't. . . no." 
Edward is crying. Hamish shakes the container 
and says: "See nothing's . . . there's nothing 
inside it." 
Hamish shows Edward the object. 
Derick - Edward: "They're not teasing." 
George - Edward: "There's nothing in it." 
George shows Edward the container. 
Derick - Edward: "It's just blue stuff." 
* Numbers in brackets following a child's name refer to 
Group to which child belongs. 
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Edward stops crying, the four children go to 
the climbing frame together. 
This interaction is based on the transmission of 
mutual understandings. Children are actively interpreting 
a social situation - i.e. the reasons underlying Edward's 
distress - and their interpretations of this situation are 
implicitly conveyed and understood. Thus, they can come 
together in their attempts to alleviate Edward's distress. 
Hamish does not say: 
"I think Edward is upset because I'm not 
letting him take my construction." 
Rather, this meaning is implied in: 
"See nothing's . . . There's nothing 
inside it." 
Moreover, the implicit meaning of this utterance is 
immediately understood by Derick: 
"They're not teasing." 
George's remark, in turn, reflects his interpretation of 
the implied meaning of "teasing ": 
"There's nothing in it." 
Indeed, Derick's remark is interesting in that 
a) it suggests that he has some form of supposition about 
the relationship between Hamish and George and, based on 
this supposition, has assumed George's involvement by 
virtue of Hamish's. Hamish is solely responsible for the 
object under discussion and moreover, the argument had 
occurred between him and Edward. 
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b) it expresses Derick's interpretation, as a third 
person, of 'their' intentions. 
If we isolate these utterances from their context of 
occurrence, we lose not only their 'meaning' but the 
relationships that they reflect too. Abstract George's 
remark, "There's nothing in it ", and it becomes a 
description of an object rather than an act upon his social 
environment. Children do act with intended effect upon 
their social environment. The above example is illustra- 
tive of an interest that extends beyond themselves, of an 
interest in the relationships and feelings of others and 
their consequent attempts to bring about changes in their 
social environment - i.e., to alleviate Edward's distress. 
Acts are not discrete and independent units; they occur 
not within a void, but within a context. 
In this chapter, I will argue that children, in their 
communications with each other, actively establish and 
maintain a social context which is expressive of the 
differential relationships upon which group organization 
is based. If the social structure is selectively organized 
then this selective organisation should be expressed in 
children's interactions. 
II Solidarity 
If the group does constitute a distinct social unit 
then its very distinctness necessarily implies the active 
use of exclusive behaviours. Exclusive behaviours are 
those which function to deny group membership and thereby 
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protect group identity. This line of thought logically 
concludes in the assertion that exclusive behaviours 
should be selectively distributed in a manner conforming 
to the proposed structure of social organisation. 
In the previous chapter, I suggested that 'closed' 
behaviours may subsume two functionally distinct forms of 
social behaviour, i.e., that of rejecting a person, and 
that of rejecting a theme or an idea (page 133). Consider 
the two examples below: 
(i) rejection of theme or idea 
Mary (4), a 'patient', is being taken to 
hospital on an 'ambulance boat'. (The 
'vehicle' consists of an arrangement of 
large blocks; at the front is a large 
block with a steering wheel on it.) 
Jimmy (2) is the 'driver'. Earlier this same 
morning, Group 2 children had built this 
structure and called it a 'boat'. George (2) 
protests against this changed identity, saying 
to Jimmy: "This is a boat." 
Jimmy doesn't respond. George then says 
repeatedly to Jimmy: "This is a boat!" 
Jimmy. "It's an ambulance boat." 
George: "No, it's not." 
Jimmy: "Yes it is. Here's the patient." 
Jimmy points to Mary. George leaves. 
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(ii) rejection of person: 
Brian (1 ) and Arthur (1) are on the climbing 
frame. Linda (3) approaches. 
Linda: "I'll be your friend if you let me on." 
Brian: "We don't want to be your friend." 
Brian - Arthur: "She's a silly girl." 
Linda: "Well, I'm still coming on." (rejection of 
theme) 
These two examples illustrate interactions bearing 
functionally distinct implications. In the first example 
George is rejecting the identity Jimmy has ascribed to the 
structure. He does not, however, reject Jimmy, whereas 
in the second example, Linda herself is explicitly being 
rejected. Moreover, her response constitutes a rejection 
of the import of Brian's utterance - i.e., she refuses to 
go away = rather than a rejection of Brian. 
Piaget (1926) approaches this topic within an intra- 
individualistic rather than a social context. As noted 
in Chapter 4, acts are ascribed a communicative value on 
the basis of a consideration of cognitive constraints 
(page 113). In his functional classification of speech, 
he delineates the two categories 'Criticism and Derision' 
and 'Commands, Requests and Threats', describing them as 
the "socialized language of the child in its non- 
intellectual aspect" (page 26). Constitutive factors 
within the child himself circumscribe the relationships in 
which he participates (Piaget, 1926). Therefore, 
potential for true interchange is pre- determined by level 
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of cognitive development. Thus Piaget isolates content 
from context and considers utterances classified within 
'Criticisms and Derision' and 'Commands, Requests and 
Threats' within an intra- individualistic perspective. 
Utterances within the category 'Criticism and Derision' 
reflect a baser side of human nature: 
"Their function is not to convey thoughts, but 
to satisfy non -intellectual instincts such as 
pugnacity, pride, emulation etc." (page 26) 
'Commands, Requests and Threats' are referred to as 
"language that is bound up with action" (page 42). Inter- 
actions between children are rooted in action, in their 
ongoing activities, rather than in the formation and 
maintenance of relationships per se: 
"The child does not in the first instance 
communicate with his fellow -beings in order 
to share thoughts and reflexions; he does 
so in order to play." (page 27) 
Children's statements are not considered within the 
context of the interaction within which they occurred but 
within the context of the speaker's cognitive level, i.e., 
they are abstracted from a relationship and considered 
in relation to the child himself, indicating a desire to 
emulate or supersede or an absorption in his own activity. 
Thus, utterances bearing socially distinct implications 
receive the same functional classifications. For example, 
classified within 'Commands, Requests and Threats' are the 
statements, "Ez, come and see the salamander" and "No, 
take it away 'cos I want to put on mine" (page 27) though 
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the former is expressive of an invitation for mutual 
involvement in an activity and the latter, the converse. 
Similarly, the utterances "You're not putting it in the 
middle" (a plate on the table) and "We made that house, 
it isn't their's" (page 27) are classified as being 
functionally equivalent and within the category 'Criticism 
and Derision'. However, the social implications of these 
two utterances are quite distinct, the former referring to 
the addressee's activity, the latter to a mutual activity. 
Moreover, in the first utterance, the child is objecting 
to a particular action per se - i.e., the addressee is 
putting the plate in the wrong place (rejection of theme) 
- whereas in the second utterance, the child is objecting 
that other children are interfering with their (the 
speaker and his friend) house though they don't have right 
of access to it (exclusion). Thus, though both utterances 
do constitute criticisms, their functions within the 
relationship are distinct. 
Functionally diverse statements are extracted from 
their context of occurrence and ascribed a common social 
significance on the basis of constraints inherent in the 
child's developmental level rather than on the basis of 
constraints inherent in a relationship. Indeed, this is 
a necessary consequence of an intra- individualistic 
approach. Results of analyses in chapters 3 and 4 
indicate that children selectively organise their relation- 
ships within a mutually meaningful framework. This 
suggests that constraints in individual action as a function 
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of relationships are operative. Consider the following 
example: 
Edward (1) is sitting before a steering wheel 
attached to a large block. He is turning it 
around, having said he's driving the car to 
the hospital where Fiona (1) is a "patient ". 
He is repeatedly calling Fiona, exhorting her 
to join him. Hamish (2) approaches, sits 
behind Edward and states that he's a 
"passenger ". Edward responds by pushing 
Hamish away, Saying: "It's not a taxi or a 
bus . . . it's a car." 
Edward then explains to Hamish that a car is 
not a vehicle of public transportation like a 
bus or a taxi. 
Hamish's assumption of the role of 'passenger', though 
thematically consonant, is not acceptable to Edward. 
The 'car', being a vehicle of private transportation, is 
not available for Hamish's use. It is, however, 
available for Fiona's use. 
Within Piaget's classification scheme, Edward's 
statement to Hamish would be classified within the 
category 'Demands, Requests and Threats'. Also classified 
within this category would be his exhortations to Fiona 
to join him. Though both utterances function as 
directives, the latter is intended to secure an interaction, 
the former, conversely, to terminate an interaction. 
Contexts of occurrence render them functionally distinct 
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and it is this distinction that determines their separate 
classifications under the taxonomic system employed here. 
Thus, Edward's directive to Fiona to join him in his car 
is classified as an 'inclusive' act (see Chapter 6 page 194) 
whereas his directive to Hamish not to enter his 'car' 
is classified as an 'exclusive' act (see page 152). 
Consideration of context of occurrence indicates that these 
utterances are selectively applied: Edward is friends with 
Fiona but not with Hamish (as suggested by sociographic 
analyses, page 99) and he is actively maintaining this 
distinction. Differential relationships can only be 
maintained through differential communications and the 
signification of these communications can only be 
ascertained by a consideration of social context in our 
analyses. 
Indeed, if the proposed form of social structure is 
based on group organisation and differentiation, then 
children must be engaging in behaviours that maintain this 
differentiation, i.e., the distinctness of this differentia- 
tion necessarily implies the active and selective use of 
exclusive behaviours. As noted earlier, 'closed' 
behaviours may subsume behaviours involving 'rejection of 
- theme' and 'rejection of person' (exclusive behaviours). 
If the groups do constitute distinct social units, then 
this distinctness should be reflected in the use of these 
behaviours according to group membership. Exclusive 
behaviours should be used more in interactions with non - 
group members than in interactions with group members, 
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whereas 'reject theme' behaviours should be used more in 
internal interactions. This hypothesis will be investi- 
gated below. 
Categories 
The following categories of behaviour will be 
employed to investigate the above hypothesis. (Reliability 
coefficients are presented in brackets): 
A. Exclusion: Rejection of person (.94): 
a) Deny access (1.00): refuse integration in activity. 
Example: 
Mary (4) is in a large box. 
Nancy (4) approaches. 
Mary: "This is my room. This is my room." Deny 
access 
Nancy enters the box. 
Mary: "No, I sleep here." Deny access 
Nancy sits down. 
Mary: "Nancy! This is my room!" _ Deny access 
Nancy is leaving. 
Mary: "This is my room, O.K. ?" Deny access 
'Deny access' can also be nonverbally expressed, for 
example, pushing away someone who is attempting inclusion. 
It may also be expressed in a more subtle manner: 
Fiona (1) and Brian (1) are "doing jobs in the 
house ". The "house" is an arrangement of large 
blocks. The hospital instruments are tools, 
e.g. the stethoscope is a hammer. Hamish (2) 
seeks inclusion in the activity: 
153 
Hamish - Fiona: "Need a tool." 
Fiona - Hamish: "No, you don't need a tool." Deny 
access 
b) Deny friendship (1.00): statements involving denial 
of friendship, such as expressions of dislike, refusal to 
come to each other's 'parties', and explicit denials of 
friendship. 
Example: 
Edward breaks Colin's "fire" (bricks piled on 
top of each other). 
Colin: "You're not coming to my party!" Deny friend- 
ship 
c) Insult ( .82): 'Offensive' acts such as telling a 
child he is 'stupid', making faces, expletives etc. 
Example: 
Group 1 children are playing on the boxes. 
Nancy (4) climbs onto a box: 
Arthur - Nancy: "Off!" Deny access 
Arthur - Nancy: "You've got a dirty face." Insult 
B. Reject Theme (.84): 
a) Demand cessation (.90): directives requiring that 
the child cease engagement in a particular activity. 
Example: 
George (2) and Jimmy (2) are competing at the 
dough table over who can make the biggest "man ". 
Jimmy: "George, I've finished my one." 
George: "I've finished my one." 
However, George adds more dough to his "man" 
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and is increasing its size with the rolling 
pin. 
Jimmy: "George, don't make your's the Demand 
cessation 
biggest." 
b) Counteract (.77): denials of actual content of 
peer's act. 
Example: 
Linda (3) and Derick (1) are at the climbing 
frame together. 
Derick describes their activity as "gymnastics ". 
Linda: "No it isn't. No it isn't. Counteract 
No it isn't. My teacher tells me 
it's not gymnastics at school." 
Derick: "You don't go to school. You go Counteract 
to nursery." 
Results 
For the purposes of this analysis, sub -categories 
were collapsed according to whether or not they involved 
rejection of theme or rejection of person for the following 
reasons: 
i) attention to individual sub -categories was 
not pertinent to the hypothesis under 
investigation. 
ii) some of the sub -categories are used too 
infrequently by particular children (e.g. 
Group 3 doesn't use 'Deny friendship) to 
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The results of this analysis are presented in 
Table 5.1. The hypothesis that 'reject person' 
(exclusion) behaviours are more likely to occur in 
external interactions whereas 'reject theme' behaviours 
are more likely to occur in internal interactions is 
confirmed (2 = 79, p .001A) . The way in which a 
disagreement is conducted does appear to be related to 
the nature of the relationship between the interactants. 
These results also suggest that consideration of the 
context within which acts occur can provide information 
about the way in which children structure their social 
relationships. 
'Exclusion' in the research literature 
Exclusion, as an organisational feature of preschool 
children's relationships, has received scant attention in 
the research literature. Rubin (1980) notes that "Even 
among toddlers in the Kibbutz, group membership is closely 
linked to the exclusion of non -members." Thus, exclusion 
appears to be a form of behaviour characterizing the 
relationships of children younger than the children 
comprising this sample. In an investigation of children's 
relationships, Corsaro (1981) reports that children are 
predominantly concerned with 
a) gaining access to ongoing activities and, 
b) resisting access attempts of others into 
activities once they themselves have 
achieved inclusion. 
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Corsaro isolates the following five categories of 
exclusion: 
i) verbal resistance with no justification 
ii) justification based on arbitrary rules 
iii) ownership claims 
iv) justification with reference to space or number 
of people involved 
IT) denial of friendship. 
Ownership claims and justification with reference to space 
or number of people involved were found to be the most 
consistently used types of exclusion (46.8 per cent and 
17 per cent respectively). 
Aspects of Corsaro's methodological approach 
constrain the significance of his findings: 
i) His sampling units were derived from what he terms 
"interactive episodes ". These were interactions occurring 
between individuals within ecological (i.e. activity) 
areas of the nursery. Sampling terminated when children 
left the area: 
". . . I defined an interactive episode as 
sequences of behaviour that begin with the 
acknowledged presence of 2 or more interactants 
in an ecological area and end with the 
physical movement of interactants from the 
area, which terminates the originally 
initiated activity." (page 212) 
Thus, the commencement and termination of an interactive 
episode may sometimes have been determined by physical 
location though the children under observation may have 
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been interacting prior to entering the area, or after 
leaving the area, or both. Such information can only 
be obtained by alternative sampling methods - such as 
focal individual sampling (see Chapter 2 page 42) - and 
moreover, this information is essential in a study of 
organizational features inherent in childrenfs relation- 
ships. Consider the following example: 
Derick (1) and Iain (2) are playing with large 
blocks. Arthur (1) enters the area, 
Arthur: " Derick, we can have our snack." 
Derick leaves with Arthur, Iain is alone. 
If interactive episode was determined by physical location 
the interaction between Iain and Derick would have been 
artificially terminated upon Derick's departure, though 
their interaction does in fact continue: 
There is an empty chair at the snack table. 
Derick calls Iain: "Iain, we keep this 
chair for you." 
Iain goes to the snack table, the 
interaction continues. 
Corsaro asserts that children interact in order to gain 
access to, and participate in, an activity rather than to 
form relationships per se yet this observation could be 
an artefact of his sampling methods, not to mention his 
finding that 51 per cent of the interactive episodes were 
less than 5 minutes and 32 per cent were less than 10 
minutes. The social context within which an interaction 
occurs is distinct from its physical context. 
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ii) Corsarots sample is based on the following two pre- 
school groups: A morning class of 24 children with an age 
range of 2 years 11 months to 3 years 11 months and an 
afternoon class of 26 children with an age range of 3 years 
9 months to 4 years 10 months. Corsaro collapses the two 
groups and thus has a sample with a two year age range 
that are treated as a homogeneous unit. Moreover, 
children under four years of age must have dominated his 
sample. As his data analyses are generally based on 
averages, interpreting the significance of his findings is 
problematic. Differences in the social and linguistic 
skills of preschool children as a function of age have been 
well documented in the research literature. (e.g. Foot et 
al, 1979; Shatz and Gelman, 1975). Indeed, length of 
interaction alone has been found to vary as a function of 
age in preschool children (e.g. Van Alstyne, 1932). 
iii) Videotapes of interactions were coded on a dyadic 
basis: 
"In this coding procedure no child could have 
more than one social contact with any other 
particular participant in a given episode." 
(page 226) 
Thus, interactions involving more than two children are 
coded in the same way as dyadic interactions. Yet an 
interaction is not necessarily dyadically based. This is 
illustrated in the interaction below: 
Group 1 children are teasing Nancy at the snack table. 
Brian: "Shets got smelly crisps." 
Colin: "She's got cherry crisps." 
160 
Brian: "She's got soggy crisps." 
Edward: "We got clean crisps." 
Brian: "We got clean crisps." 
Colin: "She's got cherry crisps." 
Three children were evidently involved, albeit in varying 
degrees, in the above interaction, not to mention Nancy, 
the target of mild teasing. Thus, coding individual 
utterances dyadically would distort the social context 
within which they occurred. 
iv) Corsaro reports that there were no instances in 
which certain children were consistently accepted or 
rejected. He does not report whether or not children 
equally sought access to all interacting groups regardless 
of group composition or to particular groups. Whether or 
not the behaviours under study were differentially distri- 
buted across the sample is also not addressed. Only the 
distribution of these behaviours relative to each other 
is presented. Yet, Corsaro notes that children tend to 
play with particular peers more than others. Therefore, 
differential affiliative preferences must have characterized 
his sample. He argues that children form multiple 
relationships in order to maximize their chances of 
involvement in activities. However, the same argument 
could be made of adults who also have multiple friendships. 
Corsaro4s argument that children interact with many 
individuals in order to maximize opportunities for inclusion 
in activities rather than to form relationships is 
reminiscent of Piaget's (1926) assertion that "the child 
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does not in the first instance communicate with his fellow - 
beings in order to share thoughts and reflexions; he does 
so in order to play" (page 27). However, Corsaro does 
not provide any empirical justification for his assertion 
and, moreover, his methodological approach confines him to 
a consideration of the distribution of his categories 
relative to each other rather than their distribution 
relative to children's relationships, not to mention 
underlying motivations. Though his results do provide 
important information about the ways in which children 
organize their relationships, his approach does not allow 
him to exclude the possibility that an ongoing activity 
may be the result of a pre -existing relationship - i.e., 
children may play tógether because they like each other - 
rather than the relationship being the result of the 
activity. Indeed, results of the above 'Reject theme'/ 
'Reject person' analyses indicate that children do 
selectively structure their conflicts in a manner that 
conforms to the organisation of their affiliative 
preferences such that in interactions with friends, the 
substantive content of the act per se is rejected whereas 
in interactions with non -friends, the 'actor' himself is 
rejected. 
Exclusion and Group Size 
If children do employ exclusive behaviours to protect 
their relationships, rather than to protect their inclusion 
in activities, then we should expect the use of exclusive 
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to bear some relationship to group size. As Shaw (1971) 
observes, the potential number of interpersonal relation- 
ships between group members necessarily increases with group 
size. As noted in Chapter 3 (page 107), interactional 
differences between relationships involving more than two 
people compared to those involving two people have been 
reported in the adult research literature (e.g. Cartwright 
and Zander, 1968; Shaw, 1971). Allen* (1981) writes: 
"certain phenomena are possible in groups of 
3 or more that are not possible in two -person 
interactions: for example, coalition, rejecting 
a deviant, majority pressure." (page 183) 
Rubin (1980) makes a similar point: 
"A group . . . is a social entity which 
transcends the level of individual personalities 
and two -person relationships. . . Groups also 
pose for the child some of the most acute 
problems of social life - of inclusion and 
exclusion, conformity and independence." (page 91) 
The above research suggests that dyads will not use 
exclusive behaviours to the same extent as groups composed 
of three or more. These speculations lead to the 
following hypothesis: 
Results of the previous analyses suggest that 
children do use exclusive behaviours to protect 
their relationships rather than to protect 
There is disagreement in the research literature regarding 
whether or not a dyad constitutes a ?group?. Allen (1981) 
and Rubin (198 0) do not regard a dyad as a ?group? contrary 
to Putallaz and Gottman (1981) , Shaw (1971) and Hinde (1979) . 
The distinction appears to be purely definitional. 
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their inclusion in activities. If this were 
not the case, they would not be using these 
behaviours differentially according to the 
identity of the target child. However, the 
above research findings do suggest that the 
use of exclusive behaviours will be affected 
by group size and resultant interactional 
possibilities. For example, coalition 
against an 'outsider' is less likely to occur 
within a dyad than within a larger group. 
Thus, one would expect Groups 1 and 2 to be 
making a more rigid distinction than Groups 
3 and 4 in their use of 'reject person' 
behaviours across internal and external 
interactions. 
Results 
Table 5.2 contains the relative frequencies of 'reject 
person' and 'reject theme' behaviours by group size. 
(Groups were collapsed on the basis of size however Groups 
3 and 4 were engaging in these behaviours in the same way 
as each other as were Groups 1 and 2.) The hypothesis is 
not confirmed. Examination of the table indicates that 
in Groups 1 and 2,79 per cent of total 'reject person' 
initiations are directed towards non -group members and, 
similarly, in Groups 3 and 4 76 per cent of initiations are 
directed towards non -group members. The obvious argument 
against this latter finding is that it could be merely a 
result of the fact that 'external targets' comprise a large 
Table 5.2 
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number of children however, analyses conducted in Chapter 6 
reveal that inclusive behaviours are evenly distributed 
across internal and external interactions for Groups 3 and 
4 (page 201). If number of individuals was the determinative 
factor then inclusive behaviours should be similarly 
distributed as exclusive behaviours, however they are 
inversely related. Thus, it does appear that the distribu- 
tion of 'reject person' initiations for Groups 3 and 4 
reflects selectively structured interactions as it does with 
the larger Groups 1 and 2. Indeed, this finding is 
interesting in view of Allen's (1981) and Rubin's (1980) 
assertions (cited above) that exclusion is a property of 
larger groups but not of dyads (they do not regard a dyad 
as a group). The results here suggest that, for this 
sample of children, exclusion serves to protect relation- 
ships within dyads as well as the relationships between 
larger 'groups' of children. 
However, an unexpected observation is that Groups 1 
and 2 appear to be making a greater distinction than Groups 
3 and 4 in their relative use of 'reject person' and 
'reject theme' behaviours, i.e., 'reject person' is used 
more in external interactions whereas 'reject theme' is 
used more in internal interaction. Groups 3 and 4 do appear 
to be making some distinction (i.e., internal: 29 per cent 
(person) to 71 per cent (theme) - external: 36 per cent 
(person) to 64 per cent (theme)) though it is obviously not 
of sufficient magnitude to yield statistical significance. 
Indeed, significant results were obtained for Groups 1 and 2. 
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( 
Y-2 = 93.2, p 4.001") but not for Groups 3 and 4 (1.2 = 1 .4, 
,dC -I 
not significant). Hence, group size appears to exercise an 
effect in so far as the relative distribution of 'reject 
person' - 'reject theme' behaviours is concerned but 'reject 
person' behaviours appear to be an important organizational 
feature for all groups. 
Functional Outcome of Exclusive Behaviour 
Results of analyses undertaken thus far suggest that 
exclusive behaviours are a constituent factor underlying 
the social organization of this sample of children. 
Children do appear to be engaging in behaviours that main- 
tain a social structure based on the organisation of 
affiliative preferences, i.e., they do behave differently with 
those who are their friends compared to those who are not 
in a consistent and sustained manner. 
Relationships appear to be important to children thus 
they engage in actions that regulate and maintain a social 
world of a distinct and differentiated nature. The 
differential distribution of 'reject theme' and 'reject 
person' behaviours across internal and external interactions 
appears to be especially important in the interactions of 
Groups 1 and 2 though we have seen that Groups 3 and 4 are 
making some distinction. However 'reject person' 
(exclusion) behaviours occur more frequently in the 
external interactions of all groups. These results 
suggest that restraints in individual actions may be 
operative as a function of relationships which, in turn, 
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suggests that these two categories of behaviour may have 
different functional outcomes, that is to say, they have 
different effects on an interaction. Consider the 
following: 
Derick (1) and Edward (1) are guards on a train. 
They are in the Wendy House making themselves 
supper before they start to collect tickets: 
Brian (1) approaches them saying: 
"We have to go to school." 
Derick promptly rejects Brian's statement: 
"We don't go to school we work on the trains." (Reject 
theme) 
At this point, Brian has two alternatives: 
i) he can conform and behave appropriately, 
i.e., state that he is also a member of the 
train crew, 
ii) not change his behaviour, thus rendering' 
himself ineligible for participation in the 
activity. 
Brian opts for the former alternative. 
Let us compare this interaction to the previously 
mentioned example in which Edward would not allow Hamish 
to be a 'passenger' in his car on the grounds "it's not 
a taxi or a bus ". Both examples involve rejections 
initiated by members of Group 1 with the important 
difference that in one case it is directed towards a 
friend and, in the other case, to someone who is not a 
friend. In the first example, Brian (1) made a themati- 
cally dissonant remark, however his friend responded by 
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creating a situation where correction was possible and 
therefore, subsequent inclusion in the ongoing activity. 
In contrast, Hamish's remark was thematically consonant 
but his rejection was based on his identity and thus, the 
possibility of inclusion was not made available to him. 
Restraints in individual action within relationships 
appear to be determined by: 
(i) who you are (person) 
(ii) what you do or say (theme) 
Consideration of these examples suggests that.a different 
type of interaction may be associated with 'reject 
person' initiations as opposed to 'reject theme' 
initiations - as they do appear to bear socially different 
implications. These speculations lead to the following 
hypothesis: 
If exclusion does function to protect intra- 
group relations, then 'reject person' 
behaviours should be more likely to lead to 
a 'closed' (see page 118) response than 
'reject theme' behaviours. This should 
hold regardless of group size. 
Results 
Table 5.3 presents the distribution of responses to 
'reject person' and 'reject theme' initiations. Because 
the relationship between these categories of behaviour 
differed by group size, Groups 1 and 2 and Groups 3 and 4 
are considered separately here to see if the responses 
Table 5.3 
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differed on the same basis. However, the hypothesis is 
confirmed for both larger and smaller groups. 'Reject 
person' initiations are more likely to lead to a closed 
response than 'reject theme' initiations whereas 'reject 
theme' initiations are more likely to lead to an 'open' 
response than 'reject person' initiations (Groups 1 and 2, 
2 dPs o c9Ç ' 
)(.2 = 9.1 , p :.005,,; Groups 3 and 4, x = 5.03, p .025,.) . 
Thus, it does appear that exclusion functions to protect 
intra -group relations. 
Closed behaviours do indeed have a disruptive effect 
on interactions. In the thematic analyses conducted in 
Chapter 4, a significant relationship was found between 
type of act initiated (thematic sub -categories) and type 
of response received (open /closed) for 'open' initiations 
but not for 'closed' initiations (page 132). The 
differential responses to 'reject theme' and 'reject 
person' (exclusion) initiations would seem to account for 
this result. Further, this finding indicates the extent 
to which children actively interpret the content of acts 
and base their response on their interpretations. 
Considerations 
Trevarthen (1982) writes: 
"Human beings neither know nor perceive as 
isolated individuals." (page 81) 
This assertion summarizes the fundamental approach upon 
which this research endeavour is based. If we consider 
children's interactions within their context of 
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occurrence, a social world that is distinct and 
differentiated emerges, rather than a converse one marked 
by diffuseness and lack of differentiation. It is this 
latter 'world' which prevails in traditional cognitive 
theories of early social development. 
Analyses of the distribution of exclusive behaviours 
and 'reject theme' within a social context indicate that 
children act upon their social environments with intended 
effect, the net result a social organization of a defined 
and distinctive nature that is predicated upon their 
friendship preferences. Corsaro (1981) looked at the 
occurrence of specific behaviours within a social context 
yet considered his results within an intra- individualistic 
context i.e., children engage in certain behaviours in 
order to ensure their own inclusion within an activity. 
Piaget (1926) extracted acts from their social context, 
considered them within the context of restraints inherent 
in developmental level and then made assertions about 
relationships on the basis of analyses conducted within 
an intra- individualistic framework. I am not by any 
means trying to negate the significance of factors such 
as cognitive or linguistic levels, but rather, am 
endeavouring to argue that, in studying social behaviour, 
we must necessarily consider the different situations in 
which different social acts occur since a social act is, 
by definition, inter -individual. Thus, approaching it 
from an intra- individualistic perspective is fraught with 
both heuristic and ontological problems since such an 
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approach can lead to conclusions based upon the perspective 
within which the phenomenon was examined rather than upon 
the actual phenomenon itself. As Ervin -Tripp and Mitchell - 
Kernan (1977) write: 
"Both the interpretation of what is said and 
rules for choosing among options depend on 
features of the social context such as setting 
and activity, and features of the speaker, 
addressee, and audience." (page 2) 
If we look at a social phenomenon in relation to the 
relationship rather than in relation to the individual, a 
2rnerSeS; nne_ 
social structureAthat is made distinct and orderly by the 
children's own actions, 
Pronominal references 
-, _,;15erms of address can establish a context 
based on social contrasts. Consider the following example: 
Group 1 children - Derick, Edward and Arthur - 
return from the snack table to find Group 2 
children - George, Hamish and Jimmy - on 
their 'ship'. Group 1 children protest 
against this invasion of their territory: 
Edward (1): "What are Lou doing on our ship, 
huh ?" 
Hamish (2): "We're making a different ship 
for zou." 
Derick (1): "They're breaking our ship." 
Group 2 continue engaging in building 
activity, Group 1 are watching them, 
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Arthur (1): "We don't like your ship." 
Derick (1): "We're going to break it." 
(My emphasis) 
Exclusion and inclusion complement each other. The 
appositional use of pronominal references - i.e., the 
inclusive 'we' or 'our' versus the exclusive 'you', 'your' 
or 'they' - expresses a social context based on two 
discrete alignments. Consider the following example: 
Karen (3) and Nancy (4) are in the see -saw 
together. Linda (3) enters a cardboard box 
beside them and announces: 
"Now I can play 'Jack in the Box' with myself 
because nobody's helping me." 
. . . Karen (3) and Nancy (4) continue rocking. . 
Linda (3): "I'm only going to ask Karen in my 
car. Karen, would zzu like to 
come in my car. ?" 
Karen (3) tells Nancy (4) to stop rocking. 
Nancy (4) doesn't. 
Linda (3) - Nancy (4): "Stop . . . you're 
naughty." 
Karen (3) screams. Nancy (4) hits Karen (3) 
says: "Don't scream." 
Linda (3) - Karen (3): "Hit her." 
Karen (3) enters the 'car' with Linda (3). 
Nancy (4) starts knocking the 'car' . 
In this example we also see a complementary co- occurrence 
of inclusion and exclusion. An inclusive relationship 
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is established between Karen and Linda and, simultaneously, 
an exclusive relationship between Karen and Linda versus 
Nancy. Linda establishes this particular context in 
saying: "I'm only going to ask Karen." Within Karen's 
inclusion is expressed Nancy's exclusion. Thus, a social 
context based on appositional relationships is established. 
However, this interaction does express a qualitativèly 
different relationship exists between Karen and Linda 
compared to the relationships between children comprising 
Groups 1 and 2 respectively. Linda uses first person 
singular pronominal references, referring to the 'vehicle' 
as "my car ". Groups 1 and 2, on the other hand, both 
employ first person plural pronominal references. 
Inclusion and exclusion are mutually definitive. 
One necessarily implies the other. In forming an inclusive 
relationship with particular individuals, one is ipso facto 
forming an exclusive relationship with certain other 
individuals. Pronominal references are important in that 
they are expressive of types of relationships and thereby, 
of social context. The examples presented above involve 
alliances within groups against non -group members. Below 
is an example of a social context based on an alliance with 
a non -group member against a group member: 
Nancy (4) and Mary (4) are playing together. 
Mary: "You a queen and me a princess." 
Mary and Nancy then sit before a steering 
wheel and are turning it around together. 
Nancy then yells "Mary!" and'collapses' on 
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the floor. Mary attempts to 'revive' her. 
Janet (0) puts a pillow under Nancy's head. 
Nancy pushes Janet away. 
Mary (4) - Janet (0): "Nancy's dead . . 
C'mon, let's go away." (my emphasis) 
Nancy (4) follows Mary (4) and Janet (0) to 
the see -saw. 
Nancy (4) - Janet (0): "Get out!" 
Nancy (4) holds the see -saw such that they 
can't use it. 
Nancy (4) - Mary (4): "I was going to come to 
your party." 
Mary (4) - Nancy (4): "You're not my friend." 
Janet (0) - Mary (4): "You're my friend." 
Mary (4) - Janet (0) : "Yes." 
Nancy (4) - Mary (4): "I want to come to your 
party." 
. . . Mary doesn't respond. 
Nancy (4), crying - Mary (4): "I was your best 
friend and I was . . . we was princesses." 
Janet (0) and Mary (4) leave, Nancy (4) is 
following them. 
In this interaction Mary aligns herself with Janet 
and this alignment is used to express Nancy's exclusion. 
For example, in the utterance: "Nancy's still dead. . 
C'mon, let's go away ", an exclusive third person singular 
- Nancy is only referred to, not addressed - is followed 
* Younger child 
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by an inclusive first person plural. Nancy, on the other 
hand, is trying to protect her relationship with Mary 
through attempts to oust Janet and assert her own relation- 
ship with Mary: 
"I was your best friend and I was . . . we was 
princesses." 
Mary had, in fact, assigned the role of ?princess' to 
herself ( "You a queen and me a princess ") whereas in the 
above utterance, Nancy transforms it into a mutual identity. 
This interaction also emphasizes the importance of 
considering the context within which acts occur. Nancy 
is very clearly concerned about her relationship with Mary 
rather than about gaining inclusion in the see -saw activity. 
Her statements indicate a concern about friendship that 
extends beyond the immediate interchange which is proposed 
by many theorists (e.g. Selman, 1981) to constitute the 
basis of young children ?s conceptions of friendship (see 
Chapter 1, pages 25 -26). Indeed, the interaction does 
culminate in a discussion about relationships. 
The examples I have discussed suggest that the 
selective use of pronominal references in 'closed/ inter- 
actions may serve to establish a social context based on 
exclusion in that they reflect the establishment of 
differential relationships. Indeed, Ervin -Tripp and 
Mitchell -Kernan (1977) write: 
"It is clear from the social differentiation 
in address terms, pronouns, and directives 
that children systematically must come to 
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attend the features of age and power and 
familiarity of addressees. We can assume, 
therefore, that for a child the 'meaning' of 
an utterance is not a matter merely of 
ideational contrasts but an act of social 
interpretation which has more than a single 
source of interpretive knowledge as input." 
(page 11) 
These speculations may be investigated in the form 
of the following hypothesis: 
First person pronouns with reference to a 
second person (e.g. "I'm not your friend ") will 
be more salient during 'closed' interactions 
than during 'open' interactions. 
Method 
All acts involving pronominal references were coded 
according to whether or not they contained only first 
person pronouns (I or we) with no reference to a second 
person or persons or first person pronouns with reference 
to a second person or persons. Second person plural was 
coded when more than one person was being addressed. 
Results 
Frequencies of pronominal references for 'open' and 
'closed' interactions are presented in Table 5.4. If we 
compare 'open' interactions with 'closed' interactions, we 
notice an increase in the use of first person pronouns 
with reference to a second person for 'closed' interactions. 
` 
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However, the increase is not of sufficient magnitude to 
warrant statistical analysis. The increase is most 
striking for Group 1 interactions and does not obtain for 
Group 2 interactions. Thus, though there is a trend in 
the predicted direction, suggesting that the establishment 
of appositional relationships is used to some extent as a 
form of rejection they do not appear to be as important a 
form of exclusion as the behaviours subsumed within the 
'reject person' category. 
Third person pronominal reference 
Group 1 appear to make further use of pronominal 
reference in their use of third person references in 
'closed' interactions. Table 5.5 contains the frequencies 
of second (singular and plural) and third (singular and 
plural) person references in 'open' and 'closed' contexts 
for all groups. An example of an open third person 
reference is: "Iain's my king "; an example of a 'closed' 
third person reference is "She's silly ". Whereas the 
relative proportion of third person references (compared 
to second person references) decreases in closed contexts 
for Groups 2, 3 and 4, it stays constant across open and 
closed contexts for Group 1 interactions. Being 
disagreeable to someone in the third person would seem to 
constitute a greater insult than directly arguing with him 
in the second person simply because in the latter case the 
individual is being addressed whereas in the former case, 
the implicit insult is that the individual is not even 
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'worth' direct acknowledgement, i.e. his mere presence is 
being tacitly negated or rejected. The fact that such a 
sensitive use of pronominal reference occurs at all in this 
age group is interesting from a purely theoretical point 
of view since it indicates a degree of awareness of the 
other (in so far as selectively applied techniques of 
rejection are concerned) that challenges assumptions of 
egocentrism. 
Conclusion 
It is clear that the use of exclusive behaviours does 
conform to a pattern of social organisation based on the 
distribution of friendship preferences described in 
Chapter 3 (page 99). Group size appears to exercise an 
effect in so far as the relationship between 'reject 
theme' and 'reject person' (exclusion). is concerned - they 
are inversely related in the larger groups: 'reject 
person' behaviours are more likely to occur in external 
interactions and less likely to occur in internal inter- 
actions whereas 'reject theme' behaviours are more likely 
to occur in internal interactions and less likely to occur 
in external interactions. Exclusive behaviours 
appear to be a basis of differential relationships in 
that they function to maintain inter -group differentiation. 
It should be stressed, however, that this distinction is 
quantitative. 'Reject person' behaviours do occur in 
internal interactions but the point to be stressed here 
-Iheycu42- 
is that much more likely to occur in interactions 
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outside the group. Further the finding that exclusion 
is more likely to lead to a closed response (than 'reject 
theme' initiations) emphasizes its exclusive function. 
It does appear that 'exclusion' protects extant relation- 
ships. Children's use of pronominal reference (first 
person, no other reference versus first person, other 
reference) in open and closed contexts suggests an aware- 
ness of the performative force of pronominal reference 
within different social contexts, though the results of 
analyses do indicate that it is not a criterial basis of 
group differentiation. However, exclusion cannot in 
itself constitute the sole basis of the organisation of 
friendships. It establishes boundaries between friends 
and non -friends. What happens within these boundaries 
will be the topic of the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6: INCLUSION 
Introduction 
"In our view it violates both commonsense 
and the Occam's razor principle to assume, 
without proof, that children's friendships 
are based on essentially different 
mechanisms from those upon which adult 
friendships are based." 
(Duck et al, 1980; page 93) 
The results of analyses conducted in the previous 
chapter suggest that children can establish a distinct 
social world based on differential relationships that are 
mutually maintained. This is indeed a prevailing 
circumstance of the daily life of an adult. The social 
relationships of the child and those of the adult are 
presumed to be discontinuous. This approach stems from 
the primary assumption that the child is not initially 
social, hence a focus on the individual and how he 
becomes social. (This view was discussed in Chapter 1.) 
Early relationships are therefore held to be constrained 
by developmental processes. Ontogeny is conceived as a 
process of 'knowing'; knowing is predicated upon 
internal processes and initial ignorance - i.e., want of 
knowing - is complete. 
'Want of knowing' in an extreme form can be seen in 
the argument that propinquity is the causative factor 
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underlying interpersonal contact at the personal level. 
This view is expressed in studies of early relationships 
based on interviews with an experimenter (e.g. Selman, 
1981; Hayes, 1978; Bigelow, 1977) and on observations 
in a nursery class (e.g. Corsaro, 1981). Because the 
young child is egocentric, he is aware of the other as a 
physical entity but not as a psychological entity. This 
was discussed in Chapter 1 (page 25 ). Thus, his inter- 
personal relationships are necessarily physicalistic, his 
friend being whomever he happens to be playing with at 
that moment in time, this, in turn, being determined by 
proximity. For example, Selman (1981) writes: 
"Conceptions of friendship relations are based 
on thinking which focuses on propinquity and 
proximity (i.e. physicalistic parameters) to 
the exclusion of others." (page 250) 
Corsaro (1981) presents the following interaction as 
supportive of Selman's position: 
Richard (r), age 3.11, and Barbara (B), 
age 3.0, are building with blocks while 
Nancy (N), age 3.1, sits nearby. 
R -B: We're playing here by ourselves. 
B -R: Just -ah -we friends, right? 
R -B: Right. 
R -B: Go over there. (Points to a block) 
Get that block behind you. 
(page 231) 
However, we are not informed whether or not Richard and 
Barbara play together on a regular basis. It is 
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certainly not clear from this example that their 
independent actions resulted in their being in the same 
place at the same time and culminated in their playing 
together in affirmations of friendship. Indeed, Corsaro 
notes in the same article (discussed in Chapter 5, pages 
156 -161) that children tend to play with particular peers 
more than others, thus suggesting that interactions may 
be based on mutual attraction, rather than on proximity 
and consequent involvement in a shared activity. 
It is indeed theoretically possible to ascribe a 
determinative role to proximity in preschool relationships 
through deductive inferences within the framework of 
Piagetian theory as follows: 
i) interpersonal contact is rooted in individual 
action rather than in the formation and 
development of relationships per se: 
"The child does not in the first 
instance communicate with his fellow - 
beings in order to share thoughts and 
reflexions; he does so in order to 
play." (Piaget, 1926; page 27) 
(This point was discussed in greater detail 
in Chapter 5, page 148) 
ii) the child is not aware of the other as an 
autonomous subjective entity: 
"he supposes . . . that his thought 
is common to all, since he has not 
attempted to escape from his own 
personal point of view." 
(Piaget, 1929; page 276) 
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So, if we accept that interpersonal contact is rooted in 
individual action and that peers are not perceived as 
psychological entities, then the 'propinquity argument' 
becomes axiomatic since the young child will have no 
intrinsic interest in seeking and establishing relation- 
ships with his peers. It is thus possible to place pre- 
school interpersonal contact within the realm of 
'serendipity', a physical parameter becoming the cause of 
contact rather than the intentional acts of the children 
themselves, propinquity underlying contact, rather than 
the children actively and selectively seeking each other's 
company. 
Such theoretical assertions can in themselves be 
presented as constraints in the study of early relationships: 
"Our slow progress in empirically identifying 
friendship interaction patterns may be partly 
due to the methodological considerations involved. 
First, there is the temporal factor to be 
considered. Once the child is past the point 
when a friend is whoever he /she happens to be 
playing with at the moment, identification of 
behavioural patterns requires repeated 
observations. Friendships are formed . . . 
over time, with the actors oftentimes not 
fully aware of what is happening nor cognizant 
of the markers which denote that a bond has 
been established or severed. Second, these 
interactions are not constantly displayed. 
In the course of a day, children interact 
toward their friends in much the same manner 
as they do toward children who are not their 
friends. As they grow older, their time is so 
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structured that there are fewer and fewer 
opportunities to observe their interactions 
with friends." (Serafica, 1982, page 22, my emphasis) 
The theoretical premise that the child's interaction with 
peers has no meaning beyond the immediate activity is 
presented by Serafica as a justification for not studying 
friendship at the preschool level. It thereby functions 
as a heuristic constraint. Results of analyses conducted 
thus far suggest that it may not be an actual or 
psychological constraint. 
Selective social organisation necessarily implies 
that propinquity is a parameter that is regulated by the 
children themselves rather than the reverse. The socio- 
page 99) 
metric analyses in Chapter 3 (Table 3.2/ indicate clearly 
that preschool children do have distinct affiliative 
preferences. The exclusion analyses of Chapter 5 demon- 
strate that children, regardless of group size, differen- 
tially employ exclusive behaviours in a pattern that 
conforms to the distribution of affiliative preferences 
revealed in the sociogram. Indeed, Strayer (198 0) also 
found that proximity was related to affiliative organisation 
in the preschool children he observed. Further, though 
children may interact in a similar manner with friends and 
non-friends (as do adults), this should not in itself 
constitute a research barrier. Affiliative distinctions 
are not constantly displayed but they are very clearly and 
explicitly operative. 
Children do appear to organise their social world on 
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the basis of their friendship preferences. Thus, I would 
argue that children not only make an initial distinction 
between self and other, but that other is apprehended in 
a differential and selective manner. The selective use 
of exclusive behaviours is necessarily based on the 
ability to make this distinction. If children do make 
this distinction, then they are not viewing their social 
world as subjectively undifferentiated . They must be 
aware of other children as autonomous and subjectively 
independent of themselves, with separate likes, dislikes, 
thoughts, emotions, intentions etc. Consider the 
following: 
Jimmy (2) breaks the screwdriver, 
Jimmy (2) - Iain (2): "What shall we do ?" (my 
emphasis) 
Iain: "It was just an accident, wasn't 
it? 
Jimmy: "Yes." 
(Jimmy tries to hide the object) 
Such an interaction is interesting both from a purely 
theoretical point of view and within the context of the 
present work. First of all, Jimmy seeks the support of 
his friend. The consequences of his act become a source 
of mutual involvement in his use of the pronoun, "we ". 
Solidarity is sought in times of stress. Iain responds 
to this call for help. His immediate concern is not the 
broken screwdriver, but Jimmy and his intentions. 
This conversation illustrates succinctly an awareness 
of the subjective autonomy of the other, with thoughts and 
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intentions that are distinct from one's own. As Shields 
(1978) writes, "The common or presupposed constitutes a 
field across which differentiated messages can pass" 
(page 314). The above interaction also contradicts 
theoretical expectations of what should have transpired 
when Jimmy broke the screwdriver. Iain's concern should 
have been the screwdriver and the fact that it was broken, 
rather than Jimmy and his intentions. Acts are not 
judged in terms of the intentions of the actor but rather 
in terms of external criteria such as parental dictates, 
"veracity is external to the personality of the subject" 
(Piaget and Inhelder, 1969; page 126). Thus telling a 
lie that one got good marks is less naughty than saying 
one was frightened by a dog as big as a cow because in the 
first example the mother didn't know it wasn't true 
whereas in the latter case, nobody ever saw a dog that size. 
Jimmy's and Iain's act bears situational similarities to 
the first example in that they were completely alone when 
the act occurred (if my presence was having an inhibitory 
effect on the interaction, then Jimmy would not have 
attempted to hide the object in front of me), yet Iain's 
concern was Jimmy's intention rather than how to avoid 
anyone 'finding out'. The act was not part of a story 
read out by an adult but an act committed by a friend in 
a shared environment. Thus, it occurred in a meaningful 
context, indicating clearly not only an awareness of the 
other person, but an interest in him too that is subjec- 
tively, rather than just physically, based. 
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Indeed, awareness of the other extends to an aware- 
ness of their relationships too. This is illustrated in 
the following interaction: 
Iain's (2) father has made an aluminium 'space 
suit' which is generally worn by boys in 
Groups I and 2. Linda (3) puts the suit on; 
two younger children are watching her. 
Linda interprets their watching her as a 
desire to wear the suit and tells them: 
"You have to ask Iain or Janet." 
Janet is Iain's younger sister. She is just 
under three years old and does not play with 
Iain or Linda. Moreover, she never wears 
the suit, it is too big for her. Linda has 
assumed: 
i) the younger children's intentions in 
watching her 
ii) Janet's right to determine who wears 
the suit by virtue of her relationship 
with Iain. 
Inclusion 
An argument of selective social organisation implies 
that children have an awareness of not only their own 
relationships but of the relationships of others. 
Children actively establish and maintain a social structure 
of a distinct nature. Indeed, in using the term 
'selective', I am necessarily introducing a teleological 
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element into children's relationships. This awareness 
is illustrated in the examples below: 
a) awareness of own relationships 
Iain (2) - Nancy (4): "This is my necklace. 
You're not allowed to touch it." 
George (2) - Iain (2): "I am I'm allowed to 
touch it." 
Iain (2) - George (2): "Yes." 
We see here in active operation a shared awareness of 
the 'rights' dictated by a particular type of relation- 
ship. Friendship allows an intimate form of contact 
from which non -friends are excluded. 
b) awareness of other children's relationships 
Derick (1) - Linda (3): "I'm on your side." 
Linda: "No you aren't." 
Derick: "Yes." 
Linda: "You aren't on my side now." 
Derick: "I'm on Karen's." (Karen is 
Group 3) 
Linda: "I'm not on your side." 
Linda was not involved in the activity Derick is referring 
to. He assumed 
i) Linda's involvement in the activity by 
virtue of Karen's 
ii) Linda would be on the same side as Karen. 
In these texts we can see the children activiely 
communicating their interpretations of their social worlds. 
They form opinions of others based on their own 
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relationships, based on the relationships existing between 
others and, moreover, form assessments of other children's 
intentions, emotions etc. These examples provide an 
interesting contradiction to attribution research which 
argues that young children perceive others in terms of 
physical characteristics rather than in terms of enduring 
subjective states (Livesley and Bromley, 1973). (This 
research is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7 
pages 280 -281.) Not only do children indicate an aware- 
ness of the relationships of others, they will also 
express differential degrees of liking for individuals 
within that relationship: 
Arthur (1) - Jimmy (2): "I'm not your friend." 
Arthur (1) - Edward (1): "I'm just your friend." 
Edward - Arthur: "You only like Iain. You only 
like Iain, eh ?" 
Arthur - Edward: "Yes." 
This interaction illustrates the following: 
a) differential relationships with non -group 
members and a shared awareness of these 
relationships 
b) association of Iain (2) with Jimmy (2), 
thus indicating an awareness of the 
relationships existing between other 
children 
c) though Arthur and Edward like Iain, they 
still place a distinction between him 
and themselves. 
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Thus the above interaction is expressive of an 
'inclusive' relationship with Iain and an 'exclusive' 
relationship with Jimmy, yet both are being 'grouped' 
together as part of the same separate social sphere. 
Through the term 'inclusive', I am referring to the nature 
of the relationship that exists between friends, based on 
mutual affection and an active involvement in each other's 
company. However, it is evident from the above texts 
that the term inclusion will necessarily encompass 
relationships involving varying degrees of friendship. 
Inclusion is the inverse of exclusion. The two 
terms are mutually contrastive and therein, can be considered 
mutually definitive. Exclusion can serve to maintain an 
inclusive relationship, creating an interpersonal division 
that separates friend from non -friend, e.g. George (2) - 
Group 1 children: "You donyt know what we're doing today." 
By its essentially contrastive nature, it may strengthen 
the bond between individuals within an 'us' versus 'them' 
framework. Sherif and Sherif have made this observation 
in their study of adolescent male groups (Sherif and 
Sherif, 1964). Similarly, an inclusive relationship with 
particular individuals necessarily implies an exclusive 
relationship with others. Indeed, this is implicit in 
the term 'best friend'. If we continue this line of 
thought to its logical conclusion, then inclusion and 
exclusion should be inversely related. This assertion 
may be investigated in the form of the following 
hypothesis: 
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Inclusive initiations will be employed more in 
interactions with group members whereas exclusive 
initiations will be employed more in interactions 
with non -group members. 
Categories 
The categories of exclusive behaviours have been 
described in Chapter 5 (pages 152 -54). As stated above, 
'inclusive' relationships are based on mutual interest and 
active involvement in each other's company. Thus, I 
classified in the category 'Inclusion', acts that involve 
expressions of interest in the other as a person (rather 
than in his activity per se) such as asking a child to 
join one in an activity, or involving oneself in his 
activity, expressions of friendship or affection and 
expressions concerning the personal appearance, likes, 
dislikes etc. of oneself or the other. The rationale 
underlying this scheme of categorisation is as follows: 
All of these types of acts indicate a commitment to the 
other person and ensure the continuity of that relation- 
ship in (a) providing assurances that the interaction will 
be pleasureable; (b) encouraging expectations that the 
relationship will continue beyond the ongoing interaction. 
As Hinde (1979) writes, "More usually . . . intimacy 
breeds intimacy" (page 117). Furthermore, there is a 
degree of personal investment in initiating these types 
of acts in that one is necessarily exposing oneself to the 
possibility of personal rejection. For example, asking 
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someone to play with you, or joining someone in his 
activity, leaves you open to rejection in a way that 
saying "I'm making a train" doesn't. Similarly, taking 
someone's hand or hugging him, is potentially more 
threatening than passing him a paintbrush. On this 
basis, I established the following categories of behaviour 
as definitive of 'Inclusion'. (In brackets are the 
reliability coefficients yielded for each sub -category. 
The mean reliability for 'inclusion' was .86.) 
1) Integration (.86): acts that establish involvement 
of self or other in a mutual 
activity such as invitations or 
expressions of one's own involve- 
ment. 
EXAMPLES: 
a) George (2) - Iain (2): "C'mon Iain that2s not our 
ship . " 
Mary (4) - Nancy (4): "Nancy! Will you come in the 
see -saw with me ?" 
This category sometimes requires a certain amount of 
subjective interpretation in that description of one's 
activity may be a way of integrating another into one's 
activity or it may not be. To illustrate, if a child 
enters the Wendy House and the child already in there 
says "I'm making our supper ", then I would code this 
utterance as 'integration' because the child has included 
the other in his description of his activity. In 
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contrast, a statement such as "I'm making lovely, lovely 
mud" does not express possibilities for mutual involvement 
whereas the child's response to this utterance, "Do you 
want me to help you ?" does and thus would also be coded 
as 'integration'. 
2) Friendship (.91): expressions of friendship or 
affection. 
EXAMPLES: 
a) Mary (4) - Nancy (4): "You're my friend." 
b) Derick(1) - Arthur (1): "When I'm at school, I 
won't have you or anyone for my friends." 
Friendship can also be nonverbally expressed in hugging 
or holding hands. 
3) Feelings (.80): statements about aspects of the 
person, oneself or the other, 
involving appearance, likes, etc. 
EXAMPLES: 
a) Arthur (1) - Fiona (1): "You like crisps, Fiona ?" 
b) Karen (3) - Linda (3): "I like your bracelet, Linda." 
Results 
Table 6.1 contains the distribution of inclusive and 
exclusive initiations by group membership of target child. 
Examination of the table indicates that they are inversely 
distributed, 2 analyses demonstrate that this relation - ,d= 
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Thus, the hypothesis is confirmed. Inclusive initiations 
are more likely to occur in internal interactions whereas 
exclusive initiations are more likely to occur in 
external interactions. However, though exclusive 
initiations are asymmetrically distributed, across internal 
and external interactions, the distribution of inclusive 
initiations is less striking. Though children do make 
more inclusive initiations to group members, they also 
make, a considerable number to non -group members. This 
result indicates that insofar as initiations are concerned, 
group differentiation is contrastively based through the 
initiation of exclusive behaviours. 
Inclusion and Group Size 
In the previous chapter, I argued that group size 
exercised a determinative influence on the relationship 
between 'reject theme' and 'reject person2 (exclusion) 
initiations as a function of interactional possibilities 
it dictates. For example, coalition against an outsider 
is less likely to occur within a dyad than within a group 
of four. Results indicated that the relationship was 
significant in the interactions of Groups 1 and 2 ('reject 
theme' initiations were more likely to occur in internal 
interactions whereas 'reject person' initiations, i.e. 
exclusion, were more likely to occur in external inter- 
actions) but not in the interactions of Groups 3 and 4, 
though they were in the predicted direction. However, 
exclusion appears to be an important regulative factor 
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underlying social organization regardless of group size. 
If group size is a determinate factor in childrents 
relationships, then the distribution of inclusive 
initiations to internal and external targets should also 
vary as a function of group size since a dyad has fewer 
internal interactional possibilities than a larger group. 
It stands to reason that Groups 3 and 4 will initiate more 
inclusive acts to non -group members solely by virtue of 
interactional limitations inherent in a dyad. For example, 
activities such as fantasy play have a breadth that cannot 
be realized within the dyad alone, e.g., role differentia- 
tion. In a larger group, several roles can be assumed in 
contrast to the maximum of two within the dyad. These 
speculations lead to the following hypotheses: 
1) The initiation of inclusive behaviours will be 
more evenly distributed across the internal 
and external interactions of Groups 3 and 4. 
The interactions of Groups 1 and 2 will be 
characterized by a more uneven distribution 
of inclusive initiations, inclusive initiations 
occurring more frequently in internal inter- 
actions. 
2) From the above follows the hypothesis that 
inclusive and exclusive initiations will be 
more inversely related in the interactions of 
Groups 1 and 2 than in the interactions of 
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Results: 
The distributions of inclusive and exclusive 
initiations by group size are presented in Table 6.2. 
Examination of the tables indicates that the first 
hypothesis is confirmed. Inclusive initiations are more 
evenly distributed in the interactions of Groups 3 and 4 
and more concentrated in the internal interactions of 
Groups 1 and 2. However, Groups 1 and 2 do make a 
considerable number of inclusive initiations to children 
outwith their immediate social sphere: 58 per cent of 
total initiations occur in internal interactions whereas 
42 per cent occur in external interactions. The results 
are especially interesting insofar as Groups 3 and 4 are 
concerned as their initiations of inclusive acts are 
equally divided between internal and external targets. 
In view of the small sample of females in this study 
I am reluctant to ascribe any determinative role to sex 
differences (there is also a female in Group 1), however, 
these findings do concord with other research findings on 
female preschool children's pattern of relationships. 
Rubin (1980, page 92) notes that females tend to form 
"networks of initmate friendships" whereas boys tend to 
form larger groups. Rubin et al (1976) also report this 
difference. As stated above, the result of these analyses 
in view of interactional limitations within a dyad. 
However, the high frequency of external inclusive initia- 
tions for Groups 1 and 2 indicate that they are not a 
constitutive basis of social organisation for this sample 
of children. 
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The second hypothesis also receives confirmation. 
Inclusive and exclusive initiations are inversely related 
however this relationship achieves significance at the .001 
level for all. groups of children (/, 2 = 116.35 andx2 = 14.67dc ' 
in Groups 1 and 2 and Groups 3 and 4 respectively). 
These results further indicate that in so far as initiations 
are concerned, group differentiation is contrastively based 
on the use of exclusive behaviours. Inclusive initiations 
do not in themselves appear to be a determinative factor 
underlying social organisation. Thus, I would assert that 
children are actively showing a friendly interest in their 
peers, but maintain a special relationship with particular 
individuals. Through exclusive initiations, they exclude 
other children from this special relationship. Commitment 
to particular individuals does not preclude relationships 
with others. The pattern of initiation of exclusive 
behaviours ensures, however, that this commitment is 
maintained. 
Functional outcome of inclusive initiations 
We have seen that inclusive initiations are clearly 
not in themselves a constitutive basis of social organisa- 
tion. However, the responses to these initiations may 
provide such a basis. In the discussion above concerning 
the definition of 'inclusion', I asserted that a degree of 
personal investment is inherent in an inclusive initiation 
that is not present in mere descriptions of activities. 
Asking someone to play with you, or telling him that he is 
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your friend, involves a greater degree of personal 
commitment in the other person than does telling him that 
you're painting a bonfire. In expressing a relationship 
with a particular person, one is necessarily exposing 
oneself to the possibility of personal rejection. If 
this is indeed the case, then one would expect inclusive 
initiations to be responded to differentially across 
internal and external interactions. These questions can 
be answered through investigation of the hypotheses below: 
1) Initiations concerning descriptions of activity 
are less likely to receive a closed response 
than inclusive initiations. 
2) Children respond more frequently to the inclusive 
initiations of group members than non -group 
members. 
3) Group members are more likely to receive an 'open? 
response to inclusive initiations. Conversely, 
non -group members are more likely to receive a 
'closed' response to inclusive initiations. 
Categories 
The classificatory basis of 'Inclusion' has been 
described above (pages 195 -96). 
Activity description (.90): Descriptions of what 
one is doing or of what the other person 
doing. 
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EXAMPT ,T S : 
Karen (3) - Linda (3): "Every time I come here I paint 
a picture." 
Mary (4) - Nancy (4): "I'm going to make a crispie." 
Results 
1) Inclusive and description of activity initiations: 
Results of analyses are presented in Table 6.3. The 
hypothesis is confirmed, inclusive initiations are more 
likely to receive a closed response than activity 
description initiations, this relationship is significant 
c6-1 
at the .001 level 
(Z2 
= 18.280. However, the distribution 
of inclusive initiations indicates that the predominant 
response is an open one. 
2) Frequency of response to inclusive initiations by 
group identity of target: 
The distributions of responses for Groups 1 and 2 and 
Groups 3 and 4 are presented in Table 6.4. Responses to 
inclusive initiations are more likely to occur in internal 
interactions than in external interactions. This result 
holds for both groups (Groups 1 and 2: 2 = 26.54, 
dr =1 dF =, 
p .0014 Groups 3 and 4, 
2 ) = 6.85, p .01). 
3) Distribution of open and closed responses to 
inclusive initiations by group identity of target. The 
distribution of open and closed responses for internal and 
external interactions is presented in Table 6.5. Results 
confirm the hypothesis: Inclusive initiations are more 
likely to receive a 'closed' response when directed towards 
towards 
an external target and an 'open' response when directed/ 
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an internal target. This finding is significant at the 
cF = 
.001 level ()2 = 12.46) . The interactions of Groups 1 
and 2 and Groups 3 and 4 are considered together as the 
results of analyses of frequency of response (Hypothesis 2) 
indicate that response to inclusive initiations is an 
important factor in group differentiation for all groups. 
If this is the case, then responses in internal interactions 
should be more conducive to a continuation of the inter- 
action (i.e. 'open') than in external interactions. 
Consideration of results: 
Rubin (1980) writes: 
"In nursery school . . . inclusion and exclusion 
are constant themes of social life. It is 
through the continuing negotiation of who is 
tint and who is touts that children establish 
and maintain group boundaries." (page 94) 
The results of analyses in this chapter, and in the previous 
one, indicate that this is a complex process. First of 
all, negotiation of who is tint and who is 'out' is 
selectively determined by individual identity. This 
selectivity is stable and enduring over a five month period 
for the sample of children under study. Moreover, 
negotiation of who is 'out' (exclusion) appears to be a 
more straightforward process than negotiation of who is 
tin' (inclusion). 
On the basis of results of analyses, we may conclude 





contrary to exclusive initiations, inclusive 
initiations do not in themselves appear to be 
a constitutive factor underlying social 
organisation. Children make a large number 
of inclusive initiations to both group and 
non -group members though we have clearly seen 
that they are making a distinction between 
these individuals; 
however, children do seem to be 'aware' of the 
interpersonal implications of inclusive initiations, 
i.e., that they are intrinsically expressive of 
relationships, or a desire for mutual involvement, 
in a way that mere description of activities are 
not. Thus, the former are more likely to receive 
a closed response than the latter, probably 
because they require a degree of personal involve- 
ment that an interactant isn't necessarily willing 
to meet. 
the distribution of responses to inclusive 
initiations do conform to the proposed structure 
of social organisation, both qualitatively and 
quantitatively. Inclusive initiations within 
internal interactions are not only more likely 
to receive a response, that response is also 
more likely to be open. In contrast, 
inclusive initiations within external inter- 
actions are less likely to receive a response 
and that response is more likely to be closed 
than in internal interactions. 
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At the beginning of this chapter, I discussed the 
thesis that propinquity underlies interpersonal contact 
in preschool children (e.g. Selman, 1981). The results 
of the inclusion analyses further vindicate a rejection 
of this argument in favour of an inverse one, i.e., that 
propinquity is a parameter that is regulated by the 
children themselves. In so far as their behaviour is 
concerned, children appear to be not only apprehending the 
distinction between self and other, but actively maintain- 
ing differential relationships. The results of the 
inclusion and exclusion analyses are illustrative of this. 
The results of these analyses further illustrate the 
inadequacy of an intra- individualistic approach to 
children's relationships. The 'propinquity argument? is 
theoretically, rather than empirically, derived, reflecting 
theoretical assumptions about the constraints in inter- 
personal contact dictated by cognitive level, i.e. level 
of ?knowing'. Youniss (1978, page 208) writes that when 
it is asked how the other person affects the child, one 
has to look at the child's mediating activity ", yet the 
point at which 'Actor' and ?Thinker' converge has not been 
elucidated. Certainly, it does not appear that the 
latter can be considered in isolation of the former. 
The results of the inclusion analyses do support previous 
assertions that children can discriminate communicative 
intent and that the way they respond to the import of an 
act is determined by their relationship with that 
particular individual. Thus, it would appear that in 
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investigations of Chow the other person affects the child', 
a study of both of them, and of what is occurring between 
them, is essential. 
Walkerdine (1982) writes: 
"The point has been pertinently made by many 
researchers that children are neither 'abstract 
epistemic subjects' nor 'ideal speaker -hearers', 
but grow up in real contexts, facing real 
problems and so on." (page 129) 
Thus, we return to one of the central arguments of this 
research endeavour: A consideration of social context is 
a necessary prerequisite in the study of children's 
relationships. Children's social behaviours cannot be 
extracted from their context of occurrence and adequately 
understood. A consideration of social behaviours within 
their social context indicates that children are actively 
maintaining a social structure that reflects their 
friendship preferences. Results of analyses in Chapter 4 
indicate that interactions occur within a mutually 
meaningful framework. Children do act upon their social 
world with intended effect yet the meaning underlying these 
acts cannot be gleaned if they are considered in isolation 
of each other. 
Inclusion in the research literature: 
The terms 'inclusion' and 'exclusion' are used in 
the research literature as descriptive concepts of group 
interactions. Shaw (1971) provides the following 
definition of 'inclusion': 
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"Inclusion refers to the need for togetherness, 
the need to associate with others." (page 30) 
McDavid and Harari (1968) define 'cohesiveness' as follows: 
"A suitable definition of cohesiveness is that 
it is the 'resultant of all forces acting on 
all members to remain in the group' (Cartwright 
and Zander, 1960, p. 64). The specific 
dimensions that might contribute to this resultant 
include such factors as the attraction of 
individual members to one another, the attraction 
of individual members to the activities and 
functions of the group, and even the extent to 
which the individual is attracted to the group 
as a means of satisfying his own personal needs. 
Thus, cohesiveness is a general term for a 
variety of specific dimensions of individual 
attraction to a group." (page 293) 
McDavid and Harari concede in the following paragraph that 
cohesiveness is a "multidimensional concept that is 
difficult to define ". 
Group interactions are obviously based on relation- 
ships yet the 'relationship' is a concept that can elude 
attempts to render it empirically tangible, i.e., 
quantifiable. Definitions beg the need for further 
definitions and thus research on friendships often 
culminates contrastively in recursions to the individual, 
his needs, interests, motivations etc. This is evidenced 
in the above -cited definitions of 'inclusion' and 
'cohesiveness'. Shaw (1971, page 85) cites research 
isolating factors such as physical attractiveness and 
similarity (e.g. attitudinal, economic, personality) that 
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presumably constitute determinants of interpersonal 
attraction. Similarly, Asher, Oden and Gottman (1977), 
in a consideration of children's friendships, cite research 
demonstrating that name, physical appearance, race, and sex 
are important determinants of peer acceptance. However, 
our knowledge of friendship per se is limited: 
"Familiarity and friendship are not the same 
thing. Does the social behaviour of 
children differ from their behaviour with 
non -friends? The evidence is scattered and 
thin." (Hartup, 1978; page 161) 
Gottman and Parkhurst (1980) similarly comment on the 
dearth of research in this area: 
"Given this renewed interest in peer 
relationships and friendship, it is remarkable 
how little descriptive research has been 
conducted to create a data base for generating 
hypotheses and constructing theories about 
the processes of friendship and acquaintance- 
ship . " (page 199) 
Throughout this work I have been arguing that the 
literature has been dominated by an intra- individualistic 
approach to early social relationships. Relationships 
have been examined within the context of ascribed 
competence levels (e.g. Lieberman, 1975), cognitive skills 
(e.g. Rubin, 1976) and popularity (e.g. Charlesworth and 
et al, 
Hartup/ 1967). Theoretical findings from this type of 
research spawned further research involving coaching 
'socially isolated' children in friendship skills 
(discussed in Chapter 1, page 8 and in Chapter 3, pages 83-6) 
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based upon the conception of a theoretical ideal who is 
competent, popular and engages in group activities, 
preferably of a symbolic nature. 
However, social isolation intervention programs are 
based on dubious premises in that it is not really known 
what differentiates the popular from the unpopular but 
methodological goals are to make the unpopular more like 
the popular. Why some children are viewed as 'popular' 
and others as 'unpopular' is not really known, perhaps 
because researchers have tended to seek causation and 
explanation within quantitative emission of behaviour of 
the individual rather than within the interactions between 
individuals (which presumably culminated in children 
forming certain opinions or feelings about each other, the 
result being that some children are popular and others less 
so: 
"The popular children did not behave very 
differently from isolated children when 
comparing the latter's pre -intervention play 
session data with data from the former one's 
play session." (Oden and Asher, 1977; page 505) 
Popularity is "liking by general consensus (Duck et 
al, 1980; page 94) rather than a property intrinsic to the 
individual. (Indeed, this is evident even from a strictly 
etymological perspective. A 'pure' definition of 
'popular' is "of the people" (Chambers 20th century 
Dictionary, 1972), derived from the Latin word 'populus', 
the people). Moreover, it is not an observable phenomenon. 
A relationship or interaction is based on a synthesis of 
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actions (verbal and nonverbal), expressions, emotions, 
thoughts etc. It is not an additive result or sum total 
of 'behavioural units'. Thus, reductionistic attempts 
at explaining a relationship in terms of its so- called 
constituent parts - i.e. actions of the individual - are 
unsound, both from a methodological and a definitional 
point of view. 
Putallaz and Gottman (1 981) "dichotomized" (page 132) 
children into two groups, 'popular' and 'unpopular' on the 
basis of sociometric peer nominations. Ten popular and 
ten unpopular dyads were formed. Each dyad was observed 
playing in the research trailer and then a third child, 
belonging either to the popular or unpopular group, was 
introduced into the experimental situation and ensuing 
interactions were observed. Thus, the researchers were 
able to observe unpopular dyads with popular children, 
popular dyads with unpopular children, in addition to the 
dyads interacting with their sociometric counterparts. 
Popular dyads were found to engage in more agreeable 
interactions, characterized by less squabbling and 
arguments, than interactions between unpopular dyads. 
Gottman and Putallaz (1981) thus assert: 
"dyadic interactional style creates two 
distinct membership groups that are 
identifiable by sociometric nomination 
technique." (page 144) 
Popular children were more successful at gaining entry 
into ongoing dyadic interactions of children belonging to 
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either group whereas unpopular children were more likely 
to be rejected, regardless of group composition of the 
dyad. Their response hierarchy was organised in such a 
way that the probability of being ignored was maximized. 
Moreover, when unpopular children attempted to enter their 
own membership group, this response organisation was 
likely to lead to rejection. Puta11z and Gottman liken 
the behaviour of unpopular children to that of newcomers. 
For example, they were silent for longer periods of time 
and avoided attracting attention to themselves. 
In this study, children were grouped together not 
on the basis of their relationships with each other but, 
rather, on the basis of criteria determined by the 
researchers, the dyads "homogeneous by sex and socio- 
metric status" the entry child of "varying sociometric 
status" (page 132). Thus, we do not know whether or not 
the children assigned to the groups and to the various 
experimental conditions played with each other outside 
the experimental context. Moreover, the interactions 
occurred in a research trailer with a set activity (a word 
game) and therefore, may not have revealed the children's 
day -to -day interests, activity preferences, friendships 
etc., factors which are of crucial importance in an 
investigation of early relationships. 
Though Putal1a7, and Gottman (1981) have succinctly 
demonstrated that the two groups do exhibit distinct 
behavioural differences, we do not know how these 
differences are operative in the day -to -day existence of 
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these children. Do the unpopular children behave like 
newcomers with their friends? It is possible that some 
children may have been intimidated by the experimental 
situation itself. We do not know if the behaviours 
observed reflect two different ways of dealing with a 
bizarre social situation, i.e., engaging in a prescribed 
activity in a research trailer with children one may not 
normally play with; difficulties posed by the experimental 
situation itself may be increased for children who enter 
the trailer and encounter an ongoing interaction and are 
obliged to enter it. The way a child deals with this 
situation may indeed be reflective of a particular 
behavioural style, but, the social implications of that 
style can only really be assessed when viewed in its 
'natural' context of occurrence, i.e., in the child's own 
social environment. 
Putal1a7 and Gottman (1981) assert that the negative 
interactional style of the unpopular children causes them 
to associate with each other because the more agreeable 
W;11 not interact w.Th 'tie 
children , in other words, friendship by default. 
Popularity is thus assumed to be a regulative factor 
inherent in children's social behaviours, the existence of 
the unpopular group definitionally predicated on the 
existence of the theoretical ideal, the popular group. 
The researchers discuss intervention programs, designed 
to make the unpopular more like the popular. Whilst 
some children may experience distress over their social 
predicament, we cannot assume that all are there by virtue 
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of some form of social inadequacy. This point was 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
Manning (1978) has demonstrated that encapsulating 
children within 'polar ends' of what is deemed to be a 
continuous or unitary dimension can be misleading. In a 
study of 'hostility2, she found that its expression varied 
according to contextual conditions (activity /non- activity) 
and motivational conditions (provoked /unprovoked). This 
research emphasizes the importance, both theoretically and 
clinically, of a consideration of the contextual conditions 
in which behaviours occur in a study of children's 
relationships. Other research also discussed in Chapter 3 
demonstrates clearly that children have distinct inter- 
actional and activity styles (e.g. Montagner et al, 1974; 
Maxwell, 1983; Coates et al, 1975). Thus the imposition 
of a unitary dimension with implicit assumptions of 
homogeneity may not be justified. Just as adults in 
their relationships constitute a heterogeneous group, 
heterogeneity can also characterize the relationships 
of children. 
Nursery environment: 
Different activities, interests etc. necessarily 
involve different interactional possibilities. These 
possibilities can be realized in an environment where 
children choose what they want to do and with whom they 
want to play. However, interactional possibilities are 
necessarily constrained in cánrtr vvelsettings that expect 
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children to engage in a particular activity with particular 
individuals, as in the Putallaz and Gottman (1981) study 
described above. We cannot expect the same type of 
interaction to occur between children who are painting 
alongside each other compared to those who are engaged in 
mutual fantasy in the Wendy House. Shure (1963) has 
noted that interactions occurring in the doll house are 
more complex, Charlesworth and Hartup (1967) have made 
similar observations of dramatic play, and moreover that 
play with a single child is more likely to occur in block 
and game areas, and parallel play is most likely in art 
and book locations. 
The role of nursery activities in providing different 
opportunities for different types of social involvement 
has been described by Cook- Gumperez and Corsaro (1977): 
"Nursery school itself provides a collection 
of physical -environmental locations, each 
having a specifically socially -defined 
character and providing different possibili- 
ties for social interaction." (pages 411 -412) 
They assert that the "socially- defined character" of these 
different areas is determined by the following two factors: 
i) conventionalized expectations: 
the shared body of knowledge concerning 
roles (e.g. mother, father, baby) and the 
behavioural expectations associated with 
these roles 
ii) accustomed expectations: 
knowledge of the kind of activities the 
different spatial areas are used for. 
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These expectations jointly determine the communica- 
tive activities and strategies of children in different 
areas of the nursery. Thus we return once more to one of 
the central arguments of the present work. A considera- 
tion of context is essential in a study of children's 
relationships. Cook -Gumperz and Corsaro observed inter- 
actions in the playhouse, the sandbox and the work tables. 
Their findings in each area are presented below: 
1) The playhouse 
Children enter the playhouse with accustomed 
expectations that role play occurs in this area 
and use conventionalized expectations, e.g. 
family role play, to structure their inter- 
actions. Appropriate roles will be allocated 
that conform to the dictates of family inter- 
action, i.e., appropriate role and status 
differentiation. Thus, the nature of inter- 
actions occurring in this area is, to a large 
extent, pre -determined by the very nature of 
the area itself. 
2) The sandbox 
This area is less clearly pre -defined than the 
playhouse. The specific content of activities 
will therefore be generated to a greater extent 
by the children themselves. Thus, children will 
not enter this area with clearly defined 
accustomed expectations and conventionalized 
expectations emerge as a function of the activity 
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they engage in, e.g., racing car drivers vs. 
construction workers. Moreover, the structure 
of the activity is dependent on interactants 
progressively developing each other's ideas: 
"There are no suggestions offered regarding a 
plan for action, rather the children rely on 
responses of the interactive parnters to 
signify that they are playing together and 
must fit into the interaction with appropriate 
responses when necessary. Appropriateness is, 
in this case, context -bound and spontaneous in 
that children build the interaction by plugging 
into and expanding upon the contributions of 
their interactive partners." (page 423) 
Children presented more verbal descriptions of 
their behaviour in this particular area. This 
facilitates an interaction that is structured by 
the children themselves rather than by the actual 
area (as in the playhouse), thereby informing 
peers of what is happening and providing possi- 
bilities for thematic development. 
3) Work tables 
This area is marked by the continual presence of 
teachers and their active involvement in the 
children's activities: 
"We repeatedly observed teacher (adult) control 
of the nature, flow and direction of the inter- 
action in this area." (page 423) 
Thus interactions between peers were more limited in 
this area than in the playhouse or sandbox. The 
majority of interactions occurred within a teacher- 
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child dyad, the teacher controlling the interaction. 
Shields (1978) makes a similar observation in her 
study of the communicative skills of preschool 
children: 
"Where there was an adult in charge of the 
interactional sequence, she usually played a 
highly organising function in distributing 
the interactional turns." (page 321) 
Cook -Gumperz and Corsaro comment that the minimal 
peer interaction in this area results from children's 
accustomed expectations associated with this 
particular area plus the presence and interactive 
behaviour of teachers. Other researchers have also 
noted the inhibitory effect of adults on peer inter- 
action. In an investigation of "language styles" 
in preschool children, Michell (1982) writes: 
"Long stretches of talk were not common, although 
some children did manage to say quite a lot in 
some free play contexts when no adult was present." 
(page 22) 
Thus, social context and physical context do appear 
to exercise a determinative influence on peer interaction, 
and moreover, children structure their interactions to 
meet the interactive demands implicit within particular 
contexts. Cook -Gumperz and Corsaro conclude their study 
with the observation that children do actively structure 
their interactions: 
"The direct study of spontaneous peer inter- 
action within a nursery school reveals the 
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communicative strategies children employ to 
achieve social order in their daily lives. 
We found that specific properties of social 
context are part of the information children 
make note of and utilize in combination with 
conventionalized expectations to create 
cultural and normative sense throughout the 
course of interactive episodes." (page 431) 
Piaget (1926) describes the class where he collected 
his observations as follows: 
"In the class where our two subjects were 
observed the scholars draw or make whatever 
they like; they model and play at games of 
arithmetic and reading etc." (page 5) 
Piaget's use of the term 'scholars/ does reflect fundamental 
expectations about the nature of child development and the 
role of the nursery in facilitating this development. 
The nursery serves an educational function and social 
interaction is a by- product rather than a goal in itself; 
therefore, it is considered within the framework of this 
educationally- oriented context. Individual performance 
is stressed by the very nature of the context itself. 
In noting that children did not engage in sustained 
contact with each other till around eight years of age, 
Piaget writes: 
"These stages of social development naturally 
concern only the child's intellectual activity 
(drawings, constructive games, arithmetic etc.) 
It goes without saying that in outdoor games 
the problem is a completely different one; but 
these games touch only on a tiny portion of the 
thought and language of the child." (page 42) 
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Because the nursery where Piaget conducted his 
observations was based on individual activity, it is most 
probable that children would have been starting and 
completing their respective activities at different times, 
not to mention the compounding factor of variations in 
duration of the activities themselves. This will 
necessarily affect the type of contact children have with 
each other both quantitatively and qualitatively. 
Piaget argues that the children's tendency to talk about 
their own activities is rooted in egocentrism, and the 
constraints it imposed upon social interaction, but in a 
context that is based upon individual activity, this 
would seem to be a natural outcome, i.e., their conversa- 
tions reflect the context within which they are interacting. 
The child's activity thus may provide a 'communicative 
bridge' between himself and the children working alongside 
him. 
Piaget presents the following as an example of 
'monologue' (pages 6 -7): 
Pie (to Ez who is drawing a tram -car with carriages 
in tow): "But the trams that are hooked on 
behind don't have any flags." 
(No answer) 
Pie (talking about his tram): "They don't have 
any carriages hooked on." 
(He was addressing no one in particular. No one 
answers him.) 




Pie (to Hei): "This tram hasn't got no carriages, 
Hei, look, it isn't red, d'you see." 
(No answer) 
In considering the above text, Piaget writes: 
"Here, then, is a first category which should be 
singled out, and which in future we shall 
designate as monologue. When Pie says to Hei 
or Bea: "'T'sa tram . . . etc." . . . or "this 
tram . . . etc." . . . he seems on this occasion 
to want to make himself understood; but on 
closer examination it will be seen that he cares 
very little who is listening to him (he turns 
from Bea to Hei to say exactly the same thing) 
and, furthermore, that he does not care whether 
the person he addresses has really heard him or 
not." (page 8, my emphasis) 
It is possible to interpret the same text in an 
alternative manner: Pie may have repeated himself to 
different children simply because he was not successful 
at eliciting a response and wanted to talk to someone, 
i.e. he does care whether or not he has been heard. 
Piaget's approach to this text is wholly intra- individualistic 
in that he does not consider the behaviour of the child to 
whom the statement was directed. Thus Pie's repetition of 
his statement is viewed as being determined by internal 
factors, i.e., cognitive level, rather than external 
factors, i.e., the other children didn't answer him. 
Though Piaget argues that Pie doesn't care whether or not 
he has been heard, he fails to consider the behaviour of 
the 'listener'. 
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An environment which is based on individual perfor- 
mance may not only result in interactions based on 
individual activity but also, the sustained presence of 
adults. As stated above, the emphasis of the environment 
is education of the individual child (e.g. "spontaneous 
work provided by the educational games of the Maison des 
my emphasis 
Petits" (page 381/. Vygotsky (1962) criticizes Piaget 
for failing to take due account of the determinative 
effect of environmental contingencies on behaviour: 
"The developmental uniformities established by 
Piaget apply to the given milieu, under the 
conditions of Piaget's study. They are not 
laws of nature but are historically and socially 
determined. Piaget has already been criticized 
by Stern for his failure to take sufficiently 
into account the importance of the social 
situation and milieu. Whether the child's talk 
is more egocentric or more social depends not 
only on his age but also on the surrounding 
conditions." (page 23) 
Cook -Gumperz and Corsaro (1977) have demonstrated that 
children's interactions are affected by not only the nature 
of the activity but also the presence of adults. Piaget 
writes: 
"as we have taken down in its entirety the 
context of our two subjects' conversations, 
especially when it was addressed to an adult, 
it will be quite easy to eliminate from our 
statistics all that is not spontaneous talk 
on the part of the children, i.e., all that 
may have been said in answer to questions 
that were put to them." (page 6) 
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As discussed above, research indicates that adult 
presence appears to have an inhibitory effect on peer 
interaction (e.g. Michell, 1982) and adult -child interac- 
tions tend to be organised by the adult (e.g. Shields, 
1978). Thus, even if 'didactic' texts are removed from 
statistical analyses, the problems prised by the presence 
of adults, and its effects on peer interaction, still 
remain. 
Research has indicated that the nature of the class 
environment - i.e., educational or Montessori programs 
versus a less structured nursery school - does exercise 
differential effects on the social orientation of the 
children. Dreyer and Rigler (1969) report the following 
differences in the performances of nursery school and 
Montessori children on various cognitive tasks: 
i) on nonverbal measures of creativity (Picture 
Construction Test), nursery children gained 
higher scores. 
ii) Montessori children used more physical 
characteristics to describe commonplace 
objects whereas nursery school children 
used more functional terms,(using the 
Verbal Encoding Subtest of Illinois Test 
of Psycholinguistic Abilities). 
iii) the free drawings of Montessori children 
include people significantly less often 
than the free drawings of nursery school 
children and geometric forms significantly 
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more often than nursery school children. 
Indeed, Piaget (1926) makes a similar observa- 
tion of his subjects at ?Maison des Petits': 
"the children of the Maison des Petits deal 
in their drawings and free compositions 
with animals, physical objects (stars, sky, 
rain etc.), with machines and manufactured 
objects (trains, motors, boats, horses, 
bicycles etc.)." (page 30) 
iv) during the administration of the Children's 
Embedded Figure Test, the two groups did not differ 
in mean achievement scores however, Montessori 
children were found to be more task -oriented, 
completing the task more quickly than nursery 
children who used the opportunity to become 
socially involved with the experimenter. 
On the basis of these findings, Dreyer and Bigler conclude: 
"The study . . . does support the notion that 
differing preschool educational environments 
yield different outcomes. Montessori 
children responded to the emphasis in their 
program on the physical world and on the 
definition of school as a place of work.* 
Nursery school children responded to the 
social emphasis and opportunity for spontaneous 
expression of feeling." (page 415) 
The observations on which this thesis is based were 
collected in the less structured environment of a nursery 
whereas the structure of the 'Maison des Petits' conforms 
* Indeed, Piaget frequently uses the word 'work' to refer 
to the children's activities at the Maison des Petits. 
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to that of a Montessori program. In the former, children 
could engage in a variety of activities containing the 
potential for either individual or collective activity or 
both. Imposed structure was minimal in so far as the 
children's use of any particular area was concerned (see 
Chapter 2, page 39). Thus, the social potential of any 
activity was realized through personal choice. On the 
other hand, we have seen that at the 'Maison des Petits', 
emphasis was placed on individual activity of a specified 
nature. Though nursery environment does certainly seem 
to exercise a pervasive effect on children's interactions, 
the results of analyses conducted here on 'inclusion' and 
'exclusion' suggest that interactions are also affected by 
social contingencies inherent in relationships (i.e., 
internal versus external interactions). Hence, the 
relation between nursery environment and children's 
relationships would seem to be worthy of attention. This 
will be addressed below. 
Social organisation and the environment 
The research we have been reviewing illustrates 
clearly that the child and his environment are not 
separate and discrete. The child interacts within a 
framework in which social and environmental contingencies 
are at play. Dreyer's and Rigler's (1969) research 
suggests that nursery structure per se exercises an 
influence on social orientation. Coates' and Lord2s 
(1975) research indicates that the type of activities 
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engaged in reflects social orientation. Cook -Gumperzts 
and Corsarots (1977) research illustrates that different 
areas realize different interactional possibilities. If 
manipulation of environmental contingencies serves a function 
in structuring different types of relationships, then the 
following hypothesis necessarily arises: 
If the social structure is based on differentiation 
of various relationships, and if different areas 
do realize different interactional possibilities, 
then we should expect the groups to be further 
characterized by differentiation in activity 
preferences. 
This hypothesis will be investigated below: 
Categories: 
Activity area at the moment of observed interaction 
was recorded. For the purposes of the hypothesis under 
investigation, activity areas were functionally classified 
according to type of activity on which these areas are 
based: 
a) Role -Play Areas 
Areas which are conductive to role differentiation and, 
thus, joint activities. Included in this category are 
the following: 
i) Hospital: contains bed, bandages, stethoscope, 
tsyringet etc., suggesting activity based on 
doctor /nurse and patient interaction. 
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ii) Wendy House: contains cooker, sink, pans, cups, 
plates, high chair, bed, kettle, teapot etc. 
suggesting activities of a domestic nature, e.g. 
tea parties. 
iii) Self- created areas: these are 'areas' which are 
created by the children themselves and are 
assigned a specific identity; objects from 
different parts of the nursery are brought 
together in the construction of this area. 
e.g. Group 2 children arrange the bricks in a 
row, put chairs on each one, with a steering wheel 
at the front and call the structure a 'bus4, 
suggesting an activity based on a passengers - 
driver interaction. 
b) Parallel Play Areas: 
Areas in which children work alongside each other on 
constructive (building) activities, sharing materials: 
i) Art areas: contain painting and drawing materials, 
easels, paper, scissors, glue etc. 
ii) Dough /plasrecine area: contains dough, plastecine, 
rolling pins etc. 
iii) Puzzle table: contains jigsaws, puzzles based on 
matching shapes and colours etc. 
iv) Wood table: contains wood, nails, hammer, 
screwdriver, saw etc. 
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c) Undefined areas: 
These are areas in which the social nature of the activity 
is not explicitly defined. Children can engage in 
individual activity or group activity. These areas were 
further classified according to whether or not they 
involved fine motor activities, i.e., manipulation of 
small objects or gross motor activities, i.e., running, 
climbing etc.: 
i) Undefined fine motor: 
water table: ships, toys which pump the water, 
containers of diZferent shapes and sizes, etc. 
sand table: pails, spades, cars. 
Example of group activity: 
Fiona and Derick are playing with boats at the 
water table, Fiona's ship is "sailing ". She 
calls for Derick's help. 
Example of individual activity: 
At the sand table, Nancy is putting sand into a 
pail; "I'm making lovely, lovely mud ". 
music area: records, record player, musical 
instruments. 
Example of group activity: 
Children form an "orchestra ". 
Example of individual activity: 
One child plays an instrument whilst another is 
listening to the record player. 
ii) Undefined Gross Motor: 
Included in this area are the climbing frame and 
large bricks which can be used for constructive 
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activities or for funning and jumping. 
Example of group activity: 
Group 1 children arrange the bricks in a row and 
pretend they are driving to "Hampstead ". 
Example of individual activity: 
Linda and Karen are climbing on the climbing frame, 
Linda - Karen: "Watch me doing a backward run." 
The following areas are functionally distinct and thus are 
presented separately. They are included in the discussion 
because the groups interacted in these areas: 
i) Snack table: self-explanatory. 
ii) Crispie Area: Children can make a chocolate crispie 
in this area. Objects present include saucepan, 
corn flakes, chocolate etc. This area is different 
from those subsumed within the ?Parallel Play' 
category because only one child at a time can make 
a crispie whereas in 'Parallel Play Areas? children 
can engage in their respective activities 
simultaneously. 
iii) Steps: These are five steps by the fire escape door. 
Children often congregated here though it is not 
specifically an activity area. Thus, it was 
differentiated from areas included in the 'Undefined' 
category because this category includes areas that 
are explicitly based on engagement in particular 
activities. 
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iv) See Saw: The see -saw by its very nature dictates a 
specific form of joint gross motor activity and 
thus was not included in the 'Undefined Gross Motor' 
Category. 
v) Cash Register: During the early stages of observation 
an old cash register was brought into the nursery and 
was generally placed on a large brick. Though the 
cash register would appear to be appropriately 
classified in the role play area (since its very 
nature is conducive to role play activities, e.g. 
shopkeeper- customer), it was not included in this 
category as I noted in the course of observations 
that the register was broken and a lot of interactions 
were based on attempts to open the till. 
vi) Non - activity areas: These are areas where the children 
was their hands, wash their cups after snack, put 
articles that they have made to take home etc. 
Results: 
Total interaction frequencies for each group 
(including internal and external interactions) are 
presented in Appendix 6.1. (Total interaction frequencies 
of less than 15 are excluded.) The distribution of 
internal interactions x activity area is presented in 
Table 6.6. The groups will be considered separately below. 
Group 1: 
Interactions are concentrated in the 'undefined gross 
motor' areas (47 per cent), followed by the 'Role Play' and 
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236 
Snack Table Areas. These three areas together account 
for 80 per cent of Group l's interactions. In contrast, 
frequency of interaction in the 'Parallel Play' is 
relatively low. The high interaction frequency in the 
Snack Table area is interesting in that there is no 
specific activity here within which children can structure 
their interactions, i.e., there are not toys which they 
share and there is no 'expected' performance as there would 
be, say, in the Wendy House. 
Group 2: 
Group 2 interactions are concentrated in two main 
areas, the 'Parallel Play' Areas and the 'Undefined Gross 
Motor' Areas. This accounts for 82 per cent of their 
internal interactions. They do not engage in sustained 
interactions in any other area. 
Group 3 
Group 3 interactions are concentrated in the 
'Parallel Play' Areas, followed by the 'Role Play' Areas, 
accounting for 70 per cent of their interactions. The 
remaining 30 per cent is dispersed over several areas. 
Group 4: 
The distribution of Group 4 interactions is marked 
by a striking lack of sustained interaction in any 
particular area. This is in contrast to the other three 
groups. The highest percentage of internal interaction 
occurs in the 'Undefined' Gross Motor area however. This 
accounts for only 39 per cent of their activities together. 
The next highest interaction frequency (17 per cent) is in 
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the see -saw which reflects their lack of sustained involve- 
ment in activities. Though the see -saw provides an 
opportunity for a cooperative activity, the activity is 
repetitive and, by its very nature, does not pose 
opportunities for development or expansion as do areas 
like the Wendy House. In Chapter 4, it was noted that 
Group 4 engage in more closed interactions (behaviours not 
conducive to further interaction) than the other Groups 
(page 138). The absence of sustained involvement in 
activities is consonant with this finding. 
The 'Role Play' Areas, 'Parallel' Areas and ?Undefined? 
Areas appear to be used by all the groups. The 'Non- activity? 
areas are uniformly characterized by low internal interaction 
frequencies. Internal interactions in the other areas 
(crispie, cash register, steps, see -saw and snack table) are 
more pronounced for some groups than for others, but they 
are in all cases quite low. 
The hypothesis that the groups would be further 
characterized by differentiation in activity preferences is 
not confirmed. Though each group does have particular 
activity areas where their interactions are concentrated, 
they do not have distinctive types of activity preferences. 
Groups 1 and 3 show similar interest in the 'Role Play' 
areas (16 per cent and 13 per cent of internal interactions 
respectively), Groups 2 and 3 in 'Parallel Play' areas (42 
per cent and 57 per cent of internal interactions respec- 
tively), and Groups 1, 2 and 4 in the Undefined Gross Motor 
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Areas (47 per cent, 40 per cent and 39 per cent of 
internal interactions respectively). Proportion of 
internal interactions in the 'Undefined Fine Motor' Areas 
is markedly similar for all groups (4 per cent to 6 per 
cent). However, the distribution of activity preferences 
does serve to differentiate groups from each other: 
Group 1: role play, gross motor, snack table. 
Group 2: parallel, gross motor. 
Group 3: role play, parallel. 
Group 4: gross motor, see -saw. 
Thus, the preferences in themselves do not in themselves 
provide a constitutive basis of the social structure under 
investigation but the distribution of these preferences 
does appear to be a distinguishing feature. An explanation 
of social organisation within the framework of physical 
context per se is therefore not justified. Though the 
distribution of preferences may distinguish friend from 
non -friend, we cannot argue that these children are friends 
just because they like to do the same things. 
Considerations 
Though children's relationships cannot be explained 
in terms of the physical context within which they occur, 
their interactions do reflect environmental contingencies. 
To illustrate with an extreme example, 
Iain (2) and Linda (3) are at the wood table: 
Linda: "Can I have the hammer for a minute ?" 
Iain: "I haven't finished with it yet." 
Linda: "I mean after you finish." 
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Structural features intrinsic to an activity area per se 
can dictate interactional possibilities. For example, 
the degree of mutual involvement existing between two 
children painting alongside each other at their respective 
easels will obviously be different than that between two 
children engaged in a joint activity on the climbing frame. 
Inviting a companion into a shared theme, "All aboard! 
Let's go!" is expressive of a potential for mutual involve- 
ment not realized in utterances such as "Every time I come 
here I paint a picture ", though both utterances did occur 
within the context of friendly interactions with group 
members. 
Parten (1933) assigned toys a social participation 
value. Houses and dolls were found to be associated with 
the most cooperative form of play. Sand, paper, clay, 
swings, beads and paints were associated with parallel 
activities. Block play occurred with almost every form 
of social interaction. Thus, houses and dolls received 
the highest social value scores whereas toys associated 
with parallel pursuits were assigned a social value of less 
than 50 per cent of that ascribed to houses and dolls. 
It is quite reasonable to expect more sociable interactions 
to characterize joint activities compared to those 
occurring within the context of parallel activities. 
However, we have seen that activity preference does not 
provide an explanation of social organisation. Children 
do not form relationships just because they like to do the 
same things. 
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Cook -Gumperz and Corsaro (1977) argue that the nature 
of the interaction children engage in is determined by the 
locus of interaction itself, physical constants with 
implicit socially -defined expectations, e.g., activities 
in the Play House lead to domestic activities. The meaning 
of an act is thus determined by the meaning of the area: 
"Our aim in this paper has been to demonstrate 
how children employ communicative strategies to 
connect the accustomed expectations of the 
nursery school settings with conventionalized 
expectations to generate socially ordered 
productions. Peer interaction, then, can be 
viewed as the continual practice of reality 
production." 
(Cook- Gumperz and Corsaro, 1977, page 431) 
However, peer interaction can also be viewed as the 
production and maintenance of differential relationships. 
Further, if this differentiation is maintained, then 
children must be manipulating environmental contingencies 
in order to structure their interactions. The analyses 
of 'exclusion' (Chapter 5) and of 'inclusion' indicate that 
children are actively structuring their interactions on 
the basis of their relationships with their peers. In 
Chapter 5 it was demonstrated that the distribution of 
'exclusive' ('reject person') initiations is selectively 
distributed in a manner conforming to the organisation of 
the children's affiliative preferences. The inclusion 
analyses indicate that the pattern of responses to 
inclusive acts also conforms to this structure. Further, 
the analyses of thematic consonance in Chapter 4 demonstrate 
241 
that the children are interacting within a mutually 
meaningful framework. Though environmental contingencies 
will undoubtedly affect or determine the actual content 
of children's interactions, providing a mutual frame of 
reference, children must be manipulating contingencies 
within that framework in order for the structure of social 
organisation to be sustained over a five month period. 
Consider the following interaction: 
Group 1 children are sitting together in a 
large brick and are "miaowing" to each other. 
Nancy (4) approaches them, saying: "Miaow ". 
Derick (1) - Nancy (4): "Woof woof" 
The signification of Derick's act lies in his relationship 
with Nancy, couched within a frame of reference established 
by the ongoing activity. The frame of reference is 
maintained, i.e., an 'animal' theme. Derick assumes the 
role of 'dog' in order to exclude Nancy from their activity. 
So, the semantic force of any message may reflect 
not only the nature of the activity engaged in but also, 
the relationship between the children within that activity. 
The way in which children manipulate the course of an 
activity can be a direct function of contingencies dictated 
by the relationship per se. Consider the following 
interaction: 
Group 3 children are pretending that a clothes 
rail is a "bus ". Linda is the driver and 
Karen is the passenger. 
Linda: "I'm driving on the bus. Who wants 
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to come on because I'm a driver ?" 
Karen: "Can I come on ?" 
Linda: "Yes." 
Linda leaves, Karen goes to the driver's position. 
Linda returns, saying: "No, I'm still . . 
I'm a driver." 
Karen: "You be the driver now but I'll stand up 
here. Pretend it's driving that way." 
Karen points to the middle of the 'bus' where she 
was standing previously. Linda goes to the 
middle, Karen remains at the front. 
Karen then 'drives', i.e. turning an imaginary 
steering wheel around and making appropriate noises. 
Karen: "Who wants to get on the bus? . 
This my bye." 
Linda then leaves. 
This interaction is interesting in that it illustrates the 
active manipulation of environmental constraints within 
the framework of the contingencies dictated by a particular 
relationship. The content of the activity itself 
indicates that children are conforming to "conventionalised 
expectations" (Cook -Gumperz and Corsaro, 1977; page 414) 
in the structuring of their activity in so far as role 
differentiation and expected performance is concerned, 
i.e., buses have a driver at the front and passengers in 
the middle. Karen wants to be the driver - however, she 
is obviously aware of Linda's right to that role over her 
own as determined by their relationship. She seeks to 
243 
gain this role covertly through explicit contravention of 
"conventionalized expectations ", i.e., "Pretend it's driving 
that way." Karen then vacillates between being a "driver" 
and being a "passenger ". As the "driver ", Karen 'drives' 
and says, "who wants to get on the bus ?" As the 
'passenger', Karen says, "This is my stop. Bye bye." 
Vygotsky (1966) and El 'Konin (1966) have both commented 
that in play the child must conform to the behavioural 
boundaries dictated by the role he has assumed: 
"In play the child is free. But this is an 
illusory freedom." (Vygotsky, 1966; page 10) 
The interaction between Karen and Linda illustrate the 
extent to which the reality of an ongoing relationship, 
and the restraints in individual action it dictates, 
pervade the structure of fantasy. 
Interactions within activities between children who 
are members of larger groups may reflect not only the 
relationship between the interactants, but their relation- 
ships with other children in the group. This is illus- 
trated in the following interaction: 
Group 1 children are in a car (bricks in a row 
with a 'steering wheel' at the front). Arthur 
assumes the role of 'driver' and relegates 
Edward and Derick to the back as 'passengers'. 
Arthur leaves. 
Edward - Derick: "Who'll drive ?" 
Edward's utterance is interesting in that it 
reflects the following: 
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1) the nature of the activity being engaged in, i.e. 
a car theme 'Conventionalized expectations' (Cook - 
Gumperz and Corsaro, 1977, page 414) dictate that 
a car should have a driver and a passenger. 
2) the relationship between Edward, Derick and Arthur. 
Though all children were equally involved in the 
construction of the 'cart, neither Derick nor 
Edward question Arthur's 'right' to the more 
desirable role of 'driver' and their relegation to 
the back as 'passengers'. 
3) the relationship between Edward and Derick. 
Edward's utterance suggests that he does not 
perceive Derick as more entitled to the role of 
driver than himself (compared to his relationship 
with Arthur, nor vice versa). 
A relationship precedes an interaction and thus, can 
exercise a determinative influence on the course of an 
activity. Cook -Gumperz and Corsaro (1977) argue that 
children's interactions are based on "situated meaning" 
(page 411) which is meaning defined by the activity area 
(and its intrinsic socially -defined implications) itself. 
The examples of children's interactions discussed thus 
far and the results of the exlusion and inclusion 
analyses, suggest that the meaning of an act may reflect 
not only the nature of the activity itself but the 
relationships between interactants within that activity. 
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Pronominal references: 
"He liked the way Om kept saying 'we', it 
gave him a sense of solidarity." 
(The Nature of Passion,, R. Prawer Jhabieala) 
In Chapter 5 I argued that terms of address can in 
themselves express different types of relationships. 
The appositional use of pronominal references (we vs. you) 
in 'closed' contexts (compared to 'open' contexts) was 
found to increase slightly for Groups 1, 3 and 4, 
reflecting a social context based on the establishment 
of two discrete alignments (pages 172 -179). 
In friendly (i.e. 'open') interactions within an 
activity, first person pronominal references can indicate 
degree of mutual involvement in an activity. For example, 
the utterance "I'm *going to make a fancy one with red and 
green and it's going to be na one" may be of interest to 
the listener but it does not serve to include him in the 
ongoing activity as statements such as "We sleep by the 
river tonight" do. The social implications of first 
person singular and first person plural pronominal 
references, insofar as relationships are concerned, are 
functionally distinct, the latter expressing a potential 
for a degree of mutual involvement that the former defini- 
tionally constrains. This is illustrated in the following 
interactions of Group 1 and Group 4 children: 
(i)Fiona (1) and Brian (1) are repairing their house. 
(i.e., bricks stacked on top of each other). 
Brian: "Fiona, pass the tools." 
* All underlined pronominal references are my emphasis 
from page 245 to 251. 
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Fiona: "Which tools ?" 
Brian: "Our tools." 
Fiona gives Brian the medical instruments which 
are being used as tools. 
Mary (4) approaches, protesting against the use 
of medical instruments as 'tools': "These are 
sleeping things. . . These are the 
nursery's." 
Fiona (1) - Mary (4): "I know but we're just 
playing with tools." 
ii) Mary (4) and Nancy (4) are on the bricks, Mary 
enters a brick and announces: "This is ay room. 
This is nay, room." 
Though both groups are in the same activity area, they 
structure their interactions within that framework in a 
distinctly different manner. Group 1 children establish 
a framework of reference based on a degree of mutual 
involvement that is noticeably absent in Group 4 inter- 
actions. This difference is strikingly conveyed through 
first person pronominal reference. 
Style of 'inclusion' can also reflect the relation- 
ship between interactions. Consider the following two 
interactions: 
(i) Karen (3) is in the see -saw with Nancy (4). 
Linda (3) is sitting beside them in a cardboard 
box she has called her 'car': 
"Karen, would you like to come in my, car ?" 
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(ii) Iain (2) is playing on a tshipt (i.e., the 
climbing frame) with Group i children. 
George (2) approaches: 
George: " Cimon, Iain. That's not our ship." 
Linda's and George's statements are functionally similar 
in that they are both attempting to integrate their 
friends into a shared activity and lure them away from 
activities with other children. However, they use 
contrastive pronominal references - 'my' versus 'our' - in 
their attempts to achieve this end. This does suggest a 
fundamental difference between the relationship of Linda 
and Karen compared to that between Iain and George. 
Moreover, if we compare an interaction between Karen and 
Linda at the wood table with an interaction between Iain 
and George in the same location this difference is 
equally apparent: 
Karen (3) and Linda (3): 
Linda and Karen are engaged in parallel construc- 
tive activities. Linda finishes her task and 
gives it to Karen saying: "I made this for you." 
Linda then takes the screwdriver from Karen 
saying: "because I can drill a hole for you 
because I do it faster." 
Linda is drilling, Karen is watching. 
Karen: "I want to do it now." 
Linda: "Alright, and then let me do some." 
Karen is drilling, Linda takes the screwdriver 
from her saying: "I'll have a bit now." 
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Linda drills for a while, then both are looking 
at the hole in the wood. 
Linda: "It's quite deep now." 
Karen: "I'm taking another shot after you have 
finished." 
Linda: "Right, you have the second shot." 
Karen is drilling. Linda picks up the present 
she gave to Karen, turning a piece of wood on 
top, she says: "This can move. That's why I 
put it quite loosely." 
Karen continues drilling. Linda is watching her. 
Karen: "I'm going to have quite a long shot, 
Linda . " 
Karen stops drilling and says: "See, Linda." 
Linda is looking at the hole in the wood. 
Karen: "Can you see ?" 
Linda doesn't answer, she is looking at the hole 
in the wood, then picks up screwdriver. 
Linda: "Now I'll have a very, very, very long 
shot." 
Karen: "Not too long." 
Linda: "I'm going to do it fastly." 
Karen is looking at her present: "It's a funny 
shape." 
Karen suggests an extra piece of wood be put on. 
Linda: "I'm not going to put it on now but it 
is funny." 
Karen turns around the top piece, saying: 
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"It's not like a diving board. 
It looks like a little gun." 
Linda: "Yeah - bang, bang." 
Karen: "Bang." 
Linda: "See how deep it is now." 
Karen: "Can I have a shot now, Linda ?" 
Linda: "No, because I'm going to have another 
shot." 
However, Linda gives Karen the screwdriver and 
leaves, saying: "Here you are." 
George (2) and Iain (2): 
George and Iain are making something together, 
Iain is cutting the wood. He gives the saw to 
George, saying: "You get this one for me, O.K.? 
Iain picks up a piece of wood and says: 
"There's certainly bended nails in here." 
He is removing the nails with pliers, saying 
repeatedly: "bended ". 
George, re. nails in the wood: "We need it to 
turn round." 
Iain: "I'm going to take it to my house, aren't I? 
If you come to my house, it will be yours 
and mine because you're sawing it and I'm making 
it. We're making it so its your's and mine both. 
George is cutting the wood, then passes saw to 
Iain, saying: "Now you saw." 
Iain: "Yes." 
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George: "I made you a bigger slit." 
Iain cutting the wood, saying: "Your's and mine 
both." 
He then passes the saw to George saying: "I've 
done quite a bit. Now you do it." 
George is cutting the wood. Iain is looking at 
a piece of wood that George had been working on 
previously: 
Iain: "I don't know how you make it so round. . . 
We get it like that." 
George cutting the wood, says: "Iain, I think we 
should saw very fast. When you . . ." 
Iain is looking in the tray containing nails. 
George: "Now you saw." 
Iain is cutting the wood, then passes saw to George, 
saying: "I've done quite a lot." 
George is cutting the wood, Iain is watching: 
. . . George gives Iain the saw, "Now do that bit, 
Iain." 
Iain cuts the wood, then gives George the saw, 
saying: "I done quite, quite a bit. I done quite 
a bit." 
. . . Iain leaves for the snack table. George 
follows, asks teacher at table to write "George and 
Iain" on their construction. Iain is eating, 
watching George. 
Iain: "Because we don't want it to turn, do we ?" 
(reference unclear) 
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George doesn't respond. Iain repeats: "Because 
we don't want it to turn" 
George doesn't respond, interaction ends. 
Consideration of these interactions 
These texts both feature friendly interactions 
occurring within the framework of a constructive activity. 
Environmental contingencies constitute the actual content 
of both conversations yet the nature of the interactions 
reveals fundamentally different types of relationships 
between the Group 3 children and the Group 2 children. 
Though Karen (3) and Linda (3) are working on the same 
construction, the degree of mutuality inhering in their 
conversation is minimal. Linda's involvement in Karen's 
activity commences with her taking it over saying, ". . . I 
do it faster ". All references to the activity are in the 
first person singular. Each checks the other's use of 
the screwdriver in order to sustain individual involvement, 
e.g., Karen: "I want to do it now ", "Not too long ", 
Linda: "Let me do some ", "I'll have a bit now ". Indeed 
a large part of their conversation does concern securing 
personal involvement in the ongoing activity. In contrast, 
in George's and Iain's activity, each child ensures that 
the other contributes to the ongoing activity. Statements 
such as "I've done quite a bit. Now you do it" (and 
subsequent compliance) are explicit acknowledgements of 
mutual responsibility for the construction of the object. 
This mutuality is reflected in the use of first person 
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plural pronouns that recur in their conversations, 
individuation is similarly reflected in the activity of 
Group 3 children by the very absence of collective 
references. References are made to Linda's previous 
activity (e.g. Karen: "It's a funny shape ") but they are 
thematically peripheral to the ongoing activity. In 
contrast, Iain integrates George's previous activity into 
their collective endeavour: "We get it like that ". 
Thus the distinction between the relationship of Karen and 
Linda, compared to that between George and Iain, suggested 
in their inclusive statements ( "Karen, would you like to 
come in my. car" versus "C'mon Iain, that's not our ship ") 
are maintained across different physical contexts. The 
way in which children use environmental contingencies 
reflects this difference in relationships. Indeed, the 
lack of mutuality in Group 3's relationship is evident 
across a variety of contexts. We saw in the 'bus' 
example, the two children vying to be 'driver'. (Linda: 
"I'm a driver" versus Karen: "You be the driver now, but 
I'll stand up here. Pretend it's driving that way "; 
Karen is a 'covert' "driver ".) Similarly, personal 
involvement is constantly being established in the above 
activity at the wood table. Moreover Linda dominates in 
both activites ( "Who wants to come on because I'm a 
driver ", and Linda takes over Karen's construction saying, 
"because I do it faster ".) 
Children structure their interactions within a 
framework of reference defined by the physical context yet 
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the way they manipulate environmental contingencies within 
that context appears to be determined by contingencies 
intrinsic to their relationship. From this assertion 
follows the further one that an analysis of children's 
interactions in terms of the physical context (as do 
Parten (1933) and Cook -Gumperz and Corsaro (1977)) may 
reflect the extent to which environmental contingencies 
dictate the content of an interaction, but it will not 
provide us with information about how children organise 
and structure their interactions within that context. 
Physical context may provide a medium of communication but 
the way in which this medium is used appears to be 
determined by contingencies particular to the relationship 
between the participants in the activity. Collective 
versus singular first person pronominal references could 
constitute an interesting basis for distinguishing the 
extent to which children use the physical context to 
establish a mutual versus parallel activity. Whereas the 
potential of certain areas such as the wood table can be 
realized in individual action (in contrast to areas such 
as the Wendy House whose potential can only be realized 
in group action), we have seen that joint action can also 
be established in these areas. Thus, though Table 6.6 
indicates that both Groups 2 and 3 have a striking 
preference for parallel activities, they may not be using 
these areas in the same way insofar as their interactions 
are concerned. 
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The ongoing activity may provide a frame of 
reference, but how that activity is conducted (within the 
social context) is determined by extant relationships 
between participants. These speculations may be expressed 
in the form of the following hypotheses: 
1) The data considered above suggests that the use of 
first person singular and first person plural 
pronominal references indicate different types of 
relationships in that they reflect degree of 
mutual involvement. If this is the case, then 
we should expect to find a significant difference 
between the groups in their use of first person 
pronominal references but not in their use of 
second person pronominal references. 
The rationale underlying this approach is as follows; if 
children are just using plural references on the basis of 
number of people involved in an ongoing activity, then 
there should be no difference between the groups in their 
use of singular and plural references for both first and 
second persons. 
In French, there is a structural difference between 
singular and plural second person references based on 
syntactic features in speech ('tut - 'vous') whereas in 
English, this distinction is not made. The same form is 
used to address one person and more than one person. 
However, this does not hold for first person pronouns. 
In English (as in French), two different forms are used 
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to distinguish singular from plural reference: the 'I' 
'We' (or tjet - 'nous') distinction does not only 
reflect number of people being addressed, it also reflects 
a differentiation between self -reference based on 
individuation versus that based on collectivization. 
Now, if children are using the !It - twee distinction in 
the same way that they are using the distinction between 
second person singular and plural pronouns - i.e., it 
merely reflects number of people present - then we should 
expect no difference between the groups in their use of 
first person pronouns (plural and singular) and in their 
use of second person pronouns (plural and singular). 
2) If the above hypothesis is confirmed, then we 
should expect to find that groups will be 
expressing different degrees of mutual involve- 
ment in the different activity areas. 
Categories: Pronominal references: 
For the purposes of this analysis, all first person 
singular and first person plural - i.e., I, we, mine, our 
- were recorded. Similarly, all second person singular 
and second person plural references were recorded, i.e., 
you, your. Second person plural references occurred 
when the child was addressing more than one individual. 
Only pronominal references occurring in a friendly 
context were recorded as the maintenance of mutuality in 
activities- necessarily means a friendly context must 
prevail. It was decided that it was not necessary to 
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conduct reliability tests of these categories as only 
verbal pronominal references were considered. Thus, 
there were no interpretive problems with the categories. 
In only one instance did an interpretive decision have 
to be made. This occurred for the above -cited inter- 
action between Iain and George at the wood table. The 
expression "Your's and mine both" was coded as a first 
person plural as it is a collective reference to mutual 
activity and thus coding it as first person singular or 
second person singular would distort the content of the 
utterance. 
Results: 
1) Group differences in pronominal reference: 
First person and second person pronominal references 
by groups are presented in Table 6.7. The hypothesis 
under investigation is confirmed. The difference among 
the groups in their -use of first person pronominal 
d4 =3 
references is significant at the .001 level V2 = 46.33,,) 
whereas the difference in their use of second person 
dß'3 
pronominal reference is not significant (x2 = 
Thus, first person pronominal references are 
expressive of relationships and children do appear to be 
selectively structuring their interactions to establish 
certain types of relationships. The absence of any 
significant difference between the groups in their use of 
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this finding. Indeed, as stated above, the distinction 
between second person singular and second person plural 
references does not reflect the intrinsic nature of a 
relationship so much as number of people being addressed. 
Further, the distinction between the interactional 
styles of Groups 1 and 2 versus Groups 3 and 4 observed 
previously is maintained. In Chapter 5 it was found 
that Groups 3 and 4 exercised a less rigid distinction 
between the 'reject theme' and 'reject person' categories 
of behaviour than Groups 1 and 2. In this chapter, it 
was found that, for Groups 3 and 4, the internal and 
external initiations of inclusive behaviours were equally 
distributed. Perusal of Table 6.7 indicates that Groups 
1 and 2 use collective references more than Groups 3 and 
4. Thus there does appear to be a relationship between 
the use of these types of behaviours and interacting in 
a collective manner. Indeed, the difference between 
Groups 3 and 4 in their use of collective references is 
minimal. 
2) First person pronominal reference by area: 
Categories: Activity Areas 
For the purposes of this analysis, children's 
interactions in the following areas were considered, 
Role Play, Parallel, Fine Motor, Gross Motor, because 
these areas were used by all the children (see Table 6.6) 
whereas the other areas were used by some of the children 
(though infrequently) and not at all by others. The Gross 
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Motor and Fine Motor Areas were considered together 
because, as stated previously, their social potential is 
undefined insofar as joint versus individual action is 
concerned. 
Results 
The results of the above analyses indicate that an 
investigation of children's use of first person pronominal 
references in different activity areas is justified. The 
results of these analyses are presented in Table 6.8a. 
The hypothesis that children will be using these areas 
differently insofar as collective versus individual 
actions are concerned receives confirmation. A significant 
difference was found for all three areas under considera- 
dF -3 
tion (Gross Motor and Fine Motor, 2 = 17.16 p .001.; 
Parallel,X 2 = 18.86 p4 .001; Role Play = 11 .62 
0 -3 p .010. These areas will be considered separately 
below: 
Fine Motor and Gross Motor Areas: 
Groups 3 and 4 rarely use plural pronouns in 
these areas, though Group 4 uses them more 
frequently than Group 3 (16 per cent versus 9 
per cent respectively). Groups 1 and 2 are 
thus using these areas for collective activity 
more than Groups 3 and 4. 
Parallel Areas: 
The most striking finding here is that Group 2 
children use these areas for collective action 
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Table 6.8 
1st Person Pronominal Reference by Area 
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more than all the other groups combined. 
Indeed, collective references are totally 
absent in Group 4's interactions in these 
areas. However, the distinction between 
the interactions of Groups 1 and 2 versus 
Groups 3 and 4 holds for these areas too. 
Role Play Areas: 
Group 1 engages in considerably more 
interactions in these areas than the other 
groups, and Group 3 the least. The 
distinction between Groups 1 and 2 versus 
Groups 3 and 4 is less striking in these 
areas. Group 4 uses relatively more 
collective references than Group 2 (33 per 
cent 29 per 
Perusal of Table 6.8 suggests that the occurrence 
of collective references are to some degree affected by 
area, however, this relationship is not consistent for 
all the groups. The most striking effect is found in 
Group its interactions: 47 per cent in Role Play Areas, 
34 per cent in Fine Motor and Gross Motor areas and 14 
per cent in Parallel areas. In contrast, the distribu- 
tion of collective references in Group 2 interactions is 
relatively constant across the various areas: 29 per 
cent in the Role Play area, 28 per cent in Fine Motor and 
Gross Motor areas, 26 per cent in Parallel areas. The 
distribution of collective references in the interactions 
Table 6.8a 
1st Person Pronominal References by Area 
Role Play Areas: 
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of Groups 3 and 4 follow a similar pattern to that of 
Group l's interactions though they occur with considerably 
less frequency. For Group 3 interactions, the distribu- 
tion of collective references is as follows: 29 per cent 
in Role Play areas, 9 per cent in Fine Motor and Gross 
Motor areas and 5 per cent in Parallel areas. In Group 
4 interactions, we find collective references distributed 
as follows: 33 per cent in Role Play areas, 16 per cent 
in Fine Motor and Gross Motor areas, an absence of any 
collective references in Parallel areas. Thus, though 
there is evidence that Groups 1, 2 and 3 are using collec- 
tive references differentially according to physical 
context, there are nevertheless substantive (and signifi- 
cant) differences between the groups themselves, 
indicating that they are structuring different types of 
interactions in the various activity areas. 
Conclusion: 
From an analysis of children's behaviours within the 
context of their interactions, a distinct social structure 
emerges. In Chapter 3 we saw that a sociographic 
analysis of interaction frequencies yields four distinct 
groups.WITEn we looked at behaviours that were the content 
of these frequencies, we saw that they provided 
constitutive bases of this distinction maintaining the 
organization and differentiation of the friendship groups. 
As noted in Chapter 4, children do generally engage in 
thematically consonant interactions. Thus, their 
264 
interactions in the various areas of the nursery are 
occurring within a framework that is mutually meaningful. 
This is, of course, a necessary prerequisite to the 
maintenance of any social structure that is characterized 
by consistency and stability over time. Further, children 
actively and selectively structure their interactions in 
a manner that maintains a framework based on differential 
relationships. In Chapter 5 we saw that even in conflict 
(i.e.'closed'interactions), children respond differentially 
to group members and non -group members; for Groups 1 and 
2, group members are more likely to have the content of 
their act rejected whereas non -group members are more 
likely to be rejected themselves. Groups 3 and 4 are 
making a distinction in this direction, however, it is 
not of sufficient magnitude to yield 
canoe. However, exclusion is used more frequently in 
interactions with non -group members by all groups. In 
friendly contexts (i.e. 'open' interactions), this 
distinction is maintained. Children respond differen- 
tially to the inclusive initiations of their peers such 
that group members are more likely to receive a friendly 
response in contrast to non -group members who are less 
likely to receive a response and when they do, that 
response is more likely to be an unfriendly one. 
Within the groups themselves, the analyses of 
pronominal references show that different types of 
relationships based on different degrees of mutual 
involvement are being expressed. The children (Groups 1 
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and 2) who engage more frequently in collective references 
also engage in a more rigid use of inclusive behaviours. 
Conversely, the children (Groups 3 and 4) who engage less 
frequently in collective references, also engage in a 
less rigid use of inclusive behaviours though we have seen 
in Chapter 5, and in this chapter, that they do actively 
maintain a distinction between their relationship and 
each other and their relationships with other children. 
Theoretically one could assert that Groups 1 and 2 are 
more 'cohesive' than are Groups 3 and 4 in that the former's 
interactions reflect a higher degree of collective action 
(in addition to their use of inclusive and exclusive 
behaviours). However, as stated previously, the relation- 
ships of all these children were consistent and stable 
over a five month period and so one must assume that they 
were satisfying to the children involved. Thus, the 
imposition of any value -laden dimension that aligns 
children on the basis of a heuristically defined concept 
may reflect the social values of the investigator more 
than what is actually important to these children. Just 
as adults have different relationships characterized by 
varying degrees of mutual involvement, so do young 
children. 
Thus, the results of analyses conducted in this thesis 
do vindicate an assertion that children establish a social 
structure based on their relationships. They interact 
differentially and selectively with individuals within their 
social environment, thereby maintaining the observed social 
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structure. The portrait of the child as constitutionally 
incapable of forming and maintaining relationships due to 
does 
constraints dictated by egocentrism not appear to be 
justified. Indeed, intra- individualistic approaches to 
early social behaviour are in themselves fraught with 
heuristic constraints, i.e., content cannot be extracted 
from context with the intent of understanding the former. 
This is strikingly illustrated in the argument that 
propinquity underlies children's interactions, an argument 
that does not withstand empirical validation. If we 
consider children within their social context, we see 
emerging a pattern of relationships that is selectively 
established and structured through the ,children's own 
actions. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONSIDERATIONS ON STRUCTURL 
"In order to handle the world with maximum 
competence it is necessary to consider the 
structure of things. It is necessary to 
become skilled in manipulating systems and 
in abstracting forms and patterns. This 
is a truth which, as aspecies, we have 
slowly come to know. If we were ever to 
renounce the activity, there would be a 
hefty price to pay." 
(Donaldson, 1978; page 82, her emphasis) 
The conclusion of this thesis is that children 
selectively and actively structure their social worlds, 
the net result of this structuring activity a social 
organisation that is functionally autonomous and self - 
regulating. This social organisation is based on a system 
of relationships which_ provides a frame of reference 
within which children structure their interactions. 
Further, this structure can only be gleaned through a 
study of interactions within their social context. The 
isolated acts of the individual or the interacting dyad 
will not in themselves reveal the framework within which 
they are couched. Consider the following interaction: 
Jimmy (2) is absent. Brian (1) asks George (2) 
and Iain (2) where Jimmy is: 
Iain: "He's away on holiday." 
Brian: "He went to Cupba Cupba." 
Iain: "Jimmy's staying with his Granny." 
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The signification of Brian's act extends beyond the 
immediate interchange, framed within an awareness of 
prevailing inter- relationships, i.e., his relationship 
with Jimmy versus that of George and Iain. Brian 
doesn't know where Jimmy is but presumes, correctly, that 
he can find out through asking them. Walkerdine (1982) 
writes: 
"Children are engaged in a process in which 
the crucial moment of understanding lies in 
a specific relation of signified to signifier." 
(page 131) 
In this thesis, we may consider an interaction to be the 
signifier and the relationship, the signified. 
Serafica (1982) writes that the 
ITsocial interactions out of which social 
knowledge is constructed occur within a 
social milieu which has its own intrinsic 
organisation." (page 14) 
We have seen that the 'intrinsic organisation' characteriz- 
ing the social milieu of these children is the product of 
their own actions. As has been stated, differential 
relationships, indicated by the results of sociographic 
analyses in Chapter 3, are substantively confirmed in the 
actual content of the children's interactions. We see 
this illustrated in the above -cited interaction in which 
differential relationships are mutually ackno+4edged and 
confirmed, thus giving an encounter a meaning extending 
beyond the interacting dyad. Similarly, the signification 
of Linda's (3) statement to Karen (3) and Nancy (4), 
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"I'm only going to ask Karen in my car ", extends beyond 
the utterance itself to an affirmation of differential 
relationships. The structure is dynamic, interactions 
affirming and re- affirming the selective organisation of 
inter- relationships. Behaviours subsumed within the 
'exclusion' (Chapter 5) and 'inclusions (Chapter 6) 
categories are functionally contrastive and the selective 
distribution of their use conforms to the selective 
distribution of their interaction frequencies: 
"relationships exist over time and each 
interaction within a relationship may be 
influenced by past interactions as well 
as expectations of future ones." 
(Hinde, 1979; page 153) 
In Chapter 3, social structures based on dominance, 
attentional and sociometric criteria were described. 
Though the heuristic value of these structures has been 
demonstrated, their phenomenological or experiential value 
has not. Dominance and attention structures have been 
found in several groups of young children though the way 
in which they are functionally operative is not clear, 
phylogenetic continuity assumed though their ontogenetic 
significance has not been demonstrated. Montagner et al 
O n Q h a p r e c, (oc,; 
(197 4) argue that dominance structures are superimposed, 
on human groups. This criticism is 
no less applicable to attention structure theory. 
Similarly, sociometric studies have demonstrated 
differential popularity within a class of children, yet 
the extent to which 'popularity! is functionally operative 
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in the formation and maintenance of relationships, i.e., 
within a child's social world, is not clear. We do not 
know whether these structures are functionally intrinsic 
to a group itself - i.e., that the heuristic criteria on 
which they are based are organizational features of actual 
relationships - or the experimenter's hypothetical 
structure of his subjects' relationships. The results of 
this research endeavour indicate that children may use 
their relationships with each other as a structural basis 
such that their interactions are selectively embedded 
within a context based on their relationships. 
The young child then does not appear to apprehend 
his social world in monolithic terms as undifferentiated 
but, rather, in differentiated terms as a system of 
relationships; "he is given to structuring" (Donaldson, 
1978, page 88). Serafica (1982) writes: 
"The hallmark of an interpersonal relationship 
is differential responsiveness. When two 
individuals have a particular relationship 
with one another, as in friendship, it is 
assumed that under certain conditions they 
will interact with one another in a manner 
different from their interactions with others. 
An adequate operational definition of friend- 
ship therefore requires a demonstration of 
differential responsiveness. In addition we 
need to know whether the difference is 
quantitative, qualitative or both. For 
instance, do friends resolve their conflicts 
more frequently than do nonfriends? Do they 
resolve them differently ?" (page 122) 
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The children comprising the sample here do appear to have 
satisfied Seraficats friendship criterion. Differential 
responsiveness prevails both in 'peace' ('inclusion') and 
in conflict (texclusiont). Moreover, these interactions 
occur within a selectively structured framework that is 
consistent and stable over a six -month period. Differen- 
tial responsiveness thus is used to actively maintain the 
distinction in inter- relationships. 
Differential responsiveness has been demonstrated in 
interactions between school -aged children in experimental 
settings based on a comparison between friends and non- 
friends. In some cases the dyads are acquaintances (e.g. 
Newcomb et al, 1979) whilst in other cases they are 
strangers (e.g. Foot et al, 1977; Serafica and Destefano, 
1982). Distinct differences between friends and non - 
friends are reported, friends being more likely to work 
towards a common goal, to engage in expressions of affect 
(e.g. smiling or touching), to express commands based on 
mutual intent and so forth. Gottman and Parkhurst (1980) 
compared preschool dyads comprising friends and strangers 
at a child's home. Interactions between friends were 
found to be characterized by greater communication 
clarity, fantasy, responsiveness and solidarity. Though 
these studies do indicate that young children are 
differentially responsive to their peers, none of them 
indicate how differential responsiveness is operative in 
a context, such as a nursery, within which a child may 
have to coordinate different relationships of a potentially 
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different nature. Selectivity and stability would here 
be necessary prerequisites of differential responsiveness 
yet the very nature of the studies precludes an investiga- 
tion of these factors. Only one interactional possibility 
was available, some used strangers as their 'nonfriend' 
sample and some used experimental settings. Though such 
investigations are not without interest, they do give a 
limited view of the role of differential responsiveness 
which in this thesis has proved to constitute an organiza- 
tional basis of a social structure in young children. 
Foot et al (1980) argue that acquaintanceship may be 
a "continuous dimension of friendly affect" (page 3). The 
results obtained here would seem to provide some support 
for this assertion. Children engage in friendly and 
unfriendly behaviours with both friends and non -friends 
but what differentiates the former from the latter is the 
relative distribution' of these belsaviours. For example, 
in Chapter 6, results of analyses indicated that internal 
inclusive initiations are more likely to receive a response 
and that response is more likely to be 'open' whereas 
external inclusive initiations are less likely to receive 
a response and that response is more likely to be 'closed'. 
Similarly, it is the relative distribution of 'reject 
theme' and 'reject person' (exclusion) behaviours that 
differentiates friend from non -friend. 
Differential responsiveness eludes description within 
a reductionist framework in which behaviours are distinguished 
from each other by their 'reinforcing value' such that the 
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child who emits positive acts is more likely to be the 
recipient of positive acts and so forth. As noted in 
Chapter 1, these functional classifications (e.g. positive 
versus negative reinforcement) subsume such a broad 
spectrum of behaviours that it becomes impossible to 
gauge qualitative processes that are differentially 
operative in different relationships. Act emitted is 
certainly not distinct from act received. but 'Cause' 
cannot be found within a unitary explanation such as the 
concept of reinforcement. The principles underlying 
social learning theory cannot account for the selective 
differentiation of relationships. This is illustrated 
by Master's and Furman's finding that rates of engaging 
in reinforcing or neutral acts are not related to specific 
friendship selection. Selectivity of friendship choice 
is similarly salient here; indeed, it is the basis of 
this thesis. 
Heterogeneity characterizes the child's social world 
just as it does the adult's world. Children do engage in 
different types of relationships and thereby challenge 
unitary explanations of their milieu. This is illustrated 
by the finding in Chapter 6 that Groups use first person 
pronouns (singular and plural) differentially across 
different physical contexts; thus, we must assume that 
they structure their relationships themselves. Gottman 
and Parkhurst (1980) found social comparison activities 
involving exploration of feelings and common ground to 
characterize younger children's (under five years) 
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interactions more than those of older children (five to 
6.1 years). On the other hand, younger children were 
concerned with establishing social contrast with strangers. 
This research further illustrates the extent to which 
young children structure their relationships. Excessively 
determinist paradigms do not allow for the possibility of 
differential relationships and hence cannot account for 
its occurrence. Differential relationships in preschool 
children thus challenge theoretical assertions that: 
a) social behaviour can be explicated by the 
tenets underlying learning theory, 
b) children have no intrinsic interest in 
relationships (Piagetian cognitive theory). 
Little is known about the relationships of young 
children. This dearth of knowledge would seem to result 
from a tendency to look at the behaviours or cognitions 
of the individual child. For example, McLoyd et al 
(1984) comment that most behavioural investigations of 
early peer relations tend to look at initiations. 
Learning theorists, Masters and Furman (1981), coded 
initiations and responses separately in their observations 
of preschool children, thus precluding an investigation of 
their distribution within interactions. In Chapter 1 it 
was argued that this focus on the individual in research 
on relationships stems from the primary assumption that 
the child is not initially social, hence a focus on how 
he becomes social, be this process expressed in terms of 
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differential rates of emission of differentially reinforcing 
behaviours (i.e., extra -psychic determinism) or be it 
expressed in terms of cognitive change within the Individual 
(i.e. intra- psychic determinism). In either case, a study 
of relationships is intrinsically excluded by the very 
nature of the paradigms generally applied to children's 
social behaviours. This can perhaps account for Shantz's 
(1982) observation that "very little research or theory 
has been devoted to the way in which social organisation 
is manifested to the child." (page 189) 
Much research has tended to address the determinants 
of friendship, both cognitive (e.g. Selman, 1980; Youniss, 
1978) and sociometric (e.g. Hartup et al). 
In some cases, sociometric and cognitive factors are 
brought together, with reports of observed correlations 
(e.g. Jennings, 1975; Rubin, 1975). This type of 
research necessarily concludes with recursions to the 
individual and his cognitive and /or social competence. 
Thus a lot of research on early relationships has tended 
to: 
1) make assumptions about the social relationships 
of the child on the basis of his present level 
of cognitive development 
2) analyzed a social phenomenon in relation to the 
individual without considering the social context 
within which the phenomenon occurred. 
As noted in Chapter 6, many researchers seem concerned 
with gauging 'competence', with an idealised norm, as 
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defined by position along a unitary dimension which 
functions as both cause and explanation of the phenomenon 
under study. 
The assertion that social behaviour is the result of 
intra- individualistic processes has to some degree 
constrained the study of the inter- individual at the pre- 
school level in spawning assumptions that are assumed to 
have both psychological and inter- personal veracity. For 
example, Corsaro (1981; 1979) examines the use of access 
and resistance rituals in preschool groups with the 
assumption that the child engages in these activities to 
secure personal involvement in an activity. This point 
was discussed in Chapter 5. He did not investigate the 
possibility that these behaviours could be selectively 
distributed within a context based on relationships but 
rather, examined their occurrence in relation to the 
individual child. It is assumed that the young child has 
no intrinsic interest in the formation and maintenance of 
relationships yet we have seen in this research endeavour 
preschool children selectively including and excluding 
each other within a context based, on relationships. 
Bearison(1982) attempts to bring the Piagetian child 
and his social world closer together by arguing that 
knowledge occurs within and is derived from a social 
environment, and therefore is necessarily socially 
structured. Hence a study of relationships based on the 
cognitions of the individual child is theoretically 
justifiable. By arguing the inherently social basis of 
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knowledge within Piagetian theory, Bearison therein posits 
a degree of theoretical affinity between Piaget and 
Vygotsky and Mead,yet the contrastive orientations of 
these theorists (i.e., the intraspective orientation of 
Piaget versus the extraspective orientations of Mead and 
Vygotsky) render this argument strained. According to 
Vygotsky (1962), cognitive structuralization is the result 
of internalization of social structures: 
"In our conception, the true direction of the 
development of thinking is not from the 
individual to the socialized, but from the 
social to the individual." (page 20) 
Though both Piaget and Vygotsky propose epistemological 
theories of development, Vygotsky argues that development 
proceeds from inter- psychic functioning to intra- psychic 
functioning whereas in Piagetian thought, intra- psychic 
functioning can act as a constraint, on inter- psychic 
functioning, e.g., the concept of egocentrism. Mead 
argues that the self (tmet) evolves within a social context 
through the medium of language (Riegel, 1978); the inter- 
personal therein regulates the intra- personal, whereas in 
Piagetian theory, the causal chain is reversed. 
Environmental factors serve a catalytic function rather 
than a directly causal function, behaviour is ultimately 
endogeneously determined. 
The results of analyses obtained here suggest that 
children actively structure their relationships. They 
impose order and consistency upon each other, i.e. upon 
their social world. The results of communication analyses 
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conducted in Chapter 4 indicate that consonance is a 
regulative feature governing children's interactions. 
Mutually meaningful interactions are actively sought and 
achieved; dissonant interactions tend to be rectified, 
i.e., rendered mutually meaningful. A social framework 
based on reciprocal regulation and control is an implicit 
result of this process. Within this framework differen- 
tial relationships are conveyed. Children structure 
their interactions in an active and dynamic way to maintain 
a distinct system of inter- relationships (inclusion and 
exclusion, the constitutive bases of this distinction) yet 
are also willing to engage in friendly interactions with 
the peer group as a whole (e.g., in Chapter 6 it was found 
that initiations based on activity descriptions are more 
likely to lead to an 'open' response than 'inclusive' 
initiations). 
Thus, the children appear to have resolved what 
Glick (1978) sees as the main task of social life, that 
is, "to sustain and maintain coherent courses of action 
which are related coherently to an interactive context" 
(page 5). The social structure observed is predicated 
upon interactions having a signification that extends 
beyond the immediate interchange. Moreover, we could 
not even have observed a social structure over a six -month 
period if children's conceptions of each other were 
transitory and bound to the immediate moment as many 
theorists assert (e.g. Selman, 1980; Youniss, 1978; 
Serafica, 1982; Bee, 1981) . 
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A distinctive assumption of much of the research 
literature described throughout this thesis is that 
theoretical representation is presumed to directly 
correspond to actual psychological structures, theoretical 
reality thus reflecting psychological reality. Assumptions 
of isomorphism between theoretical structures and psycho- 
logical structures are strikingly illustrated in the 
assertions of dominance theorists of a functional 
equivalence between tasks requiring subjects to seriate 
objects and tasks requiring subjects to rank peers on 
relative toughness (e.g. Edelman and Omark, 1973; Strayer 
and Chapeskie, 1980; Slukin and Smith, 1977). (This was 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3, pages 65 - 67.) 
For example, Edelman and Omark (1973) write that "ordering 
children into a hierarchy is equivalent to the logical 
operation of seriation" (page 108). Strayer and 
Chapeskie (1980) attribute the poor performance of their 
preschool subjects on such tasks to the constraints 
intrinsic in egocentrism, thus using a theoretical 
construct to explicate poor performance on measures of 
other theoretical constructs. Indeed, the assertion that 
cognition of the physical world and cognition of the 
social world are isomorphic is itself being challenged. 
For example, Hoffman (1981) and Damon (1981) differentiate 
between people and objects on the basis of their agency. 
Lack of knowledge does presume lack of control and 
organisationgbut failure to meet performative ideals on 
heuristic measures of knowledge does not ipso facto imply 
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its absence. However, this is a prevailing assumption 
Qkove_ 
in much of theAresearch. For illustrative purposes, let 
us consider person perception theory which argues that 
our psychological interpretation of the other's behaviour 
results in the attribution of stable or dispositional 
characteristics, i.e., personality traits. The interpre- 
tive result is our psychological portrait of the other, 
functionally expressed in our behavioural expectancies of 
others and our interactions with them. Traits are thus 
theorized to provide the organizational basis of our 
relationships with others (e.g. Livesley and Bromley, 1973; 
Rogers, 1978; Rholes and Ruble, 1984; Peevers and Secord, 
1973). A child's expressed descriptions of people are 





the young child does not use dispositional terms in. 
,b9 pin p e.rc r r) rs:, 
his descriptions of others. Cause is ascribedAto egocen- 
trism and a resultant inability to abstract or organize 
experiences derived from interactions in terms of internal 
constants. Responding only to that which is immediately 
present and visible, the young child's social world is 
variant and thus unpredictable. The constancy of human 
nature that underlies, and renders order to, this kaleido- 
scopic flow of physical events is not apprehended by the 
young child. 
Egocentrism is presumed to place a ceiling on the 
child's capacity to apprehend human nature; the fragmented 
perceptions of the syncretic mind preclude the possibility 
of a social structure(like the one that is being proposed 
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in this thesis). Piagetian theory is usedAto provide 
an interpretive framework. The assumption of egocentrism 
is central to the differential functions ascribed to 
superficial versus personality characteristics as internal 
organizational strategies. Behavioural predictions are 
therein made, based on the premise that the nature of an 
act is an outcome of intram individualistic processes: 
"If a person uses concise or peripheral terms 
to describe people he is probably at a disadvantage 
because effective and sensitive social interaction 
depends on being able to discern regularities in 
the superficially diverse actions of a person." 
(Livesley and Bromley, 1973, page 106) 
The results of analyses conducted in this thesis 
necessarily argue against any assertion that the child cannot 
perceive order and regularity in his social world. The 
social order observed is predicated upon order and 
regularity which in turn pre -supposes that children must be 
engaging in some form of interpretive process, based on 
social contextual features, that directs their interactions, 
though the substantive content of this process is unknown 
to us. The selective distribution of inclusive and 
exclusive behaviours does not correspond with a world view 
based on "outwardly observable and varying appearances and 
actions" (Livesley and Bromley, 1973; page 118). For 
example, the differential distribution of 'reject theme' 
and 'reject person' (exclusion) categories of behaviour 
suggest that young children may act upon their social worlds 
with intended effect, this in turn suggesting an awareness 
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of the effect of their actions upon others. This awareness 
is further suggested by the finding that the latter is more 
likely to lead to a 'closed' response than the former, 
thus emphasizing its 'exclusive' function. 
Freeman et al (1982, page 55) write that "context - 
epific frames of reference must be set up during social 
negotiation" (their emphasis) The social structure 
observed in this thesis is based on context-specific frames 
of reference provided by relationships and is thus 
consonant with Walkerdine's (1982, page 131) interpretation 
of context as a "criteria' feature of signification itself ". 
Indeed, as noted in Chapter 5, Walkerdine criticizes 
psychological theory for its tendency to bifurcate context 
and the child into distinct external and internal realms, 
"the context /cognition problem becomes one of how the social 
impinges upon the preexisting individual" (page 131). 
Traits or dispositional characteristics are heuristi- 
cally ascribed methods of internal organisation of social 
experiences. Implicit in approaches based on verbal or 
written reports is that the child's understanding of the 
other is captured in his expressed thought, that description 
reflects concept. Theoretical expectations are thus given 
an intrinsic validity or truth value such that a child who 
does not meet performative expectations is necessarily 
reflecting cognitive immaturity. Heuristic absence 
reflects psychological absence. The relevance of the 
phenomenon to the experimental paradigm is not so much 
investigated as assumed. It is perhaps the 'hubris' of an 
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empiricist to assume that the phenomenon should fit into 
the paradigm rather than investigating the adequacy of the 
New p`"45n-ett 
paradigm to the phenomenon itself. lick (1978) argues 
that social knowledge cannot be gauged through reflections 
in socially isolated contexts. This was discussed in 
Chapter 1 and is indeed the position adopted in this thesis. 
Traits are a means of communicating apprehension of 
constancy in the other. This does not ipso facto imply 
that they constitute an internal method of organisation 
such that their absence necessarily implies absence of 
organisation. Indeed, Freeman et al comment (1982): 
"The common image of developmental psychologists 
is precisely one in which they invite children 
to reason 'to attain some particular conclusion', 
noting whether or not the appropriate conclusion 
is in fact attained, thereby inferring something 
about the child's reasoning capacities. Only 
recently have psychologists questioned whether 
or not the child's reasoning processes were 
governed by the same 'particular abstract 
character' as that which referentially framed 
the conclusion from the experimenter's point of 
view; whether the child's temporary interest 
really did coincide with the experimenter's." 
(page 55) 
As stated above, the social structure observed in 
this research endeavour was stable over a five -month period, 
thus suggesting that though children may not be able to 
express their bases of social organisation, overt absence 
does not imply internal absence. A major problem with 
much social cognition research is that expressed thought 
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is presumed to structurally and functionally correspond 
to internal thought which in turn, is presumed to be 
linguistically structured such that concrete responses to 
an experimenter reflect an inability to abstract 
experiences derived from social interactions into a 
structured and coherent whole. Bigelow and La Gaipa 
(1980) propose that "social concepts may be inherently 
verbal" (page 19), going on to assert the following: 
"It cannot be assured that a child who has 
developed an understanding of a given concept 
will be able to verbalize it effectively . . . 
We can onl assume for the time bein_ that 
comprehension and expressive ability are 
tightly related." 
(page 23, my emphasis) 
Thus, what should be a hypothesis is treated like a 
theoretical premise. Similarly, Serafica (1982) writes: 
"A decrease with age in the use of concrete 
responses and an age -related increase in the 
use of abstract responses also characterizes 
children's descriptions of the means used to 
form, maintain and terminate friendships. 
Thus there is some tentative support for the 
hypothesis that the capacity for abstraction 
underlies at least the reresentation of a 
friend." 
(page 110, my emphasis) 
Linguistic sophistication is thereby a necessary 
requisite of social sophistication. This approach has 
not gone unchallenged. Walkerdine (1982) argues that 
experimental tasks requiring the child to manifest some 
particular form of reasoning also implicitly require him 
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to concentrate on the way in which he expresses his thoughts_ 
"Abstract reasoning . . . requires conscious 
reflection on the linguistic structure of the 
discourse itself." (page 129) 
Ervin -Tripp and Keenan (1977) question the generalizability 
of verbal reports derived in socially distinct contexts, 
arguing that "speakers are incapable of reporting out of 
context those aspects of language which are variant 
according to social or situational context" (page 1). 
Indeed, Donaldson (1978) also stresses the determinative 
role of contextual variables in reasoning: 
"It is when we are dealing with people and 
things in the context of fairly immediate 
goals and intentions that we feel most at 
home . . . when we move beyond the bounds 
of human sense there is a dramatic difference. 
Thinking which does move beyond these bounds, 
so that it no longer operates within the 
supportive context of meaningful events, is 
often called 'formal' or 'abstract'. (page 76) 
Thus, in asking children questions about their relationships, 
it may not be only their conceptions of the interpersonal 
influencing their responses. 
Vygotsky (1962) makes an important distinction 
between spontaneous concepts acquired as a result of every- 
day experiences and scientific concepts acquired contras- 
tively in specifically didactic contexts, involving a 
"mediated attitude towards its object" (page 108). 
Scientific concepts begin with a verbal definition and are 
later filled in with concrete experiences. Spontaneous 
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concepts, on the other hand, proceed in the reverse 
direction, beginning with concrete experiences and 
culminating in verbal articulation. Thus, a child may 
not be able to clearly define the concept of 'brother' 
yet present an adequate definition of the concept of 
texploitationt,though the latter, in contrast to the 
former, is "schematic" and lacking the "rich content 
derived from personal experience" (page 108). Similarly, 
a child may not be able to identify grammatical forms in 
his native language yet do so competently in a foreign 
language he is learning. Vygotsky's assertions are based 
on his experiments in which primary school children were 
presented with problems to solve dealing with either 
scientific or everyday concepts. He found that children 
experienced less difficulty in dealing with the former than 
the latter. 
Expression does not necessarily mirror concept. 
Selman's (1980) remark that "Children who do not reflectively 
understand mutuality . . . may still happen to act in 
mutually coordinated ways" (page 263) may be answered with 
Vygotsky's (1962) remark that the "child becomes conscious 
of his spontaneous concepts relatively late; the ability 
to define them in words, to operate with them at will, 
appears long after he has acquired the concepts" (page 108). 
Further, any generalizations from the hypothetical 
(experimental) context to the real context are necessarily ( New Q 
inductive.I hhroughout this thesis, l have stressed the 
importance of social context in considerations of children's 
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relationships. As stated in Chapter 5, content cannot 
be extracted from context and adequately understood. The 
signification of a social act is inextricably framed within 
a social context. The results of analyses conducted in 
this thesis vindicate such an assertion. Awareness of 
this social context, i.e., of relationships, is thus 
necessary for the structuring of interactions. Social 
knowledge is necessarily operative and framed within a 
context that is active and dynamic. It is therefore 
"more uncertain and more sensitive to current informational 
conditions that physical knowledge" (Glick, 1978; page 3). 
A social structure that is organized and coherent presumes 
New pc -,-5 ,-- 
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an awareness that is organized and coherent./ The social 
structure perceived in this research endeavour directly 
challenges a solipsistic portrait of the child as without 
interest in the other beyond momentary interchanges based 
on personal involvement in an activity. It necessitates 
an awareness of the other as subjectively distinct from 
the self. It presupposes an actively interpretive process 
to render the social world meaningful: 
"A child who is trying to figure out what other 
people mean must be capable of recognizing 
intentions in others, as well as having them 
himself. And such a child is by no means\ 
wholly unable to decentre. While he may 
certainly, like the rest of us, fail to 
appreciate the relativity of his own point of 
view, he is capable of escaping from it. Thus 
he is not debarred by egocentrism from 
communicating with us and relating to us in a 
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personal way. Indeed personal relations 
appear to form the matrix within which his 
learning takes place." 
(Donaldson, 1978; page 88) 
The child acts upon his social world with intended 
effect and these intentions are differentially apprehended 
by peers. This thesis ends with the assertion that 
children do not view their social world as a plane of 
spatially juxtaposed peers but rather, within an intrinsi- 
cally meaningful framework whose signification resides 
within relationships. Hence the social world of the child 
evades procrustean efforts at explication in intra- 
individualistic terms. 
Criticisms'and im lications for future research 
The results obtained in this thesis are necessarily 
constrained by the fact that they pertain to one particular 
nursery class and-further, the sample is quite small. 
Hence these findings need to be replicated in other 
nurseries before one can ascertain whether or not children 
do as a rule selectively structure differential relation- 
ships when sharing an environment with several individuals. 
Though the taxonomic system was not difficult to apply, it 
did contain an excessive number of sub -categories both 
from the point of view of stated research goals (i.e., in 
Chapter 4 where the research task was to demonstrate 
thematic consonance) and from the point of view of paring 
data to a minimum (i.e. in Chapters 5 and 6. the ?reject 
theme?, ?reject person? and ?inclusion? categories). 
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Over- categorising did render analyses problematic and thus 
it was necessary to collapse sub -categories into their 
superordinate classifications in order to have sufficient 
data on each group. 
Though I have been endeavouring to argue against the 
thesis of discontinuity between young children's relation- 
ships and those of adults, I have not been able to compare 
their relationships simply because there is a dearth of 
research on naturally occurring interactions in both groups. 
Indeed, Gottman and Parkhurst (1981) encountered a similar 
difficulty in their investigations of dyadic interactions 
in children: 
"Friendship in children and adults has remained 
a private world." (page 198) 
This necessarily places constraints on assertions of 
continuity. Intuitive judgements had to be made about 
the types of processes underlying the formation and main- 
tenance of relationships. 
Whilst acknowledging these constraints, some sugges- 
tions for future research can be made on the basis of 
research conducted here. The results obtained do suggest 
that excessively restrictive paradigms have been employed 
in studies of early peer relations with the result that 
the social capacities of the young child have been under- 
estimated. Social context has been neglected. A record 
of the identity of all children participating in an 
interaction and what transpires between participants appears 
to be central to a consideration of relationships in 
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revealing how children organize their interactions and 
types of relationships that prevail. A prominent 
argument of this thesis has been that isolated behaviours 
cannot in themselves reveal the relational contexts within 
which they occur. Conversations appear to provide an 
invaluable source of information. As noted in Chapter 2, 
many studies employ the broad taxon of 'conversation' or 
'positive interactions which may conceal the complexity 
of young childrents interactions. These criticisms may 
be summarized In the assertion that greater attention 
should be given to the role of communication in the 
formation and maintenance of relationships in young 
children. 
2`?Oa 
Comments on Statistical Analysis in Response to Questions 
from the Examiners. 
Contingency table analyses were undertaken in order to 
assess whether or not the classified behaviours were being 
employed differentially by individuals towards different groups 
of children. This method requires independence of behavioural 
units within an interaction sequence. But, can behaviours 
occurring within an interaction be composed only of discrete 
and independent events? In this thesis, social behaviours 
were assigned discrete classifications and were subsequently 
treated as individual occurrences of particular types of acts, 
as discussed in Chapter 2, page 49 and pages 54 to 55. It 
may be considered that an inflated estimation of behavioural 
frequencies was obtained by coding repetitions, i.e. function- 
ally similar events that occur contiguously, as independent 
events. To obviate this difficulty, a twofold strategy can 
be employed for counting behaviours: 
(i) A group of functionally similar behaviours that occur 
contiguously in one interaction sequence should be 
counted as a single event. To illustrate: 
1) Nancy (4) approaches, 
2) Mary (4): "This is my room" DENY ACCESS 
3) Nancy enters Mary's box 
4) Mary: "No, I sleep here." DENY ACCESS 
For the purposes of statistical analyses, statements 2) 
and 4) would be counted as a single act of 'exclusion'. 
ZQob 
(ii) The above criterion requires a firm definition of each 
interactional sequence in terms of its commencement and 
its termination. This can be problematic in a nursery 
where some children are entering and leaving social 
circles of other children frequently and others, while 
together for the entire period of observation, are inter- 
acting intermittently. Obviously, the period of the 
observation session itself cannot be used to define the 
start or termination of behavioural interactions. These 
difficulties can be resolved by adopting the following 
operational definition of an interaction: 
1) An interaction commences when two children, 
A and B, become involved together in an 
activity or a conversation. 
2) An interaction terminates when 
a) child A or B leaves the area 
b) children A and B commence engagement in 
another activity. 
In the latter case, the independence of 
behavioural units would be assessed on the 
basis of a change in the theme of discourse. 
This tactic would provide a means for analysing 
the interactions of children who are together 
for an entire observation session but who do 
not engage in one sustained interaction. 
A further limitation of the contingency table analysis 
carried out in the thesis is that it is based on data drawn 
from a heterogeneous sample collected over a four -month period. 
The sample comprises children characterized by different 
activity levels who belong to groups of different sizes. The 
analyses by group size for 'exclusion' and 'inclusion' 
(Chapters 5 and 6 respectively) were conducted separately to 
control for this situation. The constraints on analysis 
due to the different activity levels by different children 
are difficult to resolve because they vary widely in an 
uncontrolled way with the state of the child. 
The problems posed by data collected over an extended 
period can be resolved by conducting separate analyses of data 
collected during specific months, i.e. during February, March, 
May and June respectively. This method would enable one to 
ascertain the consistency over time of the recorded behaviours 
and hence, to assess the stability of the observed social 
structure. 
Pseudonym 
PP e.--d ; ,: C11.,- ä , 
Date of Birth 
Arthur 25 .12.74 ) 
Brian 25 .12.74 ) 
Colin 22. 5.74 
Derick 24.12.74 
Edward 20. 3.75 
Fiona 13.11 .74 
George 13. 8.74 ) 
Hanish 13. 8.74 ) 
Iain 11. 7.74 
Jimmy 20. 9.74 
Karen 23.10.74 
Linda 15. 9.74 
Mary 6.11 .74 





21.22-E NAN K lb - f/ÄP1E 3: Total initiation x target frequencies 
A 
TARGE r: 
F G H I J K L M N X Y Z B 0 D E 
I 
rr 
A 0 81 112 122 73 83 29 25 32 31 3 31 11 23 59 42 9 
I B 67 0 91. 63 116 51 33 29 46 16 9 20 31 12 63 30 11 
T 
I a 71 73 0 107 65 23 54- 20 45 23 10 49 15 8 44 20 6 
A 
T D 82 46 143 0 117 44 29 42 82 20 21 22 10 14 36 16 12 
I 
0 E 38 73 52 101 0 78 19 18 17 24 3 19 6 12 52 28 5 
F 49 a 21 12 61 0 67 8 7 8 9 8 4 7 53 51 3 
G 7 19 23 13 8 36 0 42 136 59 7 3 8 6 49 17 10 
H 7 7 8 25 19 5 73 0 11 36 5 6 1 4 48 21 8 
I 7 26 26 61 11 8 96 23 0 66 z 11 14 9 34 27 .8 
J 16 5 12 3 10 6 84 42 82 0 5 6 16 24 58 29 6 
K J 0 2 4 0 1 2 0 7 0 189 13 27 41 29 4 
L 14 8 16 11 12 7 8 8 17 9 208 0 12 20 48 50 14 
M o 4 9 3 1 17 1 1 9 8 10 14 0 83 144 34 2 
N 7 4 2 4 7 5 7 2 5 19 17 11 89 0 69 25 2 
X. 9 15 6 3 29 19 15 10 3 14 22 12 78 49 0 6 1 
Y 32 16 22 4 27 29 14 20 18 31 24 35 30 17 25 0 2 
0 8 7 1 7 0 3 2 3 4 7 0 4 2 0 0 
A to N : Sample children 
X : Younger children 
Y : Teachers 
Z : Adult Visitors 
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OPEN INITIATION - OPEN RESPONSE 





4 5 6 7 8 
R+DEV A.DIV A.3ET N.SIG TAIT 
9 10 11 12 13 
S.ßEP ATHEM INCID PAREN INAPP 
1 INTRO 0 436 46 19 0 0 31 41 25 7 9 6 0 620 
2 RAD 4 360 144 34 5 27 80 65 96 35 50 94 1 1495 
3 TANG 0 164 30 5 0 3 9 25 31 15 10 21 1 314 
4 R+DEV o 36 11 9 0 1 4 10 15 4 4 4 1 99 
5 A. DIV 2 46 7 2 1 38 7 5 7 1 9 6 0 131 
6 A.RET 0 127 25 7 2 2 14 13 23 12 12 18 0 255 
7 N.SIG 19 57 22 10 1 16 189 39 67 3 8 44 0 475 
8 DUT o 65 19 6 1 9 18 39 13 3 6 15 o 194 
9 S.REP 2 83 28 20 4 10 36 23 58 8 7 26 0 305 
10 ATHEM 0 2 3 0 18 27 2 2 6 2 2 3 0 67 
11 INCID 0 7 2 1 39 46 3 4 7 1 4 8 1 123 
12 PAREN. 0 15 1 5 79 74 12 18 15 2 2 24 0 247 
13 INAPP 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 6 
27 1899 338 118 150 253 406 285 364 93 123 271 4 4331 
APP.ENPe X ,2, CH1I.P -gliK 4 
OPEN INITIATION - CLOSED RESPONSE 





3 4 5 6 
A.DIV A.RET S.REP IMIT 
7 8 9 10 
ATRI INCID PAREN INAPP 
1 INTRO 76 7 1 0 o 0 6 1 0 2 93 
2 RAD 86 9 3 2 8 2 16 9 10 0 145 
3 TANG 20 2 0 0 3 0 2 0 3 0 30 
4 R+DEV 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 8 
5 A. DIV 7 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 0 12 
6 A. RET 13 1 0 1 2 0 5 1 2 0 25 
7 N.SIG 50 1 1 2 2 0 12 4 10 3 85 
8 IMIT 8 4 O 3 1 1 1 1 4 0 23 
9 S. REP 20 2 1 1 2 0 5 2 5 0 38 
10 ATIiEM 0 0 7 7 0 0 2 0 0 0 16 
11 INCID 0 0 4 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 8 
12 PAREN 3 0 23 10 0 0 3 0 4 1 44 
13 INAPP 14 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 20 
302 28 41 30 19 3 55 20 43 6 547 
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/4- PP' D X 3 n .CHAIPfER 4 
CLOSED INITIATION - CLOSED RESPONSE 
R E S P O N S E 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
RAD TANG A.DIV A.RET S.REP IMIT ATHEM INCID PAREN INAPP 
1 RAD 126 16 1 2 36 14 6 5 7 6 219 
2 TANG 19 4 2 0 2 7 1 2 0 0 37 
3 A. DIV 17 1 1 0 12 5 2 0 4 2 44 
4 A.RET 10 1 '1 0 5 1 2 0 2 0 22 
S s REP 33 9 3 1 21 5 5 0 3 1 81 
6 IMIT 9 2 1 1 3 10 1 1 0 0 28 
7 ATHEM 3 0 22 3 4 0 3 o 0 o 35 
8 INCID. 0 0 11 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 14 
9 PAREN 6 1 14 2 6 4 1 0 8 0 42 
10 INAPP 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 o 6 
227 34 56 10 91 46 21 9 25 9 528 
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4 5 6 
R+DEV A.DIV A.RET 
- OPEN RESPONSE 
RES PONS E 
10 11 12 13 





1 RAD 2 83 23 1 0 15 31 3 14 8 6 23 713 222 
2 TANG O 11 4 o o 1 2 1 1 1 6 23 13 63 
3 A. DIV 0 8 1 0 0 11 2 2 2 1 0 10 0 37 
4 A. RET 0 3 2 0 O 1 3 O 1 1 2 1 0 14 
5 S.REP o 6 7 0 1 7 1 0 1 o 1 4 0 28 
6.IMIT 1 o 2 0 0 2 0 0 1 o 9 6 13 34 
7 ATriEf+I O 3 o o 3 8 1 o 1 0 1 o 1 18 
8 INCID O 2 0 O O 8 o o 2 0 0 0 O 12 
9 PAREN O 1 O 1 6 5 3 o o o o 5 4 25 
10 INAPP O 1 1 O 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
3 118 40 2 10 59 45 6 23 11 25 72 44 458 
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000 - total frequency (000) - internal interactions, 
000 - external interactions, % 
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